City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2013

From Property Abandonment to Predatory Equity: Writings on
Financialization and Urban Space in New York City
Desiree Justina Fields
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2167
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY:
WRITINGS ON FINANCIALIZATION AND URBAN SPACE IN NEW YORK CITY

by

DESIREE JUSTINA FIELDS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York
2013

	
  

ii

©2013
DESIREE JUSTINA FIELDS
All Rights Reserved

	
  

iii

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
This manuscript has been read and accepted
for the Graduate Faculty in Environmental Psychology
in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Dr. Susan Saegert

____________
Date

_________________________
Chair of Examining Committee

Dr. Maureen O’Connor

____________
Date

_________________________
Executive Officer

Dr. Manuel Aalbers
Dr. David Harvey
Dr. Tarry Hum
Dr. Kathe Newman
___________________________
Supervisory Committee
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

	
  

iv
Abstract
FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY:
WRITINGS ON FINANCIALIZATION AND URBAN SPACE IN NEW YORK CITY
by
Desiree Justina Fields

Adviser: Professor Susan Saegert
Financial markets, actors and imperatives are increasingly central to today’s global capitalism,
even in areas of the economy traditionally distinct from finance, such as real estate. This
financialization changes the role of mortgage capital in urban space from building place-bound
wealth to facilitating the extraction of value from place. This dissertation addresses questions
about how financialization operates in the rental market, specifically its relation to: earlier
processes of urban disinvestment, ongoing social and political struggles around urban space, the
meaning of home and social reproduction. These questions correspond to broader theoretical
debates about the contingent relationship between today’s urban context and landscapes inherited
at the end of the 1970s, the constraints and possibilities for today’s community-based
organizations and the consequences of finance’s permeation into everyday life.

Using qualitative, archival and geographic methods, the research design revolves around a long
temporal frame beginning with the 1970s urban crisis of property abandonment and continuing
through the present. Geographic data was used to analyze relationships between property
abandonment and private equity real estate investment. Archival data and interviews with
veteran (n=11); mid-career (n=5); and emerging (n=9) nonprofit professionals provided insight
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on community responses to disinvestment and financialization. Focus groups (N=5) with tenants
(n=27) addressed social and psychological consequences of financialization.

Today’s financialization of housing shapes uneven geographies of power: finance can make itself
felt in property, but is often beyond the reach of community organizations and the city.
Concentrated in low-income, minority neighborhoods, investors’ financial risks undermined
tenants’ ontological security and social reproduction. Community organizations’ development of
discursive, data-driven and spatial tactics speaks to the political possibilities of contemporary
community practice to contest financialization. The findings are relevant to efforts of community
organizations to contest urban inequality, concerns about planning economically sustainable
cities and policy approaches to affordable rental housing. This study contributes to research on
geographies of financialization; in particular it responds to the need for critical attention to the
socially and spatially uneven nature of processes associated with financialization of the
domestic.
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1
From Property Abandonment to Predatory Equity:
Writings on Financialization and Urban Space in New York City

This dissertation addresses the changing economic, social and political significance of
housing finance and the implications this has for urban space. Mortgage market exclusion was of
critical significance to 1960s and 1970s struggles for urban social justice: activists fought for
access to mortgage capital to build wealth and gain more stability and resident control in lowincome and minority communities. However neoliberal restructuring has made financial markets,
actors and imperatives increasingly central to today’s global capitalism (Fine, 2009; Harvey,
2005, 2011; Stockhammer, 2010). This financialization alters the relationship between mortgage
capital and urban space: as the U.S. foreclosure crisis has shown, today once-underserved
markets suffer from problems of “overinclusion”, socially and economically destabilized by a
flood of high-risk mortgage capital (Newman & Wyly, 2004; Wyly, Atia, Foxcroft, Hammel, &
Phillips-Watts, 2006). Much of the high-risk lending seen at the height of the mid-2000s real
estate bubble was driven by Wall Street demand for mortgage debt to be packaged as securities
and derivatives, becoming financial products within circuits of global capital. Thus
financialization creates new possibilities for extracting value from spatially fixed real estate, and
can work against the interests of local stability and wealth creation (Aalbers, 2008; Gotham,
2009; Newman, 2009).
While the foreclosure crisis was taking shape, and in its wake, critical urban scholars in
geography, planning and sociology have developed a strong knowledge base relating the
integration of housing and financial markets to the reproduction of urban inequality (Aalbers,
2012b; Ashton, 2009; Crump et al., 2008; Immergluck, 2011; Sassen, 2009). Contributing to that
knowledge base, this study extends the focus to rental housing, which is particularly relevant for
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cities. The issues of inflated property values, weakened underwriting standards, rapid turnover
and increased demand for mortgage-backed securities in the early to mid-2000s were not limited
to the homeownership market; they also affected the rental market (Congressional Oversight
Panel, 2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; Parkus & An, 2009). For cities like New
York, which took decades to recover from the urban crisis of the 1970s, these issues raise the
specter of another prolonged period of rental housing instability and deterioration. Meanwhile
ongoing but worsening problems of declining affordability and increasing housing insecurity for
low-income renters mean that financialization threatens to perpetuate existing rental market
inequalities by normalizing risk and heightening market volatility (Pike & Pollard, 2010).
Therefore this dissertation seeks to answer questions about how financialization operates
in the rental market, specifically its relation to: earlier processes of urban disinvestment, ongoing
social and political struggles around urban space, and the meaning of home and social
reproduction. Focusing on multifamily rental housing in New York City, the study is structured
around the city’s crisis of property abandonment arising from the urban disinvestment of the
1970s, and the post-2008 collapse of a mid-2000s wave of aggressive private equity investments
into its affordable rental sector. Housing advocates have termed the latter “predatory equity”
based on the actors involved, the extractive motivations underlying the investments, and parallels
to predatory lending in the homeownership market.1 The questions motivating this dissertation
correspond to broader theoretical debates about the contingent relationship between today’s
urban context and landscapes inherited at the end of the 1970s (Schafran, 2012), the constraints
and possibilities of contemporary community practice in a neoliberal political economy
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More neutral terminology, such as “overleveraged” would also technically describe these purchases, which
leveraged debt far beyond the property’s rental income. I use the term predatory equity to retain the social and
political significance of the investments, which relates to theories of accumulation by dispossession (cf. Harvey, D.
(2012). Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution. New York: Verso.)
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(DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2006; Leitner, Peck, & Sheppard, 2007), and the socio-cultural
consequences of finance’s permeation into everyday life (Allon, 2010; Martin, 2002).
Empirically, this study adds to the knowledge base on geographies of financialization; in
particular it responds to the need for critical attention to the socially and spatially uneven nature
of processes associated with financialization of the domestic (French, Leyshon, & Wainwright,
2011; Pike & Pollard, 2010). As such the research findings are relevant to efforts of community
organizations to contest urban inequality, concerns about planning economically sustainable
cities and policy approaches to affordable rental housing.
I present the findings and interpretations from this dissertation in three manuscripts
intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals. Each manuscript contains a discussion of the
literature most germane to the main themes of the article; because each is meant to be a
standalone piece the three manuscripts overlap somewhat, primarily in giving details of the
housing crises around which the larger study is structured.
Research design and methods
This study asks: How does the financialization of rental housing affect both tenants and the
practices community-based organizations use to preserve affordable rental housing? It further
asks: How does today’s geography of financialization relate to the geography of the 1970s crisis
of property abandonment? To answer these questions I employed qualitative and geographic
research methods and a range of data sources, which I describe in some detail below after
providing an overview of the general research design.
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In relation to rental housing, I define financialization as:
•

A new role for rental housing (and the associated debt) in strategies of capital
accumulation by financial actors (e.g. hedge funds, private equity firms, issuers and
traders of securities and derivatives), and;

•

The application of capital market processes (e.g. rapid turnover of ownership), norms
(high debt leveraging, managing risk through portfolio diversification) and imperatives
(e.g. expectations for double-digit profit growth) to rental housing.
Tenants of rental properties do not purchase property as homeowners do; instead they

make rent payments to a landlord. Therefore the financialization of rental housing may involve
the more direct engagement of new financial actors or entities (such as Real Estate Investment
Trusts, or REITs) in real estate through properties or mortgages, whereas the financialization of
housing in the homeownership market is more commonly understood to involve securities and
derivatives. In this study the financialization of rental housing involves private equity firms
leveraging equity stakes and commercial mortgage loans to purchase multifamily rental
properties, frequently buying out the smaller, more local owners that characterize the U.S. rental
market (Savage, 1998). While a portion of the commercial mortgages that financed these
purchases were securitized, I primarily focus on private equity-as-landlord, how this change in
ownership entailed new assumptions about rates of profit and tenant turnover, and how it
connected the built environment’s fate to the fate of finance markets (Aalbers, 2008).
Despite the spectacle of high-risk lending, house flipping and feverish trading of toxic
mortgage-backed securities that characterized the mid-2000s housing bubble, financialization is
no recent phenomenon. Instead financialization is a recurring response to diminishing returns,
increased competition and erosion of hegemony following a period of sustained expansion
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(Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2009). Thus our most recent financial turn is deeply tied to the
economic crisis conditions of the 1970s, which followed a long period of postwar economic
expansion, and the neoliberal ideology and free market practices emerging from that crisis
(Aalbers, 2012a; Arrighi, 1994).
Drawing on this insight, the design of the present study revolves around a long temporal
frame that begins not with the housing boom of recent years, but with the 1970s urban crisis of
disinvestment and property abandonment. Here Bent Flyvbjerg’s (2001) emphasis on the
production of historically contextualized social scientific knowledge informs my approach.
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that a long view allows for an understanding of how traditions with long
historical roots influence current practices (p. 137). Concurring with this assertion, I use
geographic and archival data and generationally segmented interviewing to examine how the
spatial, social and political contours of the abandonment crisis and the neoliberal restructuring
with which it coincides help produce both the current practices of financialization and the current
tactics of community-based organizations. Finally, although scholarly interest in financialization
has grown, our understanding of the social consequences of finance’s new role in non-financial
realms (French et al., 2011), especially domestic space (Pike & Pollard, 2010), is limited. To that
end I conducted focus groups with tenants affected by predatory equity.
Data
Geographic data
Property abandonment: Most accounts of the city’s property abandonment crisis highlight
Harlem, the South Bronx and central Brooklyn as the most devastated areas; indeed this account
is embedded in the city’s collective memory. However few researchers have used Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) technology to systematically document the geography of property
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abandonment. One study of the Ten Year Capital Plan did map the concentration of housing
units built or rehabilitated per capita under the plan at the community district level, finding a
strong correlation between total Ten Year Plan activity and the district’s amount of city-owned
housing when the Plan began in 1986 (Van Ryzin & Genn, 1999). To address this gap I filed a
Freedom of Information Law request with the New York City Department of Finance (DoF) for
data on all real property transactions for the period covering 1976 (when the city’s vesting of taxdelinquent property sharply increased due to the passage of a “fast foreclosure” law) through
1981 (when the city’s number of vacant buildings peaked, according to Hackworth, 2007). I then
filtered the data for deed transfers between the DoF and the City of New York to measure
vesting of tax delinquent, abandoned property; this process indicated that 20,116 abandoned
properties were taken into city ownership from 1976-1981. I used MapPLUTO tax block
boundary files to geocode these data and then conducted a spatial join, creating a count of
abandoned properties per community district for this period. The lack of digitized, archival taxparcel level data on property characteristics (particularly number of dwelling units) prevents a
calculation of the rate of abandoned properties per community district. Here I referred to data on
the geography of New York’s multifamily housing (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban
Policy, 2010) to contextualize the count of abandoned property in terms of the share of a
community district’s residential units in multifamily rental properties and the average number of
units per property.
Predatory equity: The best available measure of predatory equity is a database of about 1072
properties covering 49,222 housing units. The list of properties was created inductively, through
the on-the-ground work of community-based organizations as they engaged tenants, researched
property owners, and followed market conditions. The Local Initiatives Support Corporation
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then pulled all of this information together and integrated it with data from the Building Indicator
Project (BIP). Using public data on building and housing code violations and liens, BIP
calculates a holistic indicator of multifamily physical and financial distress. The result of
combining the two data sources is a rich database, providing property-level information on
housing characteristics and physical and financial distress. I used this database to calculate the
percent of rental units affected by predatory equity in 56 of New York’s 59 community districts
(excluding Staten Island, which is not represented in the data). I created maps of the results with
GIS, using slightly modified natural breaks to categorize neighborhoods as having 0%, .01-1%,
1.04-4.5% or 5-10% of their rental units affected by predatory equity.
Qualitative data
Generationally segmented interviews: Whereas the geographic data afford a perspective on
how property abandonment and predatory equity relate to each other spatially, qualitative data
from interviews with veteran, mid-career and emerging nonprofit professionals and other key
actors provide insight on changes over time in housing policy and community practice. The
content of these interviews generally revolved around: how organizations initially responded to
property abandonment and how their practice changed as community-based solutions were
integrated into city policy2; the development of tactics to contest predatory equity investments;
key challenges and successes associated with responding to both property abandonment and
predatory equity, and; similarities and differences between the 1970s context of disinvestment
and today’s context of financialization.
Overall I conducted 25 interviews with nine emerging professionals (those doing frontline organizing and programming work), five midcareer professionals (those who began their
careers in the 1990s and are now at the executive director or policy director level) and 11 veteran
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These topics were generally limited to interviews with veteran professionals.
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professionals (those who have been engaged in affordable housing and community development
in New York City since the 1970s). Participants represented six nonprofit organizations with a
citywide focus and eight with a neighborhood-specific focus (I interviewed more than one
individual from five organizations); I also interviewed several representatives from for-profit
affordable housing developers, real estate think tanks, property management companies,
financial institutions and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD).
Archival data, artifacts and gray literature: Materials from the New York City Hall Library
supplemented the generationally segmented interviews and geographic data. Key archival
materials included HPD’s annual reports on the inventory of city-owned property, the triennial
report of the findings from the New York City Housing and Vacancy survey and reports issued
by community organizations. I also employ recent articles from local newspapers and trade
publications (e.g. Crain’s New York Business), press releases issued by government officials and
gray literature in the form of original research conducted by nonprofit organizations and think
tanks (cf. Shultz, Perine, Bahchieva, & Dasgupta, 2012). Artifacts related to predatory equity
such as pamphlets, blog posts and images from protests are an additional data source.
Tenant focus groups: Although there is a contingent of scholars pursuing a sociocultural
approach to financialization, much of this work remains theoretical (cf. Allon, 2010), or situates
these concerns in relation to the “assembly of everyday investor identities” (Langley, 2007, p.
67; Martin, 2002). This study considers how low-income tenants, who are at once distant from
financial machinations and yet intimately affected by them, experience the financialization of
rental housing. To that end I conducted a series of five focus groups (n=8; n=2; n=5; n=9; n=3)
with a total of 27 tenants. All participants were recruited from properties in physical and
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financial distress as a result of excessive debt leveraging. Focus group conversations addressed
changes in participants’ living conditions; the impact of housing deterioration on individual and
household well-being, health and social relationships; how participants understood the distress
they experienced in their buildings (i.e. why this was happening and whether they saw it as
connected to changes in ownership); and action taken in response to housing distress.
Participants represented three different investment portfolios with a total of 20 buildings:
10 in the Northwest Bronx; four in the South Bronx; and four in central Brooklyn. Of these 20
buildings, 10 were represented in the focus groups (six from the Northwest Bronx portfolio, three
from the South Bronx portfolio and one from the central Brooklyn portfolio). The sample was
65% female. All focus group participants were from minority racial/ethnic groups: 48% were
African-American; 25% were from Mexico, Central America or South America; 19% were
Dominican or Puerto Rican; and 8% were Afro-Caribbean American.
Dissertation structure
I use these geographic and qualitative methods and data sources to address questions of
how the financialization of rental housing relates to earlier processes of urban disinvestment,
ongoing social and political struggles around urban space and the meaning of home and social
reproduction. The findings are presented in three standalone writings, starting with the
relationship between property abandonment and predatory equity, proceeding to the social and
psychological implications of financialization and ending with the potential for community
organizations to contest financialization.
The first piece is “From property abandonment to predatory equity: A genealogy of
housing policy and community practice in New York City, 1976-2012”. It draws on the
geographic data on property abandonment and predatory equity, archival data from the City Hall
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Library and generationally segmented interview data (primarily interviews with veteran and
midcareer professionals) to trace a genealogy of housing policy and community practice
developing from the problem of property abandonment. I attend to how different rhythms of
neoliberal restructuring at the local and federal levels first cultivated a central role for
community-based organizations in rehabilitating, owning and managing abandoned property and
then facilitated a dramatic restriction of this role as the city privatized these properties entirely.
Responding to the need to situate today’s finance-led crisis in the neoliberal restructuring that
began in the 1970s, I consider how, in a series of critical junctures, the decisions made about
property abandonment also shape the possible routes for housing policy and community practice
in response to today’s crisis of predatory equity. I ground this temporal analysis in an overview
of the geography of property abandonment and conclude with a discussion of how predatory
equity intersects with property abandonment, including an analysis of the similarities and
differences in the geography of disinvestment and financialization.
The second piece, “The Lived experience of predatory equity: Financialization and the
meaning of home” analyzes tenant focus groups. Addressing a key gap in the literature on
financialization, the article considers the socio-spatial consequences of the financialization of
housing. The risk and volatility associated with financialization reproduce housing insecurity and
undermine the meaning of home for low-income and minority renters. In making visible how
financialization plays out at the level of lived experience, this piece contributes to recent efforts
to theorize changing social relations of rent (Wyly, Moos, Hammel, & Kabahizi, 2009). It also
speaks to the need to develop social, political and policy efforts that can hold financial actors
accountable. This question increasingly relevant to the broader U.S. context, in which hedge
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funds and private equity firms are encroaching into the landscape of foreclosed single-family
properties to operate as large-scale rental housing (Gittelsohn, 2012).
The third and final substantive piece of this dissertation, “Contesting the financialization
of urban space: Community organizations and the struggle to preserve affordable rental housing
in New York City” is primarily based on analysis of the generationally segmented interviews as
well as artifacts and gray literature. In many ways this article picks up where the first piece ends,
focusing on how community organizations contend with financialization in their practice to
preserve affordable rental housing. Mindful of the challenges and constraints neoliberalism poses
for community groups, the piece analyzes their responses to predatory equity in terms of how
organizations developed effective and innovative practices and forms of engagement as a means
of contesting financialization. I offer a positive reading of the political possibilities for
contemporary community practice, contributing to efforts to decenter neoliberalism in urban
theory.
Following these articles I provide a brief concluding piece in which I consider the
strengths and limitations of the study, its theoretical and empirical contributions and the
questions this dissertation has generated for future research.
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In New York City, the significance of financialization cannot be understood without situating it
in historical context of the disinvestment and abandonment the city faced in the 1970s and early
1980s. This paper concerns a mid-2000s wave of aggressive private equity investment into New
York’s affordable rental market (known as “predatory equity) and the genealogy of housing
policy and community practice linking this moment with the city’s 1970s property abandonment
crisis. I draw on a wide range of data sources, including interviews with veteran, midcareer and
emerging nonprofit professionals; archival data on property abandonment; and a contemporary
database of overleveraged multifamily properties. The resulting analysis temporalizes the
genealogy of housing policy and community practice as unfolding in a series of critical junctures
that shaped a broad public role for the city and nonprofit organizations in developing affordable,
often community-or resident-controlled housing from 1978 until the privatization of city-owned
housing in 1995. Today’s financialization of housing shapes uneven geographies of power:
finance can make itself felt in property, while the territory of finance is frequently beyond the
reach of community organizations and the city. This signals a new critical juncture and an
imperative to develop new spatial tactics of contesting finance.
Keywords: temporality, financialization, community development, urbanization, power
geographies
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From property abandonment to predatory equity: A genealogy of housing policy and
community practice in New York City, 1976-2012
“There used to be a lot of abandoned buildings. And those slowly but surely, have all been
renovated...And then, all of a sudden, you've got -- at least with the Ocelot buildings-- buildings
going completely vacant, because they were so bad.” (Gregory Lobo Jost, University
Neighborhood Housing Program)
“The entire Bronx is underwater [overmortgaged]… the number of buildings either in
foreclosure or headed to foreclosure, or being re-speculated on, or in horrible physical
condition...it brings up memories of the 60s and 70s, the Bronx could easily get to that point.”
(Dina Levy, Urban Homesteading Assistance Board)
“So, they had this much space to operate in [during the 1970s abandonment crisis]; now, we
have this much space [much less, compared to the 1970s] to operate in…. And so, we're left with
not being able to shape the solutions, but being able to kind of operate within the margins of the
solutions that are shaped for us.” (Benjamin Dulchin, Association for Neighborhood and
Housing Development).
The New York City real estate market of the 2000s, with its development boom, bidding
wars and historic deals,1 seemed to speak to how far the city had come from the urban decay of
the 1970s—the days of burning buildings, when “planned shrinkage” was on the policy agenda.
Indeed, rather than being starved of real estate capital, in the 2000s the city’s multifamily rental
market, which houses over two million New Yorkers, was awash with financing. From 20052009 private equity investors bought up 100,000 units of housing in the city’s private, rentregulated market (roughly 10% of that sector’s supply) (Association for Neighborhood and
Housing Development, 2009, hereafter ANHD 2009). Through buying up portfolios as large as
50 buildings, private equity investors quickly crowded out many longtime local operators. The
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Such as the $5.4 billion sale of the Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village development (with almost 12,000
dwelling units total) in 2006, then the biggest real estate deal in the country’s history. The buyers, BlackRock Realty
and Tishman-Speyer Properties, anticipated the properties’ income would triple within just five years of purchase,
but defaulted on their mortgage obligations in 2010.
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purchases were also heavily debt-leveraged, with prices inflated by the real estate boom,
exuberance about continuously rising property values and by investors’ expectations they would
use tenant turnover and rent increases to move units out of rent regulations and secure marketrate returns (ANHD,

2009; Center for Urban Pedagogy, 2009). This strategy earned the

investments the moniker “predatory equity”, which advocates coined to highlight both the actors
involved in the investments2 and their extractive nature. The term also links this issue in the
rental market to popular understandings of the dangers of predatory lending in the single-family
foreclosure crisis. Many predatory equity investments were overleveraged (with mortgage debt
far outweighing current rental income even when typical rates of tenant turnover are take into
account) before the 2008 economic collapse led to their financial unraveling, which has now
caused physical distress and increased vacancies reminiscent of the 1970s in many buildings.
The financial and physical distress associated with overleveraged private equity real
estate investment threatens the decades of work it took the city to recover from the disinvestment
and decline of the 1970s. The quotes from affordable housing and community development
professionals that open this paper show how the crisis of the present moment calls up fears of
history repeating itself. However they also point to intervening processes that mark important
differences between past and present—the slow but sure renovation of abandoned buildings by
nonprofit organizations, as well as a constrained role for the same organizations in shaping
solutions to today’s crisis. The past is living in the present for the city’s nonprofit housing and
neighborhood organizations in a way that urges us to pay attention the simultaneities,
interactions and inequalities through which past and present co-exist (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]).
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While private equity firms were not the only actors using heavy debt leverage to purchase affordable rental
properties, they represented a large segment of such activity in New York City, and a substantially new kind of actor
to affordable housing and community development groups.
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This paper uses today’s finance-led disturbance of the urban housing market as a point of
departure for analyzing how the character and direction of local housing policy and community
practice developed out of New York City’s landlord abandonment crisis, when the city became
“landlord of last resort” for nearly 40,000 families. Occurring in the wake of New York’s 1976
fiscal breakdown, this lineage is inextricable from neoliberal restructuring and the turn toward
urban-led capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005; Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]). With urban space as both
site and object of political economic strategy, parameters for local policy and development have
emerged that privilege corporate interests, particularly developers and bankers (Brenner &
Theodore, 2002; Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]; Moody, 2007; Sites, 1997; Sites, Chaskin, & Parks,
2007). Writing of “the urban problematic” in 1970, Lefebvre warned of the ‘fragmented analytic
tools’ available to comprehend urban society. More than thirty years later, Neil Smith reflected
on the stakes with the understandings and concepts developed since: “highly mobile global
capital increasingly descends to and aspires to the remake of urban centers; at the same time
there is a more seamless collaboration among property capital, the state, retail capital and
financial capital than at any previous time” (Smith in Lefebvre 2003 [1970], p. xxi). From this
vantage point, we are better equipped to “examine and situate the realized” (Lefebvre 2003
[1970], p. 23) and consider its significance for the present moment.
Neoliberal restructuring is rarely “pure”—instead, market-oriented reforms encounter
specific geographic, political and historical contexts, entailing a range of uneven trajectories and
outcomes in particular places (Brenner and Theodore 2002). Here I draw on Bent Flyvbjerg’s
(2001) view that such context-dependence “does not mean just a more complex kind of
determinism” but “an open-ended, contingent relationship between contexts, actions and
interpretations” (p. 43) that unfolds over time. This perspective informs my approach to crafting
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a genealogy of housing policy and community practice from New York City’s landlord
abandonment crisis of the 1970s to today’s crisis of predatory private equity investments. After
McLeod and Thomson (2009), I use genealogy not as a linear, progressive narrative of history,
but as a method to “problematize the present, examining the diverse contingencies, unpredictable
events and conditions of possibility that enable and produce the present” (p. 49).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, I provide more background on
the context in which the landlord abandonment crisis emerged from a confluence of global,
national and local circumstances. Then I situate property abandonment in relation to the
transition to a postindustrial urban economy and financialization, which leads into a more
detailed explanation of the emergence of private equity real estate investment in New York
City’s affordable rental housing. With this background in place, I ground the discussion to follow
in the geography of landlord abandonment, based on archival data provided by the NYC
Department of Finance.3 Finally I present the lineage of policy and practice connecting past and
present. This is the heart of the paper, drawing on multiple data sources including:
•

Interviews with veteran, midcareer and emerging affordable housing and community
development professionals4;

•

Reports and publications from the archives of the New York City Hall Library; and

•

A range of secondary sources such as newspaper and magazine articles and academic
research.

Temporally, organizational and policy and policy responses to landlord abandonment can
be broken down into four periods: contestation and fragmentation (pre-1978); professionalization
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3

Appendix 1 provides an overview of the methodology for defining and measuring property abandonment. is
provided in Appendix 1.
4
A complete list of interview participants is provided in Appendix 2.
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(1978-1986); opening the pipeline (1986-1994); and privatization (1994-the present). I organize
this genealogy around a series of critical junctures that mark key policy shifts in the city’s
approach to property abandonment (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Critical junctures and phases of policy and practice in responding to property
abandonment.

The practice of activists, community-based affordable housing organizations and
community development corporations is (partially) constitutive of these shifts, and (partially)
constituted through them. Here I use the idea of the critical juncture to indicate how local
pressures intersect with broader social forces, market and economic conditions and political
conflicts to prompt movements in policy. In presenting this lineage, I work to show that divisions
between time periods are rarely ruptures so much as transitional spaces where the old and the
new bleed into one another. I also attend to the ways in which both policy and practice stand in
relationship to the temporal cycle of neoliberal restructuring at the federal level. Indeed the
broader trajectory of housing policy and community practice from the 1970s to the present rests
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in large part on contingencies between the rhythm and character of changes at the federal, state
and local level. By way of conclusion I discuss points of social, political and spatial resonance
where the past is very much present in thinking and action around predatory equity.
Background
Clearing the ground
Occurring at a moment when cities were becoming “increasingly important geographic
targets and institutional laboratories for neoliberal policy experiments” (Brenner and Theodore
2002, p. 368), New York City’s fiscal crisis made it an important test case for neoliberal reforms
(Harvey 2005). Generally, deregulation (especially in banking and finance) and devolution of
responsibility from the federal level and privatization of social welfare posed particular
challenges for cities as federal aid declined and capital mobility increased (Brenner & Theodore,
2002; Hackworth, 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002). This pushed localities to find new ways to attract
and retain capital. In New York, the post-fiscal crisis restructuring of the city’s finances slashed
public spending on social welfare was (Tabb 1982) and devoted an increasing share of public
money to assisting growing sectors of the economy: finance, insurance and real estate
(Hackworth 2007).
By the 1970s the slow disaster of urban decline had been unfolding for decades, but
economic and fiscal crisis placed the city’s housing stock under acute distress. As owning and
operating a multifamily rental property became less economically viable, landlords sought to
extract capital to reinvest elsewhere (Smith, 1979). At first this took the form of cutting back on
maintenance and services, but many times equity stripping culminated in arson (to receive
insurance money) or owners simply walking away and forfeiting property claims by defaulting
on real estate taxes. This process created housing shortage as the worst units were removed from
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the market (contributing to displacement and renters living in overcrowded or uninhabitable
conditions). It also worsened New York’s fiscal problems since then, as now, property taxes
dominated the city’s tax system (Edgerton, Haughwout, & Rosen, 2004). From 1970-1978, New
York City lost 40,000 housing units a year to abandonment (Braconi, 1999), contributing to
devastating blight, particularly in central Brooklyn, Harlem and the South Bronx.
Leaving the city with ownership of a vast underperforming market in land and housing,
in some ways the abandonment crisis may be seen as an example of ‘creative destruction’ (cf.
Brenner and Theodore 2002). Housing obsolescence and land depreciation cleared the ground at
the turn to neoliberal urbanization, translating to profitable redevelopment possibilities and new
investment opportunities (Smith, 1979; Weber, 2002). Rebuilding the city’s neighborhoods
would be integral to rebuilding the (postindustrial) urban economy--one oriented around global
exports of finance, insurance and real estate services instead of goods (Hackworth, 2007; Moody,
2007).
Indeed economic liberalization has made financial markets and actors increasingly central
to the workings of capitalism, as the state has deregulated the banking and finance sectors and
opened up global capital flows (Fine, 2009; Krippner, 2005; Stockhammer, 2010). Aalbers
(2008) argues that the process of financialization entails a switching of capital from the primary
(manufacturing and industrial production), secondary (production and consumption of the built
environment) and tertiary (investments in social infrastructure, e.g. science, healthcare,
education) circuits of capital to a fourth, financial, circuit. The neoliberal restructuring
undertaken as Western economic hegemony began to unravel in the 1970s was crucial to the
financialization of the economy and promoting the rise of finance markets generally (Krippner,
2011); developments in federal banking and housing policy have especially contributed to the
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restructuring of the housing and mortgage markets in ways that link them heavily with financial
markets (Aalbers, 2008; Gotham, 2009; Immergluck, 2009). Thus demand for mortgages from
which to develop securities and derivatives drove much of the high-risk and predatory lending
practices that in turn contributed exponentially to the severity of the U.S. foreclosure crisis and
ensuing global financial crisis and economic downturn (Aalbers, 2008; Gotham, 2009; Newman,
2009). The foreclosure crisis has been widespread, but profoundly uneven, intersecting with
older frameworks of racial inequality to result in disproportionate impacts of high-risk lending
for low-income and minority communities and African-American female-headed households
(Wyly, Moos, Hammel, & Kabahizi, 2009). Meanwhile upstream actors have even profited from
the housing market collapse (Morgenson & Story, 2009; Story & Morgenson, 2010). The
financialization of housing thus changes the role of mortgage capital in local communities from
facilitating borrowers’ access to credit to facilitating global investment (Aalbers, 2008).
These dynamics affirm Pike and Pollard’s (2010) caution about the potential for
financialization to reproduce existing structures of inequality, or create new ones. In this research
I pursue concerns about financialization and inequality, but extend the focus of existing work to
include multifamily rental housing (buildings with 5 or more dwelling units) affected by private
equity real estate investment. Although many scholars have addressed this dynamic through
mortgage securitization, there are many ways of employing mortgage finance to transcend real
estate’s spatial fixity, depending on the actors involved and the tools at their disposal. For
example, private equity firms operate through leveraging equity and debt to acquire assets: to a
great extent profit depends not on the asset’s condition (or location), but on the degree of credit
capital leveraged (Linneman, 2004). Should the leveraged debt become distressed, this can be the
basis of another financial product; indeed distressed debt market has evolved from a concept to a
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global investment market since the early 1990s (DuPonte, 2010). Here I turn to the case of
predatory equity to consider the dynamics of financialization in multifamily rental housing.
Predatory equity
Like the single-family market, in the recent real estate bubble the multifamily market also
experienced inflated property values, weakened underwriting standards, rapid turnover, and
increased demand for mortgage-backed securities (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Joint
Center for Housing Studies, 2011b; Parkus & An, 2009). Also similar to the single-family
market, since 2008 the multifamily market has had a rapid downturn, increased delinquencies
and foreclosures (especially on securitized loans), and a credit freeze (Congressional Oversight
Panel, 2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b; Parkus & An, 2009).
Instability in the multifamily market threatens to magnify renters’ existing vulnerabilities.
At $33,000 a year, their income is half the national median, and falling: renters are increasingly
at the bottom of the income scale. Racial income disparities persist within the category of
renters: Hispanic renters’ income is 15% lower than their white counterparts; for Black renters
the disparity is 30% (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011a). The loss of homeownership to
foreclosure and the impact of the Great Recession has increased the number of (financially
stressed) renters; however there has also been an accelerated decline in rental affordability since
2001 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b and b). Nationwide more than a quarter (26%) of
renters faced severe rental cost burden in 2009 (paying more than half of income for housing
costs), up from 21% in 2001 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011a). In light of the role
financial practices played in the foreclosure crisis and global economic downturn, urban scholars
must attend to how financial actors shape urban space, the social consequences of such
transformations and how to work within (and contest) these conditions to create more just cities.
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Beyond the foreclosure crisis, what is the relationship between the financialization of housing
and the reproduction of urban inequality?
The case of predatory equity in New York City illustrates the growing role of financial
actors in the rental housing market. In the mid-2000s stock market returns were low, and the real
estate bubble had just about saturated other parts of the housing market--but a flood of mortgage
financing was still available. Investors sought new investment opportunities, and rent-stabilized
housing presented one such frontier for capital to expand into. State laws limiting rent increases
to a formula set annually by the Rent Guidelines Board protect these units from the open market.
However rent laws were weakened in in the 1990s, making it possible to deregulate stabilized
units once their rent exceeds $2000 ($2500 as of 2011) and introducing mechanisms that help
landlords move units toward deregulation, such as vacancy bonuses and major capital
improvement increases.5
Private equity funds, which generally target undervalued or distressed assets, were
especially attracted to the rent-regulated market: from their perspective, the regulations make
multifamily housing an underperforming asset. Weakened rent laws provided a motivation
(potential to deregulate) and a mechanism (vacancy bonuses and major capital improvements)
for private equity to exploit untapped value, and funds began targeting the rent-regulated sector
with aggressive purchases that added up to 100,000 housing units (10% of the total stock of rentstabilized units) between 2005 and 2009 (ANHD, 2009). In short investors aimed to open up
value by raising rents on units where legal protections kept rents below market value until the
units were deregulated and investors could charge prevailing market rents.6
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Allowing owners to respectively increase rent 20% each time a unit turns over to a new tenant, and pass on some
of the costs of upgrading to tenants but the program is subject to fraud (ANHD 2009b).
6
In 2008 the average rent in multifamily buildings not covered by rent regulations was $2700/month.
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Of course, rental housing is defined by its dual nature as a business for owners and a
home for tenants. But it is typically an illiquid investment with moderate profits spread out over
many years—7-8% a year in rent-regulated housing, whereas private equity investors typically
seek 16-20% annual returns over a period of 3-10 years. The purchases also stood out because of
the extremely inflated prices investors paid. In fact many deals started out “overleveraged” (or
underwater or upside-down): loaded with debt that far outweighed their income. In one example,
a group of 10 major predatory equity portfolios covering 27,000 rental units had a debt-service
coverage ratio of only 55 cents in income for every dollar of debt (ANHD, 2009).
This kind of high-risk leveraging is characteristic of private equity strategy, and loan
underwriting documents clearly laid out plans to keep the deals afloat through promoting
attrition and raising rents to market rates, and reducing maintenance and operating costs. Indeed,
investors projected tenant turnover rates of 20-30% within a year after purchase, whereas the
actual rate of attrition in rent-regulated housing is 5-6% a year. The anticipated income increases
that would be achieved by flipping units out of regulation at this rate would only be possible
through aggressively displacing tenants paying affordable rents. Community organizations found
high rates of eviction, illegal rent increases, and systematic strategies of harassment aimed at
hastening vacancies in properties that private equity funds purchased (ANHD, 2009; Chiwaya et
al., 2011; Morgenson, 2008).
Since the market downturn in 2008, unsustainable debt has come to the fore as many
deals have become financially unsupportable, standing at risk of (or already in) default or
foreclosure (ANHD, 2009; Morgenson, 2008) In 2009 more than 70,000 units of New York
City’s affordable rental housing (rent-regulated, former Mitchell Lama, and project-based
Section 8) were potentially overleveraged (Shultz, Walsh, & Levy, 2010), with debt exceeding
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net rental income. Financial distress has entailed physical deterioration, creating unsafe living
conditions for tenants (Fields, in preparation). Banks have been reluctant to write down debts to
more sustainable levels, but tightened underwriting standards limit the potential to refinance
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Parkus & An, 2009; Shultz, 2009). Instead a market in
distressed debt has emerged, contributing to market churning and piling more debt on an already
overleveraged loan, thereby increasing the risk of further decline (ANHD 2009; Shultz, 2009).
Beyond the perils to current tenants’ housing security and the potential for significant
erosion of rent-regulated housing generally, predatory equity has also generated fears about
housing deterioration and instability potentially setting off a larger and more prolonged cycle of
neighborhood decline (c.f. Shultz, Perine, Bahchieva, & Dasgupta, 2012) similar to the crisis of
the 1970s. Indeed, landlord abandonment looms large in narratives about financialization: in
talking with affordable housing and community development professionals about predatory
equity, many discussed today in terms of its connection to the past and their own personal,
organizational and professional histories:
“When I walked through some of these buildings, I'm doing this for so long, and
I'm like oh my god, I feel like I rolled my life back 20 years-- there's not supposed
to be buildings like this. I thought we fixed all these buildings.” (Ismene
Speliotis, Mutual Housing Association of New York)
‘Examining and situating the realized’
Fiscal discipline and the landlord of last resort
There is good reason to fear a return to that time in the late 1970s, when the city’s fiscal
instability ultimately tipped property abandonment into a crisis. Because the city wouldn’t
repossess properties for property tax default for ten years, landlords frequently stopped paying
taxes and providing services while continuing to collect rent (Shepard, 2012). As the city’s fiscal

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
29
	
  
problems mounted in the early 1970s it reduced the number of years before it repossessed
property—first from ten years to five years, then to three years (Shepard, 2012). The creation of
the Emergency Financial Control Board, created by the state legislature to control the city’s
financial dealings as part of its rescue from fiscal crisis (Tabb, 1982) meant an onset of
discipline, and the city passed Local Law #45 in 1976: abandoned buildings would revert to city
ownership after only one year of unpaid property taxes. The law was primarily a fiscal measure
to encourage delinquent property owners to pay their taxes and, failing that, to seize buildings
and return them to the private market before they underwent prolonged disinvestment (Gliedman
& Raymond, 1979). Instead the city became the landlord of last resort for thousands of properties
overnight: by 1979 it owned 11,717 vacant and occupied residential properties, serving as
landlord for 35,000 households; another 47,406 buildings were at risk of tax foreclosure, with
three or more quarters of tax arrears (Gliedman and Raymond 1979).
Local Law #45 represents an initial critical juncture that would set in motion a series of
developments in response to the problem of landlord abandonment and city-owned property. For
nearly two decades after the law initially backfired, the city became increasingly involved in
producing and preserving affordable housing--even as neoliberal austerity measures following
the 1975 fiscal crisis dismantled (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002) many of the
social democratic institutions that defined postwar New York (Freeman, 2001; Moody, 2007).
The development of responses to abandonment and strategies for in rem housing is deeply
intertwined with the process of neoliberalization, and with the urban community movements that
emerged inresponse to disinvestment and austerity. As it alternately promoted and adjusted to
neoliberal reforms, the city relied substantially on public-private partnerships with diverse
stakeholders such as community-based organizations, activists and tenant associations, deploying
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nonprofit and resident-controlled solutions to property abandonment (DeFilippis, 2003;
DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2006; Krinsky, 2006, 2011).
The sheer scale of property abandonment and its impact on neighborhoods necessitated
dramatic intervention on the part of the city. While compelled to respond, it lacked the fiscal and
organizational capacity to do so effectively, and turned to community organizations and activist
groups that had been working to address disinvestment since the late 1960s and early 1970s as
partners. Landlord abandonment thus had a tremendous influence in subsequent housing policy
and urban development, and social and political organization around housing. Today, it is the
local structures, institutions and organizations emerging from the abandonment crisis that are
tasked with responding to the problem of predatory equity, while the city has developed
structures to avoid becoming the owner of last resort again. This lineage paints a “more complex
and complicated picture” (Jessop, 2002, p. 464) of New York City’s restructuring in the
neoliberal era, in which some institutions were dismantled while others were (re)constructed,
revealing how “roll-back” and “roll-out” reforms are but facets in the same process (Krinsky
2011), unfolding at different speeds at different scales and in different sectors.
Before proceeding with a discussion of how housing policy and community practice
developed in and beyond the landlord abandonment crisis, I set this history in geographic and
social context using archival data from the New York City Department of Finance on transfers of
property vested to city ownership under in rem proceedings, and from City Hall Library on the
demographics of residents of city-owned property.7 This paper does not offer a systematic
analysis of neighborhood change over time in relation to housing policy and the practice of
nonprofit affordable housing and community development organizations. Nevertheless the
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For further information on these data and methods, see Appendix 1.
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abandonment crisis had strong geographic dynamics that were important in developing policies
and programs to address disinvestment. Moreover the uneven contours of property abandonment
intersect with broader processes of urban change in recent decades, and today still coincide with
enduring problems of racialized poverty, housing insecurity and health risks. Later in the paper, I
return to the geography of property abandonment to consider its relationship to the spatial
contours of predatory equity investments today.
Having established the geographic and social context of property abandonment I turn to
the heart of this piece. I trace a genealogy of housing policy and community practice in order to
better understand its significance in today’s context of financialization. In the years leading up to
and just after the passage of Local Law #45, the community determination movement contested
the impact of disinvestment and state austerity in low-income and minority communities. These
efforts were largely fragmented from the city’s approach to property abandonment, which was
mainly fiscal in orientation until 1978, when it began to incorporate community and residentcontrolled housing into policy, forming the Division of Alternative Management Programs
(DAMP). The creation of DAMP also entailed the professionalization of the neighborhood
housing movement. The Ten Year Capital Plan (1986-1997) to rebuild housing and
neighborhoods augured the further professionalization and expansion of the nonprofit sector, and
also widened the city’s role in developing affordable housing. City capital funds from the sale of
municipal bonds, federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and foundation funding all shaped a
housing development pipeline for community-based organizations in this period. In 1994 a
fourth critical juncture abruptly changed the tack of previous iterations of the city’s approach to
abandoned property: Mayor Rudolph Giuliani privatized the inventory of city-owned housing,
removed development concessions to community-based organizations, and crafted new
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governance structures to ensure that a return to the city as “landlord of last resort” would not be
possible.
Rather than a linear historical narrative, I am interested in temporalizing shifts in
strategy, tactics and assumptions about the in rem housing stock, and articulating their relation to
broader, concurrent processes of (urban) political economic restructuring. This genealogy heeds
Haydu’s (1998) caution that the choices emerging from critical junctures don’t only tack in one
direction or another, but “may also precipitate later crises, structure available options and shape
the choices made at those junctures” (p. 353). While presented as a chronology, this analysis
doesn’t view critical junctures as “stations along a historical track” (Haydu 1998, p. 353) but as
moments of contingency producing multiple paths through history’s “dynamic and cluttered field
of eruptions, forces, emergences and partial formations” (Brown 2001, quoted in McLeod and
Thomson 2009, p. 50). Thus the narrative to follow doesn’t treat earlier moments as wholly
deterministic of subsequent ones, and I work to convey some of the messiness with which
different moments and rhythms of change intermingle.
Spaces of abandonment
Few neighborhoods were untouched by property abandonment, but within the first two
years of in rem8 vestings, losses were worst in the south and west Bronx, upper Manhattan, and
central Brooklyn. From the enactment of Local Law #45 to 1979, more than 20% of units in
south and west Bronx community districts 1-6 (40% of units in district three), Manhattan
districts 10 and 11 (Central and East Harlem) and Brooklyn district 3 (Bedford-Stuyvesant) were
taken into city ownership after property owners walked away (Gliedman and Raymond 1979).
Based on archival data on real estate transactions from 1976-1981, the city completed tax
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In rem is Latin for “against the thing”. This is a legal term describing the exercise of court power over property as
opposed to the person.
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foreclosure and seized more than 20,000 (20,164) parcels from delinquent owners within five
years of the passage of Local Law #45. Brooklyn had the greatest number of abandoned
properties9 by far (9603), followed by the Bronx (3792) and Manhattan (3630), then Queens
(2735) (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Number of in rem properties by borough, 1976-1981

9603

3630

3792

Manhattan

Bronx

2735

Brooklyn

Queens

Unfortunately data limitations do not allow for an analysis of the rate of abandoned properties or
percentage of rental units taken into city ownership. However it is important to note that higherdensity buildings are concentrated in the Bronx and Manhattan and thus abandonment’s impact
was probably greatest in these boroughs in terms of the share of housing units affected. Some
Brooklyn and Queens neighborhoods had more than a thousand abandoned properties, but the
housing in these boroughs is generally lower-density, especially Queens where most of the city’s
single-family homes are located (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010a). This
reflects the historical geography of the city’s boroughs, with large old buildings concentrated in
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The data is at the tax lot level. While it is possible for a lot to have more than one property on it, generally New
York City tax lots have one residential property. In the case of condominiums, each unit is treated as an individual
tax lot; however condominiums didn’t take hold in New York until the 1980s. Thus I refer to tax lots seized for
nonpayment of real estate taxes as “abandoned properties”.
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working class parts of the Bronx and Manhattan near major subway lines (and to a lesser extent,
Brooklyn).
As shown in Figure 1.3, of the city’s 59 community districts, thirteen had more than 500
properties (ranging to more than 2000) seized in this period, accounting for 12,894 properties
overall, or almost two-thirds (64%) of the total number of abandoned properties citywide. Six of
these neighborhoods (Carroll Gardens/Park Slope, Bedford Stuyvesant, East New York,
Brownsville, Crown Heights, Bushwick and) are in Brooklyn, fanning across the center of the
borough into its eastern border with Queens. Only one community district in Queens—Hollis, in
Southeast Queens, had more than 500 properties abandoned from 1976-1981. Manhattan had
three such neighborhoods: Central and East Harlem in upper Manhattan, and the Lower East
Side. In the Bronx, the strip of three community districts running straight up the center of the
borough all had more than 500 abandoned properties: from Mott Haven in the South Bronx to
Morrisania, and stretching up to the Bathgate and East Tremont sections of the borough around
Crotona Park.
Highlighting upper Manhattan, the South Bronx, central Brooklyn and southeast Queens
as areas where the city was most active in taking ownership of abandoned properties, this
analysis is consistent with most accounts of landlord abandonment and the areas emphasized in
subsequent city policies and housing programs (Braconi, 1999; Schill, Ellen, Schwartz, & Voicu,
2002; Schwartz, 1999; Van Ryzin & Genn, 1999). As shown in Table 1.1, residents of occupied
in rem housing were overwhelmingly African-American (53% vs. 23%) and Puerto Rican (24%
vs. 14%) compared to the share of minorities among renters as a whole, and were much more
likely to be in poverty, receiving public assistance, burdened by housing costs, and living in
overcrowded conditions (Stegman, 1981).
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of households in the in rem stock, 1981 (Source: New York City
Housing and Vacancy Survey 1981)
Percent of households that are…
White
Black
Puerto Rican
Female-headed
Living with at least one child
Living in overcrowded conditions
Receiving public assistance
Earning income below the federal poverty line
Burdened by housing costs and not receiving public assistance

In rem
renters
18.6
53.5
24.1
57.9
41.5
16.1
29.7
45.8
34.1

All
renters
57.1
23.4
13.1
46.9
28.5
8.2
13.3
25.3
31.2

Figure 1.3: Community districts with > 500 in rem properties, 1976-1981. Data: NYC
Department of Finance (via a Freedom of Information Law request).
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Temporality of responses to abandonment

36

Contestation and fragmentation (pre-1978). Although abandonment accelerated rapidly under
Local Law #45, owners had been walking away from their properties for several years prior to
the law’s passage. Initially treating abandonment as a fiscal issue, the city’s Department of Real
Estate resold buildings taken into city ownership at auction. This was an attempt to recoup lost
tax revenues but given many properties’ marginal economic quality after years of decline plus a
context of high inflation, high maintenance costs (especially the cost of heating oil) and lack of
financing, the auctions didn’t attract buyers with an eye to long-term investment. Further, the
city didn’t require new owners to improve property conditions, which only added to housing
deterioration (Sierra, 1992). This approach turned out to be costly, as it was not unusual for new
owners to purchase a building, pocket several months of rent payments, and then walk away
without ever paying real estate taxes. This process of equity stripping came to be known as
“milking the building”. After being milked, abandoned properties often fell back into city
ownership vacant, further deteriorated and with additional unpaid taxes and liens (Gliedman &
Elstein, 1975; Gliedman & Raymond, 1979).
Amidst this churning at the bottom of the rental market, tenant organizers, community
organizations and activist professionals had been building a movement to keep tenants in
buildings, improve living conditions and hold landlords accountable since the early 1970s and
before (Schur & Sherry, 1977). New York City has a long history of tenant and community
activism around housing. Tenants had been employing different forms of rent strikes since the
early 1900s, but as housing abandonment and neighborhood decline spread in the 1970s, tenants
became both more organized and more frustrated: rent strikes simply couldn’t be effective in
improving conditions if there was no landlord (Lawson 1984). In the vacuum formed by
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disinvestment and the city’s failure to act on the housing crisis, this meant a turn toward more
direct control of buildings by tenants, and the emergence of community organizations taking on
basic neighborhood preservation work (Lawson, 1984; Schur & Sherry, 1977; interview with
Roger Hayes, 2011). The self-help housing movement (known alternately as the community
determination movement, or the neighborhood housing movement) of the 1960s and 70s
emphasized community and resident-controlled nonprofit housing in disinvested neighborhoods
(DeFilippis 2003). Reflecting the geography of property abandonment and the demographics of
in rem housing residents, the class and racial politics of the movement were deeply local and
rooted in the struggles of poor African-American and Latino tenants.
Race was a major context for the realities of urban life in the 1970s. Midcentury urban
renewal projects (such as the construction of the Cross-Bronx Expressway, Lincoln Center and
public housing in Harlem) had (further) divided the already-segregated city by race and class,
displacing minority residents and communities from the urban core (Berman, 1982; Zipp, 2010).
In the 1960s the city experienced massive white flight as 700,000 white residents departed, often
induced by the rental market speculators cutting back on maintenance, subdividing units and
renting to low-income and minority tenants (Sanjek, 2000). New York’s minority population also
grew that decade, adding 500,000 African-American residents; in 1970 25% of the city’s black
residents were living in poverty as the economic opportunity that drew many migrants from the
South evaporated (Sanjek, 2000). Growing joblessness associated with deindustrialization, and
the loss of housing units associated with demolition, arson and abandonment both dramatically
increased the need for affordable housing among minorities. Even as these residents faced
unemployment, violent racism (incidents sparking riots in Harlem and Crown Heights) and
inferior housing, reforms imposed in the wake of the city’s fiscal crisis led to a withdrawal of
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public support for minority communities. Sanitation, police and fire services were all decreased;
public heath resources including hospitals, neighborhood health centers, drug treatment programs
and TB-screening clinics closed; programs for youth and senior citizens scaled back; public
library hours curtailed; tuition was imposed at the formerly free City University of New York;
subway fares hiked; and public sector workers were laid off or had their wages frozen (Sanjek,
2000; Tabb, 1982; Wallace & Wallace, 1998).
The self-help housing movement thus emerged “out of desperation” at the awareness that
“there was going to be no substantial government intervention, private sector was running away”
(interview with Harry DeRienzo, 2011). The movement involved a broad spectrum of tenants,
but especially low-income and minority New Yorkers, particularly women (Lawson & Johnson,
1986; Leavitt & Saegert, 1988). Unlike top-down approaches to Model Cities and War on
Poverty approaches to community development, the movement sought a path for AfricanAmerican and Latino communities to move toward autonomy. This included organizing tenant
associations, pressuring landlords to improve building security, maintaining buildings and/or
providing building services, and collecting rents (interviews with Jim Buckley and Roger Hayes
2011). Self-help was seen as both a means of fulfilling material needs and in political terms, as
“a critique of austerity and marginalization” (Katz & Meyer, 1985, p. 21) hollowing out lowincome, minority neighborhoods such as the South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Harlem.
While the self-help housing movement revolved around the needs of low-income African
American and Hispanic tenants, the leaders of many community-based organizations were
mostly activist clergy and white, educated, middle-class male professionals (Lawson and
Johnson, 1986). Indeed many veteran nonprofit professionals participating in this study, who
were founding members of groups like Banana Kelly and the Northwest Bronx Community and
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Clergy Coalition, were white male lawyers, urban planners and political science students
bringing in a different level of expertise than low-income neighborhood constituents. However,
community residents, particularly women, often went on to replace these leaders and consistently
played crucial leadership roles in organizing tenants and communities (Lawson and Johnson,
1986; Leavitt and Saegert, 1988).
With city auctions failing to draw responsible new private owners, community
organizations and tenants sought ownership of abandoned properties. Activist clergy and
professionals sponsored the conversion of abandoned buildings to tenant-owned cooperatives as
early as the 1960s (Lawson and Johnson 1986). By the 1970s some groups were thinking about
forming housing companies to take title to abandoned buildings, while others engaged in “sweat
equity” homesteading, where tenants and community members secured stakes in an abandoned
building by putting time and work into its rehabilitation. Although not the focus of this research,
in several neighborhoods, most notably Manhattan’s Lower East Side, activists made more
informal claims on abandoned properties through squatting them (see Dobbz, 2012; Sites, 2003).
New housing groups formed rapidly in the early 1970s, mostly in low-income as well as
moderate-income and transitional areas; in this period five groups in Brooklyn, six in Manhattan
and three in the Bronx all emerged (Schur and Sherry, 1977).
In 1974 eight such groups formed the Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development (ANHD) as a federation to share ideas and experience, provide mutual and
technical assistance and develop mechanisms to promote housing programs and garner public
sector support (Schur & Sherry, 1977). Within two years ANHD included 27 neighborhoodbased housing groups; there were over 20 additional housing groups not affiliated with the
federation, but doing similar work (Schur and Sherry, 1977).

Among ANHD member

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
40
	
  
organizations activities included housing rehabilitation and construction; property management;
providing assistance to tenants associations and support for tenant management; and facilitating
the development of rehabilitation and transfer of ownership plans for tenant cooperatives (Schur
and Sherry, 1977) (see tables 1.2 and 1.3). The self-help housing movement represents a potent
moment in the orientation of tenant and community activism in which the object shifted from
getting landlords to take responsibility for housing conditions, to tenants and activists preserving
and improving housing and stabilizing neighborhoods themselves.
Table 1.2: Housing rehabilitation and construction activities of 27 ANHD member
organizations, 1965-1976 (Source: Schur and Sherry, 1977)

Rehabilitation
New

Completed

In progress

Planned

Total

1093 units
(in 161 buildings)
196 units

546 units
(in 82 buildings)
445 units

2458 units
(in 433 buildings)
2041 units

4097 units
(in 676 buildings)
2682 units

1289

991 units

4499 units

6779 units

construction
Total

Table 1.3: Tenant assistance activities of 27 ANHD member organizations, 1975-1976
(Source: Schur and Sherry, 1977)
Activity
Assisting tenants associations

# of buildings/units
2229/4748

Serving as 7A administrator

28/665

Providing assistance for tenant management

105/2138

Supporting development of rehabilitation and transfer of ownership 217/1979
plans for tenant cooperatives
Total10
579/9530
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Exclusive of individual-level assistance provided to 20,000 tenants and homeowners experiencing housing
problems.
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The self-help housing movement wasn’t entirely divorced from local policy, and at times
converged with the city’s Housing Development Agency (HDA) policies. For example in 1970
HDA provided some support to its Office of Special Improvements to explore low-income tenant
cooperatives; when activist lawyer Robert Schur (the soon-to-be founder of ANHD) was
appointed head of this office he used the city’s existing Municipal Loan Program and the federal
Model Cities program to provide low-interest purchase and rehabilitation loans to tenant groups
that wanted to purchase an abandoned property (Lawson and Johnson, 1986). Through using
existing programs in new ways, the number of buildings entering the process to become lowincome cooperatives (incorporating as a Housing Development Fund with income restrictions)
expanded. Unfortunately financial scandals among private owners in the Municipal Loan
Program led to the program’s suspension and new, more stringent regulations (Lawson and
Johnson, 1986). Another key tactic of formalizing the role of community housing groups in
deteriorated properties was the Article 7-A receivership program, in which tenants of buildings
in dangerous disrepair can petition for a court-appointed administrator. Many community groups
started to organize around this process, receiving training from the city to be 7-A administrators
and then taking on the responsibilities of ownership and undertaking low-level repairs with the
limited funds available; several groups in the Northwest Bronx and Harlem got their start this
way (interviews with Harold Shultz and Harry DeRienzo, 2011).
Overall though, the city’s efforts to preserve housing quality were sporadic and
inadequate to the levels disinvestment and abandonment had reached by the 1970s, when any
viable private market in multifamily housing had essentially collapsed. For example, while the
city had initiated a small-scale Community Management Program based on self-help housing
startegies in 1972, the program was vastly underfunded relative to need, understaffed, and had
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restrictive eligibility criteria (excluding vacant buildings entirely) (Schur and Sherry, 1977).
From 1970-1978, the city had been losing 40,000 housing units a year to abandonment (Braconi,
1999). Although community organizations had the desire, energy and constituencies to take on
responsibility for property management and ownership, they lacked the capital, expertise and
long-term planning capacity to address this scale of disinvestment (interview with Roger Hayes,
2011). Meanwhile political will and funding support (locally and federally) for low-income
housing and communities were limited: budgetary concerns, fiscal crisis and political conflict
tended to fragment the efforts of community organizations from federal and local policy.
President Nixon imposed a moratorium on federal assistance for local housing and community
development in 1973. Funding for many social and community housing programs collapsed as a
result of the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis. New York housing commissioner Roger Starr was
notoriously hostile toward community groups and the problems of low-income neighborhoods, in
1976 proposing a policy of “planned shrinkage”, in which city services would be withdrawn
from blighted neighborhoods.
The city’s main policy response to abandonment (auctions to new private owners), sought
(unsuccessfully) to extract fiscal responsibility from an increasingly unaccountable private
sector. This led to community outcry as buildings deteriorated further and displacement
pressures on tenants intensified (Sierra, 1992). At this point the ramifications of property
abandonment for tenants and neighborhoods pointed overwhelmingly to the city’s responsibility
to create a centrally planned and regulated disposition program for abandoned properties
(Gliedman & Raymond, 1979; Sierra, 1992) The self-help housing movement would be essential
to this strategy (Katz and Mayer, 1985). Indeed as Krinsky (2006) notes “many tenant organizing
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groups, having fought to get the city to force their delinquent landlords to make repairs, found
themselves managing their buildings when the city took them into tax foreclosure” (p.161).
Professionalization (1978-1986). Based on pressure from community groups and advocacy
within HDA itself to treat city-owned property as a housing issue rather than simply a fiscal one
(Sites, 1997; Katz and Mayer, 1985), a 1978 change to the agency’s charter created the
department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) (Gliedman and Raymond, 1979;
interview with Harold Shultz, 2011). Creating HPD and giving it the authority to manage,
upgrade and dispose of city-owned residential properties signaled a change in attitude toward
abandoned properties within the Koch mayoral administration: an acknowledgement that the in
rem stock required a long-term approach (Gliedman and Raymond, 1979; interviews with Harold
Shultz and Harry DeRienzo, 2011). This represents a second critical juncture, following the
initial juncture of Local Law #45 in 1976. The creation of an agency devoted to housing
preservation and development formalized an expansion of the city’s role in housing, despite the
austerity measures it was concurrently imposing in other domains of social reproduction
(Krinsky, 2011; Freeman, 2001). The move also set in motion a period of the city’s reliance on
and partnership with community-based organizations as major stakeholders in affordable housing
production and preservation, which would persist for nearly two decades.
Once HPD took over the in rem stock, the only public entity in the country that owned
more housing was the New York City Housing Authority (Braconi, 1999). The city’s first
imperative was to “stop the bleeding” by interrupting the cycle of housing loss and neighborhood
decline, which meant holding properties rather than auctioning them. However HPD lacked the
professionalized management structure, direct federal subsidy, standardized construction and
tight clustering of buildings enjoyed by other housing authorities. This constituted a challenge to
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even getting a handle on the inventory, much less staving off additional decline (interview with
Harold Shultz, 2011). With very few in rem properties not in need of immediate and costly major
repair (Gliedman and Raymond 1979), the Division of Property Management (DPM) was
stretched thin from the start—DPM representatives were frequently responsible for managing 60
or more buildings (interview with Jim Buckley 2011). The city was not prepared for this
challenge, especially considering the depth of abandonment in some areas (such as Harlem,
South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant), and its breadth across the city’s neighborhoods and housing
types.
A second imperative was to dispose of properties by means other than the private market,
which had failed thus far. Thus the Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP) was
created within HPD. This is where the self-help housing movement came in: without many
programs of its own, the agency sought to scale up earlier efforts of community management and
low-income tenant co-operatives, institutionalizing the movement into local policy. The federal
government encouraged this, providing significant additional Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG) funds to increase the number of buildings in DAMP and take advantage of
opportunities for disposition to private ownership by tenants and community partners (Katz and
Mayer 1985). In the first year of the in rem program (1978-1979) DAMP took on management
and disposition for 411 occupied buildings, a small fraction of the city-owned housing stock; the
Division of Property Management was responsible for managing the majority of 4092 occupied
city-owned residential properties (as well as nearly 7000 vacant buildings) (see figure 1.4).

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
Figure 1.4: Structure of in rem program in HPD, 1979 (Source: Gliedman and Raymond
1979)
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From 1978-1986 DAMP would take in over a thousand properties, the bulk of them
directed toward tenant-owned cooperatives (under TIL, the Tenant Interim Lease program) or
community management (under CMP, the Community Management Program). Both TIL and
CMP were based on the low-income cooperatives and community ownership models developed
by the self-help housing movement. A sizeable minority of DAMP properties was also under
management by private owners (POMP, the Private Ownership Management Program) and
court-appointed receivers (Article 7-A), and small numbers were under the management of the
New York City Housing Authority (see table 1.4 for a breakdown of DAMP properties by
program in 1978-1979).
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Table 1.4: DAMP program activity, year 111 (Source: Gliedman and Raymond 1979)
Sector
Tenant cooperatives
Community
management
Private
market
NYC
Housing
Authority
Receivership

Program
Tenant Interim Lease (TIL)

# of buildings/units
170 /4463

Community Management Program (CMP)
Management in Partnership Program (MIPP)
Private Ownership Management Program (POMP)

138 /3274
40 /1200
19 /836
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Housing Authority Rehabilitation Program (HARP) 68 /1442
Housing Authority Management Program (HAMP) 42 /923
Article 7-A

57 /1730
Total 532 buildings/12,808
units

Over this period, HPD had to professionalize its staff and partners in order to meet the
imperatives of stopping housing loss and disposing of properties. The agency needed to develop
internal competencies in program development and management, the technical and financial
aspects of giving loans and rehabilitating buildings, and being “landlord of last resort” for some
100,000 residents (as of 1979) (Gliedman and Raymond, 1979; interview with Harold Shultz
2011). Basic issues, such as keeping track of the number of properties the city acquired and
accounting for their identity, condition, and tenancy were hampered by the lack of systematic
records. This allowed some landlords to continue collecting rent after losing their buildings to
the city, caused inconsistencies with rent collections (sending rent bills to vacant buildings and
failing to send bills to some tenants), and in some cases led to the city finding itself in possession
of buildings it didn’t know it owned because of poor administrative records (Cohen, 1979).
Beyond recordkeeping, the agency had to develop workable programs. For example, its
early efforts to scale up sweat equity projects and “dollar sales” (where groups could literally
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Note that DAMP program activity total in table 5 is higher than the number of buildings in DAMP shown in table
4 (411 buildings), although data for both tables is drawn from the same source. The program activity data may
include some unspecified vacant properties in addition to occupied DAMP properties.
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purchase abandoned properties for $1) showed HPD that it needed to provide funds and
oversight for the rehabilitation process to ensure that work moved forward successfully and
buildings didn’t languish and decline further (interview with Harold Shultz, 2011). These lessons
led HPD to take a stronger and more direct role in rehabilitating properties in the Tenant Interim
Lease (TIL) program, which provided a pathway toward forming limited-equity housing
cooperatives12 for tenants of abandoned buildings. Once the problem of burnout among tenant
leaders and the difficulty of developing a strong cooperative governance structure in TIL
properties emerged, HPD turned to the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board to provide
training and technical assistance to TIL tenant-cooperators, as the organization had been doing in
the community since the early 1970s.
Starting in 1978 with essentially no structure for doing so, HPD underwent a period of
intense professionalization to manage and dispose of city-owned properties and stabilize
neighborhoods. Rebuilding neighborhoods was seen as vital for the city’s eventual recovery, and
would be critical in order to retain people who work downtown, and as a resource for businesses
that might want to be in the city (interview with Harold Shultz 2011). The aim of neighborhood
stabilization (and the city’s lack of capacity to effectively manage the scope of in rem properties
on its own) required the input, labor and constituencies of community-based organizations that
made up the self-help neighborhood movement. Professionalization within HPD would also
extend to the tenants, community organizations, and receivers participating in disposition efforts,
reshaping the self-help movement that had emerged throughout city neighborhoods to contest
disinvestment. Ultimately the self-help movement’s grassroots critique of the state was
functional for the fiscal crisis-ridden city’s rebuilding efforts (Katz and Mayer, 1985).
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Limited equity cooperatives are a form of cooperative ownership with income and resale-restrictions that aim to
ensure permanent affordability for low-income households.
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The incorporation of the self-help movement into local political structures also initially
appeared to offer an opportunity to the activists, advocates and tenants who had been trying to
get the city to combat disinvestment since the 1960s. That is, something was better than nothing,
given the severity of disinvestment and the deterioration of housing and neighborhoods in the
areas hit hardest by abandonment (Katz and Meyer, 1985). However compliance with new
requirements and responsibilities associated with DAMP programs was overwhelming, and
limited the constituency-mobilizing work that had built and sustained the movement. Groups
managing buildings found that tenants needed more and different kinds of support, such as
paying bills, making repairs, buying oil, establishing credit and a bank account, maintaining
basic security and negotiating with creditors and municipal agencies (Katz and Mayer, 1985).
For tenant groups who wanted to become a limited equity cooperative, the paperwork
requirements to join the TIL program were also a hurdle that required organizations to provide
further technical assistance (interview with Jim Buckley, 2011). As Bockmeyer’s (2003) study of
Adopt-A-Building on Manhattan’s Lower East Side shows, such managerial concerns can
quickly replace mobilization efforts.
Between responding to public sector requests for proposals for CDBG funds and the time
and labor required for bookkeeping and reporting, community groups had to develop new
management skills to cope with the rise of bureaucracy (Bockmeyer, 2003). The requirements of
the Community Management Program (CMP) also served to distance neighborhood
organizations from tenant constituents. CMP contracts shifted the movement away from self-help
to service provision. For example neighborhood groups were prohibited from subcontracting
tenants’ associations for basic maintenance and management; the program stipulated other
divisions of labor that didn’t correspond to groups’ existing structures (Katz and Mayer, 1985).

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
49
	
  
Soon, community groups were negotiating, packaging and implementing complex housing
rehabilitation deals including joint ventures with private developers and large in-house
management and construction companies: neighborhood organizing became physical
development carried out on behalf of the city (Katz and Mayer, 1985; interview with Harry
DeRienzo, 2011).
By 1986 tenants or local CBOs managed 90% of 593 buildings/12,611 apartments in
DAMP (Crotty & Moncrief, 1986). Another 502 buildings/13,138 apartments had been upgraded
and sold, a majority as low-income tenant co-operatives or nonprofit rentals, producing $2.6M
annually in taxes (Crotty & Moncrief, 1986). Additional DAMP programs would be introduced
and terminated over time but as of 1986 TIL, CMP and POMP were the largest disposition
programs, returning more than one hundred buildings to private ownership from 1978-1986 (see
table 5) (Crotty & Moncrief, 1986). Even at this early moment, contradictory tendencies may be
observed in neoliberal urban practice: rollbacks in New York City’s historic social welfare
provisions occurred at the same time as the city started actively partnering with local social
movement actors, and cultivating participation as a means of offloading some burden for
disinvestment and revitalizing property markets. The formation of HPD and especially the
Division of Alternative Management Programs points to the critical role the community housing
movement played in responding to property abandonment and rebuilding the private housing
market, a trend that could also be seen in the national community development movement.
Opening the pipeline (1986-1994). In 1986, the total in rem inventory stood at nearly 10,000
buildings, almost the same as it had been in 1978. The amount of housing HPD owned was
exceeded only by New York’s own public housing authority (NYCHA) and those in Chicago and
Puerto Rico (Schwartz, 1999), but was more difficult to manage because it was scattered
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throughout so many neighborhoods, despite heavy concentrations in some areas. More than half
(5,959) of city-owned properties were standing vacant. While community organizations had
been enlisted to dispose of properties in the Division of Alternative Management Programs, only
600 of 3700 occupied in rem properties were held in DAMP; the Division of Property
Management was responsible for the remaining 3100 occupied buildings, plus vacant ones
(Crotty & Moncrief, 1986; Schwartz, 1999).
At this time several factors prompted a third critical juncture in the city’s approach to
the in rem stock. First, the city’s financial health had improved dramatically since the fiscal crisis
thanks to increased tax revenue from a booming stock market. Secondly, housing affordability
was under intense pressure: the city’s new economic vitality caused rapid escalation in house
values and rents, extremely low vacancy rates and high rent-to-income burdens (Schill et al.,
2002; Van Ryzin & Genn, 1999). The backlog of buildings at HPD and the city’s inability to
keep pace with vesting properties for tax arrears diminished and deteriorated the supply of
affordable private housing (DeRienzo and Allen, 1985, cited in Henderson, Saegert, Sierra, &
Sullivan, 1993). Third (and in tandem with the city’s affordable housing problem), homelessness
was rising in the 1980s as Reagan put in motion federal cuts to funding for local government and
low-income housing subsidies (Dreier, 2004). In an unusual 1981 ruling, the New York Supreme
Court mandated the city to provide housing to homeless individuals and families (instead of
placing them in welfare hotels and armories), a decision that particularly rankled given the role
that erosion of federal support played in worsening the city’s homelessness problem. Finally the
continuing accumulation of tax-foreclosed housing, and the city’s inability to effectively manage
and rehabilitate properties was shaping criticism of the Koch administration and leading to calls
for public intervention to stem neighborhood deterioration (Sites, 1997). Many city-owned
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buildings were sitting vacant and decaying, while occupied properties were in need of serious
and costly rehabilitation.
The neoliberal regime shift at the national scale also added to the city’s problem of
deteriorated housing as the Reagan administration substantially cut or terminated all the main
pre-1980 federal programs that assisted community-based housing organizations (Henderson et
al., 1993). The community development block grants that had been DAMP’s major funding
source were reduced, and new restrictions came into play on remaining funds (Crotty &
Moncrief, 1986). The flexibility of community development funds, which could be used for
rehabilitation, training and technical assistance; salaries for CMP organizations; and operating
and maintenance subsidies, had been integral to DAMP (Crotty & Moncrief, 1986). The changes
at the federal level posed a major challenge to improving city-owned housing.
Physical deterioration and mismanagement made it unlikely that buildings under central
management for a decade or more would ever be placed in DAMP. These properties came to be
known as the “irreducible minimum” based on the notion that they would remain in central
management indefinitely (Sierra, 1992). Community groups also advocated that the city should
focus on this housing as a permanent resource for affordable housing (DeRienzo and Allen 1985,
cited in Henderson et al., 1993). Even those properties that were under the purview of alternative
management programs struggled under the weight of completing major rehabilitation with
limited funds. As a veteran nonprofit professional and organizer working in the Bronx recalled:
“What you could get out of the city was two systems or $2,500 a unit, and I think
at some point, it went up to $5,000 a unit. But it was kind of tough doing what
you needed to do in the building. And then, kind of arguing about what you
needed to do in the building…the procedures to get to it [funds for rehabilitation]
were difficult” (interview with Jim Buckley, 2011).13
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According to Schwartz (1999) the TIL program provided less than $3000 per unit for rehabilitation from its 1978
inception through 1986.
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However residents of properties in DAMP tenant management programs and those that
completed the co-op conversion process tended to rate their housing as more secure, cleaner and
better managed than residents of centrally managed properties, as well as those living in DAMP
private management programs and buildings returned to private, for-profit ownership
(Henderson et al., 1993). Furthermore, tenant-managed buildings had higher levels of social
capital, which contributed to lower crime and better housing quality and security compared to
surrounding buildings (Saegert & Winkel, 1998).
Under pressure to address its chronic shortage of affordable housing, ongoing
deterioration of city-owned housing and growing homeless population with dwindling federal
support, the city had two crucial resources: its improved fiscal health, and the in rem housing
stock itself. With its access to capital markets restored the city could sell tax-free municipal
bonds in order to finance capital projects (Van Ryzin and Genn, 1999). Meanwhile the in rem
inventory enabled vast opportunities of scale (due to the concentration of abandoned properties
and vacant lots in certain parts of the city), and the ability to undertake development without the
cost of land acquisition (Schill et al., 2002). These resources meant the city could house the
homeless population, add to the supply of affordable housing and address the image problems
associated with city-owned properties—all while circumventing the decline in federal funding.
With this confluence of factors and two crucial resources at his disposal, Mayor Ed Koch
announced the Ten Year Capital Plan in 1985. Taking effect in 1986, Koch’s housing plan would
ultimately commit more than $5 billion (more than 80% provided by the city), to build or
renovate 250,000 units (though it ultimately resulted in only 182,000 units) over more than 14
years (Schill et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1999; Van Ryzin & Genn, 1999).
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The Ten Year Plan (TYP) represents a third critical juncture in the city’s approach to in
rem property, once again expanding its involvement in affordable housing provision, with more
reliance on the nonprofit sector to develop, rehabilitate and manage housing than ever before
(Van Ryzin and Genn, 1999). Building on the work of previous years, the Plan represented 1) a
dramatic upswing in the city’s capital commitment, which went from $8400 per unit in 1987 to
upwards of $30,000 a unit from 1988 to 1996 and 2) an expanded scale of rehabilitation and
development (Schill et al., 2002), including a large role for alternative disposition programs.
After rehabilitating 13,138 units of in rem housing from 1978-1986, DAMP rehabilitated 77,886
units from 1987-1996 (Schwartz, 1999).14 Building dramatically on the alternative management
and ownership programs started in the 1970s, community-based organizations became major
stakeholders in housing production in accordance with the Plan’s secondary goal of
neighborhood revitalization (Ellen, Schill, Schwartz, & Voicu, 2003). In fact “not a single
comprehensive plan in the traditional sense, the 10-Year Plan is rather a shifting assemblage of
individual programs, several of which had already been operating for years by 1986” (Schwartz,
1999, p. 843).
With much of the Plan left unspecified (such as locations of new housing production, the
method of selecting tenants, the role of private sector actors and concessions they would receive
in return) (Fainstein, 1994), unlike earlier top-down urban renewal programs, the city’s most
important strategy was HPD’s ability to tailor projects to the local community through working
with nonprofit organizations (interview with Walter Roberts, 2011). The neighborhoods with the
highest rate of in rem properties (the South Bronx, upper Manhattan and Central Brooklyn) were
the sites of the most rehabilitation and construction activity under the Plan (Van Ryzin and Genn,
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Not including city funding of new construction and rehabilitation of private properties, which brings the total to
150,681 units.
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1999), and DAMP was critical in identifying the local partners who would help shape and
implement the city’s strategy. Ultimately the TYP would include “a vast array of programs”
(Schill et al., 2002) developed for specific neighborhoods, housing stocks (city-owned, privately
owned, large multifamily, brownstones, etc.), tenures (rental vs. homeownership), and project
type (e.g. moderate rehabilitation, gut rehabilitation, new construction) (Schwartz, 1999; Van
Ryzin and Genn, 1999).
With the Plan’s infusion of capital and expanded scale, ideas that had been floated and
tested in HPD’s earlier years as the agency professionalized became the basis of “a process that
was programmatic and pipeline-driven” (interview with John Warren, 2011). This generated a
nonprofit housing industry: the number of nonprofit organizations actively involved in housing
production increased from about twelve at the start of the Ten Year Plan in 1986 to over a
hundred organizations by 1994 (former HPD commissioner Felice Michetti, quoted in Schill et
al., 2002, p. 535). Nonprofit social service providers were also folded into the pipeline: HPD
often turned to them for property disposition in communities where there were no strong housing
groups (interview with Walter Roberts, 2011). This worked well for the city in terms of property
disposition and provided cash flow for the organization; however the implications for tenants are
less clear in terms of how effective social service agencies were as property managers (interview
with Walter Roberts, 2011).
Under the TYP nonprofit owners, developers and managers carried out nearly all of the
construction of new units and much of the rehabilitation work on vacant and occupied units (Van
Ryzin and Genn 1999). The city also continued a track of private for-profit partnerships
alongside and integrated with nonprofit disposition and development; this was critical to meeting
the Plan’s objectives. For example, in the cross-subsidy program on the Lower East Side the

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
55
	
  
proceeds of sales of vacant land and buildings to market rate developers financed the
rehabilitation of properties by nonprofit groups (Sites, 2003; interview with Walter Roberts,
2011).
Foundations motivated to “ride the wave” also supplemented government funding and
programs by undertaking small demonstration projects in the hope the government would scale
them up (interview with Harry DeRienzo, 2011). By then established as the vehicle through
which a lot of housing could happen” nonprofits were positioned to “take a large chunk” of
foundation funding (interview with Harry DeRienzo, 2011). Much of the funding that became
available for community-based organizations incentivized housing production, and was thus
contingent on managing buildings and developing properties. As nonprofit organizations
successfully completed projects they could count on further developer fees in the future, “a very
important thing to build up the infrastructure of the organizations” (interview with John Warren,
2011).
Beyond expanded foundation, private mortgage capital and municipal funding, federal
changes also cultivated nonprofit groups’ involvement in development. In 1987 the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program began offering tax credits to incentivize private
development and management of affordable multifamily rental housing, a bright spot in an
otherwise bleak landscape of federal commitment to low-income housing (Swanstrom, 1999). As
a Treasury-controlled tax measure, the LIHTC program helped “dismantle HUD’s capacity to act
as a policy maker” (Kochinsky, 1998, p. 122). This signaled a break with direct federal funding
of housing and move toward indirect subsidies, with private investors providing capital for
development projects by purchasing tax credits (Swanstrom, 1999). In return developers
(nonprofit or for-profit) take on less overall debt to complete the project; these savings are
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passed on to future residents in the form of lower rents. Since rehabilitation of existing buildings,
but not land acquisition costs are eligible for credits, the LIHTC was ideal for creating a pipeline
for the thousands of vacant city-owned buildings that had become an ongoing source of concern
and struggle for the city, and is thus an important element in the TYP.
The stringent rules, complex nature and competitive basis of the LIHTC program
disciplined community organizations and increased their reliance on private financing (Bratt,
2012; Kochinsky, 1998). Developers (nonprofit and for-profit) who wanted more buildings had
to be good at administering the program and adhering to its stipulations:
“You've got to follow the rules. You've got private investors who are requiring
you to follow the rules. There's a lot of due diligence there. Syndicators have got
to pay attention. And there was a lot of oversight, so -- and it was repetitive.
Every year you've got to do certain things. So, it built in a lot of discipline just
based on the fact that you had to -- using these monies, you had to follow a set of
rules. If you didn't know, you had to learn.” (interview with Walter Roberts,
2011).
This disciplined routine, and the sophistication and understanding of market conditions
organizations required to compete for allocations translated to staffing needs and new
expectations for asset management capacity (to manage the physical building and conduct
preventive maintenance, carry out administrative duties, and manage cash flow) (Bratt, 2012;
interview with Walter Roberts, 2011). Groups needed an organizational infrastructure in place to
deal with the regulatory requirements of a tax credit building, multiple funding streams and the
reporting that went along with each funding source. The disciplining process was a lot of work,
especially for small groups and those whose core mission was not property management, for
whom these duties could be a distraction from service delivery and other programming
(interview with Walter Roberts, 2011).
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National intermediary organizations, such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation
(LISC) and Enterprise Community Partners, emerged to channel capital and technical expertise
to the local nonprofit development sector from corporate and philanthropic funders seeking
income tax reduction through the LIHTC (Bratt, 2012; Swanstrom, 1999; Kochinsky, 1998).
Intermediary organizations are associated with a dramatic increase in the nonprofit share of the
LIHTC program, from 9% in 1988 to 27% in 1994 (Kochinsky, 1998). While instrumental in
securing investments, advancing grants and loans and assisting with the complexities of the
LIHTC (Bratt, 2012), technical assistants stand in complicated relationship to community
organizations. Intermediary groups serve as “both friend and policeman” (Katz and Meyer,
1985), offering community-based nonprofit developers support and lending them credibility with
private investors, but also overseeing their activities (Bratt, 2012).
The Ten Year Plan emerged under pressure from the public to address neighborhood
deterioration, increased homelessness and a chronic shortage of affordable housing. With newly
restored access to capital markets, the city pledged to build or rehabilitate 100,000 units over ten
years, largely from the stock of occupied and vacant in rem housing. As the city again expanded
its role in housing production, earlier alternative management programs were massively scaled
up. These became the basis of development pipelines for community management, tenant
ownership and private management/ownership. Having undergone professionalization as its
strategies were institutionalized into city policy under the Division of Alternative Management
Programs, housing groups became full-fledged developers as they implemented the Ten Year
Plan’s neighborhood-specific programs. In this “pipeline” period, community organizations
became major stakeholders in affordable housing production as the process itself changed,
becoming increasingly characterized by market dynamics and private sector actors. As the self-
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help housing movement built up the capacities this process demanded, some organizations also
became distanced from earlier ideals of neighborhood control and permanent affordability.
The TYP is closely tied in with the neoliberal regime shift at the federal level: diminished
federal support for affordable housing and community development contributed to the city’s
need to find other means of financing development of the in rem stock. The reconfigured federal
role in affordable housing production, from a direct subsidy via the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to an indirect subsidy system with the LIHTC represents a roll-out of ‘new
technologies of government’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002). The program opened up the pipeline for
rehabilitating vacant city-owned properties under the TYP. Its rules and complexities also
required new levels of discipline and market sophistication from nonprofit developers, bringing
the interests of community organizations in line with those of corporations and investors in
search of reduced tax burden. In this pipeline period the municipal and federal government,
intermediary groups and foundations positioned nonprofits “as alternative market organizations,
laying the groundwork for future private investments in formerly disinvested neighborhoods”
(Kochinsky, 1998, p. 124).
Privatization (1994-the present). The primary objective for city-owned housing stock was
always to return properties to private, tax-paying ownership. Yet through the Dinkins
administration, many within HPD believed some amount of the “irreducible minimum” would
always remain, envisioning an ongoing and substantial commitment to community-based
housing by the city (interviews with John Warren and Harold Shultz, 2011; Sites 2003). After the
1980s stock market boom heated up the city’s real estate market and led to concerns about
gentrification in some neighborhoods, the 1987 stock market crash led to the late 1980s/early
1990s recession, which put downward pressure on sales and prices, halting or slowing new
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construction citywide (Smith & DeFilippis, 1999). In rem takings had ebbed in the mid 1980s,
but property tax defaults ticked up again in the recession, adding to the inventory of city-owned
housing.
David Dinkins stepped into this context when he became the city’s first AfricanAmerican mayor in 1990. From the start, Dinkins faced a split between demands from black and
Latino constituents to improve housing, schools, employment and health; and from white
constituents concerned with fiscal stability (Thompson, 2006). Aiming to reconnect with a
political base alienated after the layoff of 10,000 public employees and cutbacks in social
services, Dinkins supported community housing initiatives that would direct funds away from
HPD’s “coterie of nonprofit technicians and toward community organizations committed to
citizen participation and voter mobilization” (Thompson, 2006, p. 212-213). Spending more than
$200 million for housing in Central Harlem in just four years and involving more politically
engaged organizations in the process was meant to both address concerns about housing in poor,
minority neighborhoods, and hopefully increase their votes for Dinkins (Thompson, 2006).
Giving more control of in rem housing to community organizations and politically engaged
churches did not sit well with local elected officials, and slowed ambitious housing development
efforts in Central Harlem and Brownsville (in Brooklyn), which ultimately worsened Dinkins’
credibility in Black and Latino communities (Thompson 2006). Dinkins’ expansion of subsidies
for corporate development was also at odds with his alternative vision of development and
community renewal (Thompson, 2006).
The irreducible minimum was untenable by the time Rudy Giuliani defeated Dinkins in
his 1993 reelection bid and the city was devoting $220 million a year, nearly all of its federal
community development funding, to maintaining the 5458 in rem buildings it still controlled.
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Many remained in poor condition despite the efforts of the Ten Year Plan (Sites, 2003).
Properties remained in city ownership for an average of 19 years, making the cost of acquiring,
managing, rehabilitating and disposing of in rem properties ($2.2 million per building on
average) far greater than the tax arrears ($36,000 on average upon vesting) for which they were
seized (Andersen, 1995; Allred, 2000). Unable to keep up with the increase in property tax
default in the late 1980s, the Dinkins administration had opened a queue for property vestings:
Giuliani’s HPD Commissioner Deborah Wright was shocked to find there were 8000 buildings
(40,000 units) waiting to be added to the city’s existing stock of 58,000 housing units (Barr,
1995). At this point the city quietly stopped vesting properties, which added to tax enforcement
problems (interview with Harold Shultz, 2011; Office of the Mayor, 2001).
By the mid 1990s, as neighborhoods and housing improved, government ownership was
seen as inefficient and slow to adapt to changing market conditions, thus a potential obstacle to
private investment (Allred, 2000; Andersen, 1995). Moreover buildings remaining under, or
eligible for, city ownership continued to be the most distressed (Perine, Shultz, & Marazzi,
2011). Giuliani enacted a dramatic shift in the city’s approach to both the in rem housing stock
and the larger issue of property tax default. In a final critical juncture, the city would return all
the properties it owned to the private market (to both nonprofit and for-profit developers),
breaking the path of a wide public role that had prevailed since the late 1970s. This was
consistent with Giuliani’s larger project of “reinventing government” (based on the 1992 David
Osborne and Ted Gaebler book of the same name) in a more efficient and entrepreneurial
fashion. Giuliani was part of a broad movement in 1990s municipal governance to follow on
Reagan’s privatization, deregulation and rollback of social welfare at the local level. Repudiating
the notion of city-owned property as a continuous resource to address the chronic affordable
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housing shortage, Giuliani’s commitment to trimming the city’s public sector entailed privatizing
as much of the in rem stock as possible, thereby cutting off the pipeline. The city shed over
10,000 housing units and more than a thousand buildings in just two years, going from 58,000
city-owned housing units in 1993 to 42,000 in 1995, and to 13,000 units when Giuliani left office
in 2001 (see figure 1.5) (Barr, 1995; Mayor's Press Office, 1999; Murdock, 2001).
Figure 1.5: Change in city-owned housing inventory, Giuliani administration
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The TYP had made significant inroads into the stock of city-owned housing before
abandonment ticked up again in the early 1990s. Giuliani’s signature program, “Building
Blocks!”, was therefore designed to exploit remaining economies of scale by selling clusters of
buildings (rather than individual properties). It targeted blocks with multiple occupied and vacant
city-owned properties for disposition to TIL, the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program (NEP)
and the Neighborhood Rehabilitation Program (NRP), the latter two reiterating earlier
private/for-profit and community/non-profit disposition tracks. Given the ineffectiveness of large
developers participating in POMP (uncontrolled cost overruns and low productivity) NEP was to
build the capacity of minority-owned architecture and contracting firms. This would shift city-
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owned properties to private, for-profit owners who were “rooted in their communities”, so as to
recirculate city funds in the local economy (Orlebeke, 1997, p. 165).
Privatization opened up “a tremendous pipeline” for the formation of limited equity
cooperatives (interview with John Warren, 2011).15 Previously only available to tenants of
buildings that did not require rehabilitation, once even “crummy buildings” could enter the
program, TIL became a default option and expanded dramatically (interviews with John Warren
and Walter Roberts, 2011). In earlier iterations, tenants may have been better able to accept the
challenges and responsibilities that came with co-op living; later, the people and the types of
buildings “were not the same as those early pioneering buildings” (interview with Walter
Roberts, 2011) Examples such as buildings that never left the TIL program to form a cooperative
show how strategies developed in the early stages of the abandonment crisis sometimes morphed
into a problem later on (interviews with Walter Roberts and John Warren, 2011).
Veteran affordable housing professionals have mixed views about the privatization of the
in rem stock. In one view, creating an infrastructure for private development by minority-owned
businesses within neighborhoods supported community development, potentially promoting
innovation and not simply privatization (interview with John Warren, 2011). From another
perspective cutting off the pipeline entailed restructuring existing programs in such a way that
changed their direction, reduced their size, and eventually moved towards supporting private
investment in the city’s housing and neighborhoods at the expense of nonprofit and community
control (interview with Bruce Dale, 2011). Another layer here is the extent to which privatization
would squander fifteen years of capacity building work within the nonprofit community. Having
undergone extensive professionalization and discipline through their work rebuilding housing
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Previously only available to tenants of buildings that did not require rehabilitation, now even “crummy buildings”
could enter the program (interview with John Warren 2011).
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and neighborhoods, many organizations had come to rely on working continuously in partnership
with the city—and the development and management fees and low-cost financing that were part
of this relationship. Privatization would force nonprofit organizations to find new projects on the
open market (and squeeze out smaller groups not able compete in the market). Another danger of
operating outside of the pipeline is the risk of organizations expanding too much, too quickly,
mismanaging their assets or getting far afield from early mission, (e.g. developing $1M condos),
especially in the 2000s real estate boom (interview with Richard Conley, 2011).
Cutting off the pipeline is clearly aligned with Giuliani’s efforts to reduce the size and
scope of government, improve efficiency, enhance competition and privatize government
resources to outside contractors. The Giuliani administration was also known to be unwilling to
work with nonprofit groups critical of its policies around housing, welfare and policing (Krinsky,
2011; Smith, 1998). Indeed the city terminated contracts with the Harlem Restoration Project (a
group that rehabilitated buildings in Harlem to operate as affordable housing) and Housing
Works (an activist AIDS service organization that addresses homelessness and HIV/AIDS as a
dual crisis for poor people) after they openly dissented with Giuliani (Dwyer, 2005; Smith,
1998). In some sense, privatization would expediently limit the growth and influence of
oppositional politics by low-income housing advocates, simply by cutting off their funding. This
coincided with efforts to dismantle rent regulation laws, which resulted in high-rent luxury
decontrol.
Without disputing Giuliani’s revanchist tendencies, the privatization of city-owned
property was also pragmatic: it returned abandoned properties to the private market. This may
have come at the expense of nonprofit organizations’ ability to effectively improve and engage
marginalized communities in a mission-consistent manner, but this was not the in rem program’s
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primary aim. Rather, the program sought to bring properties back onto property tax rolls, and
revitalize distressed neighborhoods that undermined the city’s economic livelihood. Lacking a
strong private, for-profit market throughout the 1970s and 1980s the city was reliant on
community-based organizations to dispose of properties, but by the 1990s these groups may have
outlived their usefulness. The private market was returning as economic activity and immigration
sharply expanded. Nonprofit organizations became less important players in negotiating
financing and coordinating neighborhood development:
“People started realizing that yes, the Bronx was going to survive, and no, they
didn't really need the signoff of the Northwest Bronx Community Clergy
Reinvestment Project to make these deals happen” (interview with founding
member of the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition Jim Buckley
2011).
The city’s low-income neighborhoods were revitalizing due to a confluence of local and
national-level factors. The Ten Year Plan had begun to bear fruit: housing construction and
rehabilitation reduced numbers of boarded up buildings and vacant lots; housing conditions
improved; and housing demand, rents and property values all went up (Bram et al., 2003; New
York City Department of City Planning, 2004). In the Highbridge section of the Bronx and
Central Harlem gains in housing quality were particularly large (Bram et al., 2003; Schwartz,
1999; Van Ryzin & Genn, 1999). The city’s influx of almost a million (legal) immigrants from
Asia, Mexico and Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
and Africa over the 1990s reversed the population decline of previous decades, further increasing
housing demand in low-income neighborhoods (Bram et al., 2003). Crime declined dramatically
in the nation’s urban neighborhoods in the 1990s (Bram et al., 2003; Moody, 2007): so too, New
York generally became more livable in the 1990s, with the largest crime and housing
improvements in the city’s poorest communities (Ellen & O'Regan, 2008). Fewer vacant
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buildings also meant fewer spaces offering shelter for drug dealing, drug use and other
clandestine activities, while immigrants’ informal housing, labor and care economies also helped
prevent crime (Moody 2007).
Since the 1970s fiscal crisis, New York’s image to the out-of-towner had become a
political strategy (Greenberg, 2008). Giuliani’s tough stance on crime, which often punished the
poor under the guise of appealing to tourists, made the city “safer” for private capital. An
expanded police force and improved surveillance and security technology, coupled with
Giuliani’s “zero tolerance” approach to petty crime and criminalization of homelessness,
panhandling and squatting all helped make Manhattan’s urban core more palatable for real estate
development interests (Moody, 2007; Sites, 2003; Smith, 1998). With much of the funding for
his successful 1997 reelection bid coming from realtors, developers, bankers and corporate
interests, Giuliani worked earnestly on their behalf. His policies continued and expanded
Dinkins’ tax breaks for developers; lowered taxes on commercial real estate while increasing
rates on single-family and small apartment buildings; and subsidized the redevelopment of
Manhattan’s business districts (Moody, 2007; Sites, 2003).
Along with these changes, which mostly benefited Manhattan’s real estate market, other
national trends contributed to 1990s improvements in low-income urban neighborhoods, not least
the country’s stock market and consumption-fuelled economic expansion that decade. The
Clinton-Gore administration also followed an agenda of “reinventing government”16 to make it
more businesslike. One application of this kind of entrepreneurial governance is the
advancement of market-based solutions for social problems (Harvey, 1989; Peck & Tickell,
2002). Thus whereas Reagan-era policies drastically cut federal assistance to community-based
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So much so that the administration created the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, with David
Osborne (a co-author of the book Reinventing Government) serving as a key advisor.
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housing groups, Clinton increased federal support for (market-oriented) community
development. This approach emphasized market inefficiencies as causal mechanisms in issues
like housing access and poverty, and was effective in shifting attention from the role of power
inequalities and social and spatial exclusion that the urban social movements of the 1960s and
1970s had emphasized (Newman & Lake, 2006).
Clinton strengthened the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act; expanded the role of the
government-sponsored enterprises and government-backed loans; contributed to the expansion of
the secondary mortgage market; and increased multifamily lending activity (Ellen & O'Regan,
2008; Wyly, Atia, Foxcroft, Hammel, & Phillips-Watts, 2006; Wyly, Atia, & Hammel, 2004).
The New Markets and Community Renewal Initiative, passed in 2000, consolidated and built on
these efforts, providing tax credits and other incentives (such as exemptions from capital gains
taxes and payroll tax breaks) to encourage investment in low- and moderate-income urban (and
rural) communities (The White House, 2000). It also expanded Empowerment Zones, which
provide tax breaks and funding for social services to revitalize underserved communities; Clinton
created 40 Empowerment Zones altogether from 1993-2000, including one in Harlem (Lemann,
1994; The White House, 2000). These efforts characterize the shift to community economic
development as the dominant approach to poverty alleviation, in which increasing for-profit
initiatives in low-income neighborhoods would produce economic transformation and
community empowerment (Cummings, 2002).
Signs of the pitfalls of opening up new markets had already opened up in the 1990s.
Nationally, in a precursor to the racially exploitative subprime lending boom of the 2000s, a
wave of subprime refinance loans stripped equity from elderly African-American owners, who
were often “house-rich but cash-poor” (Ashton, 2012; Immergluck & Wiles, 1999; Ludwig,
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2007; Stein, 2001). There were also precursors for the kind of overleveraging seen in New
York’s multifamily housing today. Government-sponsored enterprise Freddie Mac, operating in
the secondary market, purchased the debt for a group of 35 multifamily properties in the
Northwest Bronx without completing due diligence on their physical and financial conditions
(Groarke, 2004).17 Weak controls increased opportunities for fraud and abuse: inflated appraisals
over-leveraged properties, and deception about neighborhood conditions underestimated risk
(Groarke, 2004; United States General Accounting Office, 1991).
The articulation of neoliberalism’s creative and destructive tendencies was critical to the
1990s move away from community-based housing programs and toward the revival of the
private, for-profit real estate market in New York City. Giuliani’s orientation to limiting
government is consistent with a broader move in local politics to deploy Reagan’s smallgovernment neoliberalism municipally (Weikart, 2001). This approach may be contrasted with
the municipal socialism that defined many postwar U.S, cities but none more than New York
(Freeman, 2001; Moody, 2007). The in rem privatization agenda benefited from the positive
legacy of Koch’s big-government capital housing plan, the increased housing demand from new
immigrant populations and national economic growth. Privatization also coincided temporally
with the transition to a reformulated, constructive neoliberalism. This increased federal emphasis
on (and support for) private capital in neighborhood revitalization led the way from Giuliani’s
withdrawal of capital funding and public commitments for housing in his first term to the pursuit
of an a more direct role in land-value escalation in the urban core in his second term. Rather than
completely dismantling community-based housing programs, Giuliani simply withdrew earlier
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There were similar problems nationally.
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concessions to community interests (Sites, 2003), allocating concessions to private developers
instead.
Completing the city’s withdrawal from taking ownership of tax-delinquent properties
required new technologies of government, and new modes of fiscal discipline. After it officially
stopped vesting tax-delinquent properties in 1995, the city developed the Third-Party Transfer
(TPT) program to convey tax-foreclosed properties to a third party owner—the nonprofit
Neighborhood Restore, which it created to administer the TPT program. Neighborhood Restore
completes interim maintenance and management in the one to two years it takes to work with
HPD-approved nonprofit and for-profit owners to make improvements, secure financing and
transfer the property to new private ownership (Mueller, 2003; Perine et al., 2011). The
properties must be operated as affordable housing, but definitions of affordability based on area
median income are notoriously out of sync with neighborhood income levels (vacant units can
also be leased at market rates) (Allred, 2001). In a vestige of the earliest approaches to property
abandonment, tenants may also elect to form a limited-equity housing cooperative. From 1996 to
2008, Neighborhood Restore transferred 363 properties (4600 housing units) to new owners,
costing the city only $74,000 a building (compared to the $2.2 million per building prior to 1996)
and $34 million a year (compared to $220 million a year prior to 1996); this public investment is
used to leverage additional private funding (Perine et al., 2011)
However only properties that are extremely tax-delinquent and/or severely physically
distressed enter TPT (Allred, 2000; Perine et al., 2011). Tax-delinquent properties are first
evaluated for tax lien sales—liens for the most marketable properties are bundled and sold, while
the most troubled properties enter TPT (New York City Comptroller, 2012). The remainder
becomes part of a tax lien sale, a policy Jersey City started in the 1990s that became a popular
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local strategy: New Haven, Atlanta, Washington D.C. Puerto Rico, upstate New York and
Philadelphia have all securitized tax liens. The Department of Finance can securitize tax liens of
properties that are in arrears but are not distressed (about 85% of tax-delinquent properties)
(Perine et al., 2011; Rao, 2012). The city sells the liens to a trust, which uses them as collateral to
issue bonds to investors for cash; the cash is then used to pay the city for unpaid tax revenues
(Perine et al., 2011). Eventually, if owners do not pay back taxes, the liens (and thus the
properties) are sold at public auction to recover unpaid debt. Since implementing TPT and tax
lien sales, the city has recovered $1.55B more in real estate taxes (for the period 1997-2008) than
they would have if tax collection rates remained at pre-1996 levels (Perine et al., 2011). The city
has also generated surplus revenue of $89.3 million (beyond the value of arrears) from tax lien
securitization; in one example $54.7 million worth of tax liens has generated $2 million beyond
the value of the liens, with potential for more revenue (Perine et al., 2011).18
After two decades of a wide public role in the management and disposition of taxforeclosed properties, the inventory of city-owned property was privatized under Giuliani.
Further changes in housing and tax policy (creation of TPT and use of tax lien sales) ensured a
circumscribed public commitment to management, maintenance and sale of tax-delinquent
residential property going forward. These moves coincided with the 1990s economic boom,
fueled in large part by explosive stock market growth and the rise of the technology and
information economy. With Wall Street responsible for much of its 1990s economic expansion,
New York City became more dependent on the finance industry than ever (Moody 2007; Sites
2003). Employment and income growth in the financial and legal services industries increased
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It is important to note that the sale of tax liens has recently come under criticism for unfairly affecting vulnerable
homeowners, especially the elderly. This is a concern because tax foreclosure has been on the rise recently due to
the mortgage foreclosure crisis, unemployment and the weak economy (Rao 2012).
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housing demand and rents, with (largely, but not exclusively) white professionals especially
gentrifying old working class areas accessible to Manhattan’s urban core (e.g. Harlem, the Lower
East Side, and Williamsburg) (Newman & Wyly, 2006).
In the emerging bifurcated service economy, low-wage retail, restaurant and hotel jobs
were at the other extreme from high-paying business and financial services positions (Moody,
2007). Low-wage positions contributed most to increased employment in the 1990s, and the loss
of public sector and production and shipping jobs hit the city’s longstanding minorities
especially hard: blacks and Latinos fell out of middle- and upper-income groups, and they were
competing with immigrants for lower-income jobs (Moody, 2007). In 2000, more than a third of
New Yorkers were foreign-born: as immigrants changed the face of the once primarily white,
black and Puerto-Rican city, new and old groups of whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians all
struggled for space (Moody, 2007; Sanjek, 2000). Poorer residents priced out of the urban core
flowed into the further reaches of Brooklyn and Queens, heightening the spatial differentiation of
inequality: poor and minority residents without access to public, subsidized or rent-regulated
housing were consolidated in the outer boroughs, and the urban core became increasingly aligned
with educated and affluent workers in financial production and associated support services
(Newman & Wyly, 2006; Sassen, 2000)
The revival of the city’s real estate market eased property abandonment, but increased
problems with housing affordability. Over a million units of affordable housing were lost from
1996-1998 alone, and few of the 50,000 housing units built from 1994-1999 were affordable
(Moody 2007). Another factor in the decrease of housing affordability was the 1990s weakening
state-level rent-regulation laws, contributing to the deregulation of 100,000 rent-stabilized units
from 1994-2002 (New York City Rent Guidelines Board, 2003). In 1999, nearly a quarter of
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New York City renters paid more than half of their income for rent (Daniels & Schill, 2001;
Sites, 2003). One in five households had a severe housing affordability or housing quality
problem, with the worst problems in the Bronx (Highbridge and University Heights in the west
Bronx and Morrisania/Belmont and Parkchester/Soundview in the South Bronx), as well as East
Harlem. By 2000 city residents and advocates were calling for a new, capital-budget housing
plan (Sites, 2003). However without a ready supply of land and housing, the city would need to
find new ways to do affordable housing. 19
A transition occurred in the 1990s in which low-income neighborhoods came to be seen
as “underperforming assets” and “incomplete markets”. The city’s investment under the Ten
Year Plan and Giuliani’s decision to privatize city-owned housing fit neatly with this change,
making once “no-go” neighborhoods safe and attractive for private capital and real estate
development. With increased housing demand, development made affordable by low interest
rates and a steady flow of mortgage capital thanks to the growth of the secondary mortgage
market, New York experienced a building boom from 2000-2008. The city’s number of
authorized residential building permits doubled from 10,000 to 20,000 between 1998 and 2004,
then edged above 30,000 a year in 2006 (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy,
2010b). Today, private, for-profit development has become central to the New Housing
Marketplace, Bloomberg’s affordable housing strategy, with nonprofit organizations competing
in the same market. However much of the development under the New Housing Marketplace is
unaffordable to the residents of the neighborhoods receiving new housing (ANHD, 2013)
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This is not to say that New York City’s only source of affordable rental housing is/was city-owned housing. New
York has the largest stock of public housing in the country, and much of the development of city-owned housing
was done as affordable housing with long regulatory agreements.
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In many ways the 1970s crisis of disinvestment and abandonment cleared the ground for
restructuring the city around finance, insurance and real estate. As Rachel Weber (2002) notes,
“At various points in the circulation of capital the built environment is junked” (p. 521), the
better to be subsequently revalorized (Smith, 1979, 1984, 1996). This observation brings us back
to today’s crisis of predatory equity, which represents a new round of” junking” the urban
environment that is at once familiar and strange, as it gives new substance to the relationships
among property, community, finance and local government. Here I turn back to the geographic
considerations that grounded the preceding temporal analysis in an effort to consider predatory
equity in relation to spaces of abandonment. Many of the veteran and midcareer nonprofit
professionals participating in this research understood predatory equity through the landlord
abandonment crisis. The overleveraged, distressed buildings brought up memories of the 60s and
70s, and this shaped concerns about rolling back the slow, hard work of rebuilding in the wake of
abandonment: some argued that the overmortgaging, foreclosure, re-speculation and horrible
physical conditions associated with predatory equity could easily have the same kind of impact
on neighborhoods as the abandonment crisis, especially in the Bronx (interview with Dina Levy
2010). Like property abandonment, predatory equity is concentrated in low-income and minority
neighborhoods (see Figure 1.6 for demographic information about residents of neighborhoods
with the greatest prevalence of predatory equity) in upper Manhattan, the Bronx and central
Brooklyn.
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Figure 1.6: Race/ethnicity, poverty and unemployment of residents in high predatory
equity neighborhoods versus city residents as a whole. Data: Furman Center 2009.
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However the geography of predatory equity relative to abandonment is complex (see
figure 1.7). It is true that two neighborhoods, East Harlem and Belmont/East Tremont, are in the
highest categories for both property abandonment and predatory equity (more than 500
abandoned properties from 1976-1981 and more than 5% of their rental housing currently
overleveraged as a result of private equity real estate investments). But many of the other
neighborhoods that experienced the worst property abandonment in the 1970s—Manhattan’s
Lower East Side; Mott Haven in the South Bronx; Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Hollis in
Queens—all have around 1% or less of their rental housing in financial distress (1.04% in the
case of the Lower East Side). Even within this category (high abandonment and low predatory
equity) there are divergent explanations. The Lower East Side, located in Manhattan’s revived
urban core, is already heavily gentrified and still has a large amount of market-protected housing
(public and other subsidized units), thus may not have been targeted, or private equity
investments may have been less likely to collapse there. Bedford-Stuyvesant and Hollis have
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both been a major site of high-risk lending to homeowners, with the highest foreclosure rates in
the city (Armstrong et al., 2009, p. 12). Because of the concentration of Ten Year Plan activity in
the South Bronx, Mott Haven may have a greater amount of its rental housing under nonprofit
ownership or management or a long-term regulatory agreement.
Some community districts, such as Flatbush and East Flatbush in Brooklyn, never had
large amounts of abandoned property but now have among the highest rates of overleveraged
rental units. Both contain smaller areas (Ditmas Park in Flatbush, Prospect-Lefferts Gardens in
East Flatbush) positioned as Brooklyn’s new frontiers of gentrification with their more
affordable prices, proximity to Prospect Park, appealing housing stock and express subway lines
into Manhattan (Higgins 2013). Indeed residents of these neighborhoods have faced strong
displacement pressure as gentrification has pushed outward from the urban core (Wyly,
Newman, Schafran, & Lee, 2010).
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Figure 7: Predatory equity, 2011 and community districts with >500 abandoned properties,
1976-1981. Data: NYC DoF and Local Initiatives Support Corporation.
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Considering property distress levels adds another layer to the interpretation of these data.
Not all properties affected by predatory equity are in distress20 (yellow diamonds in Figure 7).
Instead we see that while East Flatbush and Flatbush have high levels of predatory equity,
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Measure of distress is based on the property’s Building Indicator Project score, calculated with public data on
building and housing code violations and liens. Buildings with scores of 800 or higher are in probably physical
and/or financial distress.

FROM PROPERTY ABANDONMENT TO PREDATORY EQUITY
76
	
  
relatively few of the properties caught up in these investments are in distress;
Inwood/Washington Heights in upper Manhattan and the entire Grand Concourse corridor in the
West Bronx also have high levels of predatory equity and in these neighborhoods, the properties
are in distress. This discrepancy may suggest that multifamily housing in the latter set of
neighborhoods is set to be junked for subsequent revalorization.
The spatial complexities of predatory equity’s relationship to property abandonment and
the uneven geography of distress among predatory equity deals offer no simple explanations.
Instead we might understand this spatiality as characterizing redrawn relations among property,
community, finance and local government, changes that are situated in the urban restructuring
begun in the 1970s.
Conclusions
To paraphrase the observations that opened this paper, today’s crisis of predatory equity
might seem to signal the distance New York City has come since its property abandonment crisis
of the 1970s. In this paper I have focused not so much on what is different (or the same) about
past and present, but on how trajectories of social, spatial and political action provide for
meaningful connections between these moments—how past becomes present. Encountering the
financialization of urban space requires that we problematize the present; here I have attempted
to do so through careful attention to the choices made over time in response to property
abandonment and how they structure available options, precipitate later crises and shape choices
made at critical junctures (Haydu, 1998). I have also worked to situate these choices in broader
processes of neoliberal urban restructuring, especially how choices at the federal level about
funding for cities, community development and affordable housing alternately serve to pressure
or to afford changes in direction at the local level. Thus the dismantling of federal support in the
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early 1980s pushed the city to dramatically retool its approach to disposition of in rem housing,
while the 1990s reformulation of community development around opening up “underserved
markets” to capital allowed the city to pursue the rapid privatization of the in rem stock.
By way of conclusion, I want to bring this analysis more fully into the present,
considering how the changing relationship between urban property and housing finance also
entails shifting geographies of power (Allen, 2011). In this topological approach, power
relationships “compose the spaces of which they are a part” (p. 284),21 playing out in “how
different actors act upon and respond to the contingency of what confronts them” (p.291). Here
power works spatially not through fixed scales of distance and location (topography), but
through the ability to make one’s presence felt—this could operate through drawing distant
others within close reach, or placing oneself beyond reach (Allen, 2011). Power topologies are
useful for understanding the contingencies confronting community organizations and the city as
finance capital has become the dominant force in urban growth and change since the 1970s
(Harvey, 2003; Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]).
This is especially relevant to the real estate market, where financial actors, tools and
imperatives have addressed the problem of spatially fixed commodities by developing processes
(such as securitization) that convert illiquid material assets to liquid resources exchangeable in
global investment markets (Gotham, 2009).

This capability generates opportunities for

investment that are beyond, or even distinct from, the property itself (Aalbers, 2008; Gotham,
2009; Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]; Newman, 2009). In a useful application of Lefebvre’s (1991)
theory of the production of space, Gotham (2009) argues that the financialization of housing thus
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Rather than being merely positioned in/extended across space, as in a topographic approach.
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entails the creation (and destruction) of mortgage markets as new spaces for profit. By detaching
financial space from urban space, the financialization of housing also transforms power
topologies, changing the “reach” of community organizations and the city in responding to
predatory equity.
Shifting power geographies
Even as property abandonment destroyed the built environment, that crisis was also
constitutive of a social, political and organizational infrastructure of community housing groups.
Local policies addressing abandonment professionalized these organizations, subjecting activists
and community groups to new expectations, requirements, and discipline but also making the
actors and solutions advanced through the self-help housing movement key players in
neighborhood development and central to the city’s long-term plan for rebuilding neighborhoods.
Community organizations and alternative disposition mechanisms, such as nonprofit
rental/limited equity ownership, became an enduring part of the housing landscape in New York
City (see figure 1.8). It is this infrastructure that has been pivotal to identifying predatory equity
as a threat to the city’s housing stock and renters, in generating a discourse around the threat and
data to substantiate this claim, and advocating with the city and the judicial system to pass
legislation and programs to help address this threat (Fields, in revision).
The activism and organizing, professionalization, and the role of organizations in
partnering with the city to rebuild after abandonment has thus been important to the role this
infrastructure is playing in contesting predatory equity. However the organizations emerging
from the abandonment crisis were confronting the effects of a junked housing market, and the
direction of their professionalization since then has been toward real estate development,
property management and negotiating tax credit programs. Remaining within the circuit of the
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built environment, even the most sophisticated community organizations may not be able to
“make their presence felt” within circuits of capital. Therefore compared to the central role
community housing groups played in responding to the abandonment crisis, today their role is
more marginal (interview with Benjamin Dulchin, 2011) precisely because it is largely bounded
to property; whereas financial actors can operate in both spaces of capital and in urban space.
Figure 1.8: Geographic distribution of low-income cooperatives today relative to
concentrations of abandoned properties in 1976-1981. Data: NYC DoF, Urban Homesteading
Assistance Board
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For example, community organizations have attempted to recapture properties as
predatory equity deals fall into foreclosure which entails first raising capital and negotiating to
buy the note from the loan servicer, and then assuming the mortgage and completing foreclosure
themselves. This is a capital- and time-intensive process, and requires legal and financial skills
nonprofit organizations typically don’t have in-house. Because the objective here is to reclaim
the property to preserve as affordable rental housing, organizations seek to acquire the note from
the mortgage servicer at a substantial discount, both to bring debt back into line with rent levels
and because they will require financing for rehabilitation due to property deterioration. However
the growth of a global private equity distressed debt market has made the purchase of distressed
mortgage notes for large multifamily properties around the U.S. a major investment opportunity
in the post-bubble years (Ascierto, 2010). Community organizations therefore find themselves
struggling to make claims on financial institutions: as distressed debt becomes a commodity of
its own in the space of finance, its value is separable from material conditions in urban space.
Here we might look to the role of the city in responding to predatory equity. Certainly the
city doesn’t want to see a return to the devastation of the 1970s and 1980s. Eager to protect the
investment it made in residential neighborhoods, it has stepped up code enforcement in response
to predatory equity, e.g. doing roof to cellar inspections and getting code violations documented
(this facilitates other programs, such as emergency repairs and 7-A receivership). Recently the
city also passed a new local law that will hold landlords accountable for addressing underlying
physical conditions, allowing the city to issue orders (enforceable in Housing Court) requiring
them to repair problems such as the source of water leaks rather than simply plastering over the
mold or holes they cause (Kusisto, 2013; Massey, 2012). Unfortunately the law does not hold
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owners of multifamily accountable for the underlying financial conditions (such as debt service
payments that outweigh rental income) that often prevent adequate maintenance and repairs.
Despite the city’s attention to code enforcement it has been hesitant to take a stronger
role in property disposition to recapture overleveraged properties, even though the market in
distressed debt can further physical decline as new investors load more debt onto properties (an
update on “milking the building” that took place in the 1970s). Instead, in response to advocacy
from the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development the city made a one-time
commitment of $750 million for the Multi-Family Preservation Program to incentivize banks to
sell overleveraged properties to affordable housing developers instead of financial actors
pursuing a capital leveraging strategy. While inadequate given the scale of many predatory
equity investments in the tens and hundreds of millions, the program does acknowledge and
make a small intervention in these dynamics, which threaten a prolonged period of deterioration
in the city’s affordable multifamily rental housing. Still, not unlike the abandonment crisis,
predatory equity calls for a stronger public role in property disposition. Yet the city is not only
reluctant to do so given the fiscal and political burden it faced as landlord of last resort, it is
unable to do so because of the regulatory architecture it set up to prevent a return to public
ownership of property.
However even in the absence of the kind of spectacular market collapse and blight seen
in the 1970s, such a role would not be unprecedented. Under Mayor Bloomberg the city has
taken up eminent domain enthusiastically (and under heavy criticism), deeming private property
blighted and seizing it for private development projects in the name of economic development,
e.g. the Atlantic Yards in downtown Brooklyn (cf. Bagli, 2011). How might eminent domain be
adapted to address blight created by speculative private equity real estate investment? Localities
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around the country are considering the use of eminent domain as a strategy to seize
overleveraged mortgages from bondholders and help climb out of the pit of housing debt (Bagli,
2011). Similarly New York City Council speaker and mayoral hopeful Christine Quinn has
proposed the city acquire distressed mortgage debt on multifamily properties at a discount with
bulk purchases, and then steer the properties to HPD-approved developers. Still, although the
city might claim more political influence than community-based organizations, its reach largely
remains within the sphere of property: even powers of eminent domain cannot (yet) extend to
financial territory.
The financialization of housing affords the production of a territory of housing finance
that can be developed and underdeveloped independent of physical property in urban space
(Gotham, 2009). This changes the relationship of the urban to the political economy in ways that
shape uneven geographies of power: finance can make itself felt in property, while the territory
of finance is often beyond the reach of community organizations and the city. In the
financialization of housing we therefore see intensified contradictions between property’s use
and exchange values that worsen displacement pressures (Wyly et al., 2010). Nonprofit or social
housing approaches are both more necessary to prevent displacement and ensure social
reproduction, and less tenable as urban space is ever more integrated in global circuits of
financial production. This moment signals a new critical juncture for urban policy and
community practice, and an imperative to develop new spatial tactics that can draw finance back
into material environments, or act within financial territories.
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Appendix 1.1
Defining and measuring property abandonment

83

Property abandonment is a lengthy process. Here I operationalize abandonment as the
point at which the local government (the fiscal division) seizes a property after an in rem
judgment has been obtained for property tax default. The NYC DoF provided me with data on all
real property transactions at the tax parcel level from 1976-1981; from this dataset I extracted all
transactions in which the property deed was transferred from the DoF to the City of New York.
While some property owners redeemed their back taxes following property seizure and were able
to reclaim their properties, this represents a minority of the volume of properties taken into city
ownership.
A major challenge for using this archival data in a Geographic Information System is the
lack of digital tax parcel maps for the 1970s and the changes since the late 1970s in the
geography of tax parcels due to condominium conversion, demolition and redevelopment. Given
this challenge I elected to aggregate the tax parcel-level data up to the tax block level, as tax
blocks have remained more consistent over time. This provided a count of abandoned properties
per tax block, for each year from 1976-1981. Because the DoF data is based on administrative
records, the yearly data also reflects the vagaries of administrative procedures—the city did not
complete in rem takings throughout every borough every year; instead it completed them on an
as-needed basis. This means that the yearly data might skip over some parts of the city in any
given year. For this reason I also aggregated data over time, resulting in a total count of
abandoned properties per tax block for the entire 1976-1981 period. In short the data is
aggregated up over both space and time.
One final limitation of the administrative data is that it does not include information
about the characteristics of the properties—in particular, it lacks information on the number of
units. Given the variation in New York City’s housing stock, which can range from single-family
dwellings to multifamily properties with hundreds or thousands of units, this information is
important. Therefore I contextualize the community district count abandoned properties with
other information about geographic variations in housing stock.
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Appendix 1.2
List of participants from the affordable housing, community development or community
economic development sector
Veteran professionals (n=11)
Name
Jim Buckley
Richard Conley
Bruce Dale
Al DelliBovi
Harry DeRienzo
Roger Hayes
Walter Roberts
Harold Shultz
Ismene Speliotis
John Warren
Tom Webler

Organization
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy
Coalition
Community Preservation Corporation*
Community Preservation Corporation*
Federal Home Loan Bank of New York*
Banana Kelly
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy
Coalition (currently Assistant Commissioner,
Harlem District Public health office)
Hope Community, Inc.
Citizens Housing and Planning Council of
New York City**
Mutual Housing Association of New York
Workforce Housing Advisors (formerly of
HPD)**
PWB Property Management***

Geographic focus
Northwest Bronx
Citywide
Citywide
New York State
South Bronx
Northwest Bronx
East Harlem
Citywide
Citywide
Citywide
Bronx

*These organizations mainly engage in lending and financial activities
**This is a real estate think tank
***These organizations are private/for-profit
Midcareer professionals (n=5)
Name
Benjamin
Dulchin
Dina Levy
Gregory Lobo
Jost
Henry Serrano
Salvatore
D’Avola

Organization
Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development
Urban Homesteading Assistance Board
University Neighborhood Housing Program

Geographic focus
Citywide

Community Voices Heard
Neighborhood Restore*

East Harlem
Citywide

Citywide
Northwest Bronx

*This organization administers the city’s Third Party Transfer program
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Emerging professionals (n=9)
Name
Organization
Tamara Czyczk
Community Action for Safe Apartments
Emily Goldstein Tenants and Neighbors
Katie Goldstein
Tenants and Neighbors
Juan Haro
Movement for Justice in el Barrio
Robert
Catholic Migration Office
McCreanor
Kerim Odekon
HPD
Gabriel Pendas
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy
Coalition
Carmen Piniero
Community Voices Heard
Erica Sims
Neighborhood Restore*

Geographic focus
West Bronx
New York State
New York State
East Harlem
West Queens
Citywide
Northwest Bronx
East Harlem
Citywide

*This organization administers the city’s Third Party Transfer program
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Abstract
Researchers at the intersection of society, economy and space often frame the dwellings and
communities of low- and moderate-income families as sites of capital extraction. Rarely entering
the space of the home, such work neglects an opportunity to connect financialization and lived
experience. Extending discussions of financialization into rental housing, this paper focuses on a
wave of aggressive, high-risk private equity investment in New York City’s affordable rental
sector to examine the consequences of financialization for housing quality, the meaning of home,
social reproduction and politicization among low-income tenants. Concentrated in low-income,
minority neighborhoods, investors’ financial risks become embodied in tenants’ health and wellbeing, social and familial relationships and housing security. The toll of financialization on
renters highlights the tensions between the city as a site of capitalist production and the
imperative of social reproduction for city residents. Financialization speaks to changing social
relations of rent. The distanciated and diffuse nature of relationships between investors and
underlying assets facilitates the neglect of the realities of lived experience in favor of a vision of
added value and increased rental income through renovation and release of ‘under-market
assets’.

Keywords: financialization, housing, tenants, home, ontological security, social reproduction,
class-monopoly rent
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The lived experience of predatory equity: Financialization and the meaning of home

The financial value associated with mortgages, derivatives and other financial
investments based on housing, and the role these housing assets play in the economy, has grown
and changed dramatically in recent years. Among researchers at the intersection of society,
economy and space, discussions of this financialization of housing often privilege the workings
of financial circuits, high-level capital flows, and the actors associated with these flows. We
frame the dwellings and communities of low- and moderate-income families as market segments
and sites of capital extraction without ever entering into the space of the home. Stopping short in
this way neglects an opportunity to connect the economic process of financialization with its
impact on kin and social relations, health and well being, and housing security. Our knowledge
of the financialization of housing therefore tends to be capital-centric, and not fleshed out with
lived experience. This paper engages with financialization of the rental-housing sector, and its
consequences for the meaning of home, social reproduction and politicization among lowincome tenants in New York City. I take up complex and changing emotional relationships to the
home in the context of concerns about financialization and inequality. Understandings of
emotional relationships with the home often emphasize positive affect rather than a full range
and complexity of emotional experience (Manzo, 2003). Moreover, we too often conceive of
emotional relationships with places as “individualistic, mentalistic, and apolitical” (Dixon &
Durrheim, 2000, p.31); this paper aims to attend to the collective, conscious and politically
contested nature of such relationships.
The increasing interdependence of housing markets and financial markets means that
risks in one arena carry over to the other (Aalbers, 2008), as when the widespread marketing of
high-risk loan products set off a wave of foreclosures that in turn endangered the global economy
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in 2007-2008 (Martin, 2011). Nancy Fraser (2010) opens the way for an analysis of how this
financial crisis jeopardizes “the capacity of families and communities to care for their members
and to maintain social bonds” (p. 21) by emphasizing the convergence of ecology, finance, and
social reproduction. I take a holistic social ecological perspective to draw more explicit linkages
between the latter two of these strands. A social ecological framework considers the complex
interplay of social, historical, economic and political factors characterizing “truly difficult social
issues”, attending to how these factors, and the multi-level, cumulative and reciprocal
relationships among them, shape outcomes at the individual or household level (Libman, Fields,
& Saegert, 2011a, 2011b). For example, a large body of research now documents that minority
and low-income communities have experienced disproportionate rates of high-risk lending and
foreclosure, and attendant consequences of vacant properties, reduced property values and losses
to local economies (Allen, 2011; Bromley et al., 2008; Kaplan & Sommers, 2009; Newman &
Wyly, 2004; Schloemer, Li, Ernst, & Keest, 2006). A social-ecological perspective builds on
these uneven structural dynamics of foreclosure by tracing their connections to household and
community health and social and psychological well-being. Such a perspective is critical if we
are to understand financialization as it plays out at the level of lived experience, and develop
adequate social, political and policy efforts to ameliorate the risks this may pose to individuals,
households and communities.
This study examines how the financialization of housing touches the lives of tenants. As
in the single-family market, the multifamily real estate market experienced inflated property
values, demand for mortgage-backed investment products and rapid turnover during the early to
mid 2000s real estate bubble (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Parkus & An, 2009).
Whereas the foreclosure crisis in owner-occupied homes has sparked interest in the
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financialization of housing among urban planners, geographers and sociologists, the conversation
has not yet carried over to multifamily rental housing. The bust in rental properties lagged behind
the downturn of the homeownership market, but delinquency and foreclosure rates on
multifamily properties rose dramatically by 2009, on securitized loans most of all (Joint Center
for Housing Studies, 2011a, 2011b). Owners of large rental properties rarely risk losing their
homes if their investment fails but stand to benefit if their investments are successful; indeed the
commodification of mortgage finance allows capital market investors to profit from both
successful and unsuccessful investments in property. In both cases, tenants may experience direct
and negative social, psychological, and material impacts (Brescia, 2008). Therefore in this study
I implement a social-ecological perspective by connecting the dynamics of financialization in
multifamily rental housing to their impact on the physical and social environment of rental
properties, and considering how this environment shapes experiences of home, social
reproduction and politicization among low-income tenants.
“Predatory equity”, a form of investment affecting New York City’s affordable rental
housing stock (e.g. buildings covered by state rent regulations) is the basis for this analysis.
During the recent real estate boom private equity funds and other investors purchased scores of
affordable rental buildings at prices that far exceeded their worth, expecting to increase returns
by flipping the building to another speculator or by increasing rents once tenants paying
affordable rents vacated their units (Center for Urban Pedagogy, 2009; Morgenson, 2008). Since
the start of the economic downturn in 2007-2008 many of these properties stand overleveraged,
with large gaps between rent rolls and mortgage payments putting them at risk of foreclosure or
further speculation (Bagli, 2008; Shultz, 2009). Predatory equity may be placed in the context of
a financialization of social goods, where such goods serve as the materials for financial
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production and capital accumulation at the expense of the general public (Fine, 2009; Fraser,
2010).
This paper reports on interviews and focus groups conducted with tenants of buildings
affected by predatory equity as part of a larger study about how housing crises have reshaped
New York City’s urban landscape. It is organized into four sections following this introduction.
In the background section, I discuss financialization and housing generally and rental housing
specifically, the meaning of home, and provide more details on predatory equity. In the research
context section I give an overview of the methodology, data, participants and their buildings. The
findings section details the changes in living conditions associated with predatory equity,
analyzes the impact this had on the meaning of home and social reproduction, and discusses
tenant resistance and politicization. I conclude by arguing that financialization of rental housing
transforms the social relations of rent by replacing the actors involved, redefining rental housing
as a short-term investment, and distancing accountability. Predatory equity represents a mode of
“accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003) whereby renters are dispossessed of housing
security so as to direct profits to a small group of fund managers and investors. This represents a
rescaling of risk, as low-income tenants and the public more broadly bear the brunt of the
negative social externalities associated with finance actors, markets and imperatives.
Background
Financialization denotes an economic shift where growth revolves around financial
markets, products and practices rather than the production of durable goods (Krippner, 2005).
This entails the expansion and proliferation of financial instruments and services, and the
increasing influence of financial markets, actors and intermediaries in arenas seemingly distinct
from finance (Fine, 2009; Pike & Pollard, 2010; Stockhammer, 2010). The recent housing
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bubble and twin mortgage and financial crises have made the potential social and spatial
implications of financialization quite evident. In that crisis, advances in mortgage finance and
securitization (paired with old-fashioned deceptive and discriminatory marketing techniques)
spawned a newfound ability to generate profits and liquidity by monetizing the built environment
(Gotham, 2009). Newman (2009) positions mortgages as “post-industrial widgets”: the raw
materials by which capital can be extracted from local urban sites and channeled into global
flows, connecting the materiality of place with the “ethereal world of securities and investment”
(p.316). Aalbers (2008) argues that financialization changed the role of mortgage markets from
facilitating borrowers’ access to credit to facilitating global investment. The logics and
imperatives of global finance endorse speculation and normalize volatility. Thus in the
financialization of housing short-term, high-risk investments; packaging and repackaging
commodities; edging out other investors, bidding up prices and competition; and increasing
market activity generally all come to shape local housing markets.
Predatory equity in New York City
The case of predatory equity illustrates the financialization of rental housing. The term
“predatory equity” implicates both the actors involved (frequently private equity firms and other
corporate institutional investors) and the extractive nature of the investments themselves, while
also drawing parallels to the risks of predatory lending seen in the foreclosure crisis. During the
real estate boom of the mid-2000s private equity funds began to heavily target their purchases in
New York City’s rent-stabilized buildings and other sectors of the affordable rental market, such
as developments with expiring subsidies. About half of the city’s rental units are subject to state
rent regulations that are designed to protect tenants from sharp rent increases; the Rent
Guidelines Board set annual rent increases. Investors bought up multi-building portfolios at
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prices sharply inflated by a real estate bubble that drove commercial real estate prices above
sustainable levels (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010), and by investors’ own expectations
that they would quickly generate higher returns through increased tenant turnover and rent
increases (Morgenson, 2008). Over time it has become clear that lower-tier speculators and even
old-school slumlords are also participating in the process, causing some to discuss the issue in
more general terms, e.g. “overleveraged” properties.
The Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) found that from
2005-2009 private equity-backed developers purchased 100,000 units of affordable rentregulated housing, or roughly 10% of the overall supply of such units (ANHD, 2009). In the
context of the broader housing bubble and saturation of other market sectors, multifamily
housing represented a profitable frontier for surplus capital. Investors took advantage of the flood
of financing in the growing multifamily lending market (Joint Center for Housing Studies,
2011b) to open up value in buildings where rent protections kept rents below market values.
Loopholes, incentives and lack of oversight and enforcement in the New York State rent
regulation system could all be exploited to raise rents and de-regulate units (move rents beyond
the $2000 mark), thus allowing investors to increase profits by charging prevailing market rents.
Underwriting documents for several predatory equity deals show aggressive “tenant turnover”
plans (20-30% in the first year in buildings with vacancy rates of less than 1% upon purchase)
with no basis in the actual rate (5-10% annually) of tenant turnover in the rent-regulated housing
stock (ANHD, 2009). Indeed, based on their inflated loan sizes (debt service coverage ratios of
.55/1) (ANHD, 2009) and sheer scale (the purchase of portfolios as large as 50 buildings),
predatory equity deals required dramatic rent increases, tenant turnover, and curtailed
maintenance costs to be sustained.
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Concerns related to properties purchased by predatory equity thus include high rates of
eviction, tactics such as illegal rent increases, and systematic strategies of harassment aimed at
hastening vacancies (ANHD, 2009; Morgenson, 2008). Since the market downturn in 2008, the
issue of unsustainable debt on predatory equity investments has come to the fore. New York
City’s multifamily housing sector has experienced increased foreclosures, reduced sales, and
price declines (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010). Predatory equity deals
also became financially unsupportable (ANHD, 2009; Shultz, 2009). Tightened underwriting
standards and credit flow limit the potential for refinancing risky multifamily loans (Parkus &
An, 2009), and banks have been reluctant to write down debts to sustainable levels (Shultz,
2009).
In this context, a market in distressed debt has emerged, with “vulture funds”
contributing to market churning of properties in various stages of default and foreclosure.
Vulture funds contribute to ongoing speculation because they buy distressed notes at close to
their (overleveraged) face value. This strategy may be aimed at remortgaging later to free up
cash and pay out dividends (Froud & Williams, 2007). But because it involves taking on more
debt on an already unsustainable loan, the market in distressed debt increases risks for already
cash-strapped properties (ANHD,

2009; Chiwaya et al., 2011). These developments raise

concerns about the effects of default, foreclosure and a wave of re-overleveraging on tenants and
the communities around overleveraged properties (Bagli, 2008; Chiwaya et al., 2011; Shultz,
2009; Shultz, Perine, Bahchieva, & Dasgupta, 2012).
Financialization and urban rental market inequality
Financialization of rental housing, especially multifamily buildings is of special
significance for cities, where higher-density housing is concentrated and renting is generally
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more common than owning.1 Multifamily dwellings require consistent maintenance, repairs and
management in order to sustain their physical and social environment and preserve long-term
investment potential. For many cities (including New York) the widespread deterioration and
abandonment of multifamily properties in the 1970s and 1980s is still a vivid memory after
decades of rebuilding. As in the broader real estate market a surge of high-risk multifamily
lending in the 2000s with loose underwriting standards and excessive leverage (i.e. high loan to
value ratios and low debt-service coverage ratios) led up to a commercial real estate downturn in
2007-2008 (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b;
Parkus & An, 2009), with increased loan delinquencies and foreclosure among multifamily loans
(Joint Center for Housing Studies 2011b). Commercial mortgage-backed securities have proved
especially risky, with issuers seeking borrowers based on short-term rather than long-term
payment ability (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b).
The financial distress in the multifamily mortgage market translates into consequences
for renters. In 2007, over half (60%) of foreclosure filings in New York City were on 2-4 or 5+
family dwellings, affecting 15,000 renter households; filings on 5+ family properties increased in
2008, expanding the number of renter households affected by foreclosure to 16,000 (Been,
2009). In buildings with five or more units, about 4000 units received a lis pendens in 2007; the
problem expanded dramatically at the peak of the city’s foreclosure crisis in 2009, when more
than 4500 units in 5+ family buildings received a notice of foreclosure in the first quarter of the
year alone (Been, 2009). In 2010 66% of all households in the city’s foreclosed properties were
renters, particularly in Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn, where the city’s multifamily housing
is concentrated (Weselcouch, 2012).
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The rise of default and foreclosure in the rental market has increased competition for
affordable rental units (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b; Swarns, 2008). As of 2009,
there were only two available, adequate and affordable rental units for every three very lowincome renters, and only one such unit for the poorest renters (Joint Center for Housing Studies,
2011a). Nationwide more than a quarter (26%) of renters faced severe rental cost burden in 2009
(paying more than half of income for housing costs), up from 21% in 2001 (Joint Center for
Housing Studies, 2011a, 2011b). In New York City 30% of renters were severely burdened by
housing costs in 2008 (Lee, 2009).
Instability in the rental market threatens to magnify renters’ existing vulnerability to
housing insecurity, which is linked to their lower incomes and higher unemployment rates (Joint
Center for Housing Studies, 2011a). This puts them at higher risk of being unable to cover
housing costs, even as U.S. renters have limited protections and resources available to offset this
insecurity. Compared to other wealthy industrialized (OECD) nations, policy support for
affordable rental housing is very limited here (especially compared to homeownership): renters
are unlikely to receive housing allowances (Andrews, Caldera Sanchez, & Johansson, 2011), and
the supply of public or social housing is small, and shrinking through programs like HOPE VI
that demolish old public housing developments. Legislation protects tenants of foreclosed rental
properties from abrupt housing loss but their living conditions may decline if owners are unable
or unwilling to invest in their properties (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011b). Low-income
tenants may be stuck in place, unable to afford the expenses of moving or better housing. The
deterioration of rental properties also stands to remove units from the market, compounding
affordability challenges by constraining supply. These concerns make the financialization
ofrental housing directly relevant to understanding contemporary urban inequality.
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In the owner-occupied market, foreclosure has had dramatically uneven consequences.
Building on historical patterns of social and spatial disadvantage, low- and moderate income and
minority communities and households have undergone the greatest loss of housing and financial
assets, class status, and well being (Saegert, Fields, & Libman, 2011; Wyly, Moos, Hammel, &
Kabahizi, 2009). The buildup of vacant foreclosed properties leads to depressed property values,
fragmented social bonds and increased crime in neighborhoods; in turn diminished tax revenues
limit funds for public services (Immergluck, 2009). Meanwhile well-publicized cases of
investment firms betting against mortgage securities they bundled and sold to investors show that
upstream actors even profited from the housing market collapse (Morgenson & Story, 2009;
Story & Morgenson, 2010). The foreclosure crisis has thus entailed the broad loss of household,
community and public assets while benefiting narrow finance capital interests, illustrating a
centralization of wealth captured in David Harvey’s (2003) notion of “accumulation by
dispossession”. In Harvey’s formulation, today’s accumulation by dispossession operates
through finance capital and the credit system, working in concert with the state (as in the
rollback of banking and finance regulations in the US throughout the 1980s and 1990s). The
process of accumulation by dispossession addresses problems of surplus capital accumulation by
providing cheap inputs or opening new markets (as in the broad expansion of the subprime
mortgage market) (Harvey 2003; Arrighi 2004).
As in the foreclosure crisis, predatory equity also destabilizes housing and neighborhoods
for the financial benefit of investors. A 2012 report by the Citizen’s Housing and Planning
Council of New York City applied some of the analytic techniques used in the study of singlefamily foreclosure to study how multifamily buildings in New York City that are overmortgaged
or have gone through foreclosure affect the surrounding community. Compared to buildings not
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located near such properties, those near overleveraged properties had twice the increase in
serious housing code violations (increase of 13.7% vs. 6.3%) and dramatic increases in
emergency repair liens (198% increase vs. 39% decrease) (Shultz et al., 2012). The New York
City neighborhoods with the highest rates of overleveraged property have higher rates of poverty
and unemployment and more African-American and Latino residents. Indeed predatory equity is
concentrated to a large extent in areas of the city that have experienced persistent poverty, social
problems, and limited availability of public and private services since the deep disinvestment
suffered in the late 1970s (Fields, in preparation). These observations about predatory equity
show how, in practice, financialization might “exacerbate unevenness across individuals, social
groups and organizations in space and place” (Pike & Pollard, 2010 p.34).
Predatory equity represents a fundamental risk to the quality and durability of
relationships with the home. This connects with “ontological security”, a core idea in thinking
about the meaning of home that refers to a “sense of confidence in the continuity of one’s
identity and the constancy of their social and material environments” (Dupuis & Thorns, 1998
p.27). Such continuity and constancy is a deep psychological need fundamental to maintaining a
stable mental state (Hulse & Saugeres, 2008). Subjective experiences of safety, security, privacy,
autonomy, and positive social status in the home correspond to the idea of ontological security
(Hiscock, Kearns, MacIntyre, & Ellaway, 2001). For a dwelling to provide ontological security,
it should offer a stable social and material environment; a spatial context for daily living routines
(sleeping, cooking, bathing, etc.); control, agency and freedom from surveillance; and the
security to construct identity and relationships (Dupuis & Thorns, 1998).
The idea of ontological security shows how housing precariousness can disrupt wellbeing. Housing insecurity intersects with other dimensions of “precarious living” that constrain
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agency and empowerment, such as financial, employment and health insecurity (Hulse &
Saugeres, 2008). When individual choice and control are limited and risk increased in these other
dimensions, home becomes even more significant as a site of ontological security. Renters, lowincome households, residents of socially and spatially segregated neighborhoods and other social
groups exposed to uneven development thus face greater constraints on the psychosocial benefits
of home (Hiscock et al., 2001). The broader landscape of insecurity in a neoliberal political
economy, the logic of risk so pervasive in financialization, and the impact of the global
economic recession on job security and public services all threaten ontological security along
longstanding fault lines of race and class by undermining housing stability for low-income,
minority and other marginalized populations.
Research Context
This project employed focus groups, a qualitative research method, to build knowledge
about the impact of financialization on renters’ home life. Qualitative methods afford the
development of novel concepts, linkages among previously unconnected domains, and the
examination of issues that are not yet very well understood by allowing for the detailed
expression of experiences. Focus groups are socially grounded: they are based in shared
experiences and relationships, promoting interaction and elaboration on individual responses
through participants’ conversations (Morgan, 1995; Wilkinson, 1999). The potential to draw out
collective understanding of the social and political processes shaping individual experiences
(Wilkinson, 1999) was especially important in employing focus groups in this study.
The findings reported here are based on a series of five focus groups with a total of 27
participants in the summer and fall of 2011. A majority of participants were female (65%) and
low-income (40% reported annual income below $10,000; 60% below $30,000); all were Black
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or Latino (table 2.1 provides a demographic overview of participants). Participants were drawn
from 10 buildings involving three separate investment portfolios located in Fordham/University
Heights (Bronx community district 5), Hunts Point (Bronx community district 2) and Crown
Heights (Brooklyn community district 8). This paper cannot fully represent the experiences of
tenants affected by predatory equity; for example I do not address the experiences of tenants who
moved due to harassment by owners, rent increases, or declining living conditions. However
participants’ demographic profile is generally similar to the neighborhoods their buildings are
located in. The population in all three neighborhoods is predominantly minority but Crown
Heights is more African-American whereas Fordham/University Heights and Hunts Point have
greater shares of Hispanic residents. Crown Heights also has a lower share of residents receiving
public assistance, Supplemental Security Income or Medicaid (38%) than Hunts Point and
Fordham/University Heights where more than half of residents receive income support. In Table
2.2, I provide detailed information about the property portfolios.
Table 2.1: Participant demographic overview (n=27)
Gender: 65%
female

Median age: 44
years (age range
25-75)

Household size: 55%
live alone or with one
other person
(maximum household
size: 7 people)

Children: 30%
of participants
had children
under 18 in the
home

Median length
of residence in
2011: 5 years
(range from 10
months to 42
years)

Race/ethnicity
54% Black (8% Afro Caribbean-American)
46% Latino (19% Dominican/Puerto Rican)
Marital status
56% single
20% married/partnered
24% divorced/separated or
widowed
Income
40% report
20% report yearly
25% report yearly income
15% report yearly income
yearly income
income between
between $30,000 and
greater than $50,000
of less than
$10,000 and $30,000
$50,000
$10,000
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Table 2: Ownership, investment and distress in predatory equity portfolios
Portfolio

Fordham/University
Heights (15 participants)
10 buildings (participants
from 6 buildings)
25-86 units

Hunts Point (9 participants)
4 buildings (participants from
3 buildings)
7-32 units

Crown Heights (3
participants)
2 buildings (participants
from 1 building)
6 units each

Purchased in 2007 by Los
Angeles-based private
equity firm Milbank Real
Estate with $35M Deutsche
Bank mortgage
Mortgage servicing
transferred three times
between 2007 and 2009.

Ownership of the buildings is
unclear: they were purchased
through an LLC for $745,000
in 1999.

Local investor Bernard
Neiderman purchased the
properties for $388,000 in
2003.

Refinanced at least three
times, most recently for $5M
in 2009.

Ten refinance loans between
2003 and 2008 ranged from
$122,000 to $1.1M. Loans
cross-collateralized these
properties with four other
nearby buildings.

Distress

Properties in foreclosure by
2009. In 2010 the Bronx
Supreme Court orders
mortgage servicer to pay
$2.5M for repairs to
address more than 3000
housing code violations.

Between the two buildings
there were 247 open housing
code violations as of
December 2011.

Disposition

Scarsdale-based developer
Steve Finkelstein purchases
the portfolio in 2011 for
approximately $26M.
Properties are under
rehabilitation and residents
extracted affordability
agreements.

Conditions deteriorated rapidly
after 2009 refinance:
properties had more than 2000
housing code violations by
2011. Owners continued
collecting rent but would not
pay property management
company to make repairs.
Ridgewood Savings Bank filed
foreclosure in 2010.
Affordable housing developer
Workforce Housing Advisors
purchased the distressed note
at foreclosure auction in 2011,
and is working closely with
community groups to
rehabilitate the properties.

Portfolio
size
Building
size
Ownership

Financing
history

	
  

After being in foreclosure
for more than two years, in
2012 the Mutual Housing
Association of NY was able
to purchase the buildings’
mortgage notes from New
York Community Bank
through a new first look
program for distressed
multifamily loans.
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Focus groups included two to nine participants, and were conducted in spaces provided
by community organizations, or in participants’ homes. Conversations were organized around
participants’ experiences as tenants of distressed properties, with questions addressing living
conditions; physical and mental health impacts of living conditions; tenant responses to the
problems they faced in their buildings; and how tenants framed their experiences with predatory
equity overall. New topics that arose during earlier conversations, such as personal investment in
repairs, were added as questions in later focus groups. Focus groups were one to two hours in
duration, audio-recorded and professionally transcribed. Participants were recruited by
circulating information about the study at open meetings of CBOs; referrals provided by CBO
contacts; posting flyers in buildings; and snowball sampling based on referrals by
participants.2 Analysis began with developing a coding scheme through hand-review of focus
group transcripts. Further coding, including developing additional categories as needed, took
place in Dedoose, a web-based analysis program.3 Coded excerpts were analyzed for the cooccurrence of two or more codes to identify interrelationships among concepts and categories;
excerpts were then downloaded as spreadsheets for further analysis and interpretation.
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The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, and Banana
Kelly Community Improvement Association all provided support in recruiting tenant participants.
3
The application allows for integration of qualitative and quantitative data, interactive visualization of data, and
dynamic coding.
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Findings
Living Conditions
The incidence of distress4 increased throughout the city’s multifamily housing generally
between 2008 and 2010, likely in connection with tightened credit and heightened financial
strain. This increase was greater in the neighborhoods with the highest prevalence of
overleveraged properties, and incidence of distress increased most dramatically in the properties
directly affected by private equity investment, even though they started off with much higher
rates of distress (see figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Changes in multifamily property distress from 2008 to 2010

Changes in NYC multifamily property distress,
2008-2010

21%

distress, 2008
distress, 2010

9.60%
5.50%

2.80%

citywide

7%
4.30%

high prevalence
neighborhoods

overleveraged properties in
high-prevalence
neighborhoods

Likewise, participants’ buildings showed dramatically increased physical and/or financial
distress from 2008 to 2010 (a score of 800 or higher indicates probable distress; see figure 2.22.4). Although more than half of the buildings had scores above 800 that already indicated
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4

The University Neighborhood Housing Program started the Building Indicator Project; the project calculates an
index score of distress for every multifamily building in New York City based on city records of housing code
violations and property liens.
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distress in 2008, their 2010 scores indicated a dramatic (up to eightfold) increase in just two
years.
Figure 2.2: Change in distress from 2008-2010, Fordham/University Heights participants’
buildings
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Figure 2.3: Change in distress from 2008-2010, Hunts Point participants’ buildings
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Figure 2.4: Change in distress from 2008-2010, Crown Heights participants’ building
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Indeed, tenants described a wholesale deterioration in their living conditions associated
with the role of predatory equity investment practices and their buildings remained under varying
levels of physical distress at the time of data collection in summer and fall 2011. By far the lack
of heat and hot water was mentioned most frequently—some went a full winter without heat or
hot water; others had more sporadic and unpredictable services. Stories of ceilings caving in due
to water damage, or of gaps and holes in walls going unrepaired were common; this allowed
infestations of rats, mice and cockroaches to spread easily. Unrepaired leaks in pipes, faulty
radiators, and general water damage caused collateral damage in the form of mold and mildew.
At building entrances locks were constantly broken, allowing anyone from the street to enter:
tenants reported coming home to find strangers lurking near elevators and stairwells. Tenants
were incensed about “patch over” repairs, which led to worsened conditions over the long term
as major systems and structural integrity continued to deteriorate. Severe destruction caused by
fires and floods was sometimes left unrepaired, or merited only cosmetic repair. Social
conditions worsened as vagrants, prostitutes and drug dealers accessed common areas and vacant
units; longtime residents reported that new tenants moving in also contributed to the social
breakdown.
Although accustomed to some level of wear and tear in their housing, even the seasoned
tenants participating in this study characterized their living conditions as inexcusable: “You
always find with buildings that something breaks…they have a leak, or got some walls falling,
things deteriorate, and that’s understandable…what happened in my building, none of that
should have happened. That’s too much” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). In some cases,
longtime residents connected the physical deterioration of their buildings to changes in
ownership. Those who moved into their buildings more recently reported their living conditions
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seemed fine when they moved in, but began to deteriorate quickly: “My impression was that it
wasn’t a bad deal…the apartment was very, very nice [upon moving in in 2006]. I moved in and
stuff started breaking immediately” (Hunts Point tenant).
Meaning of Home
These living conditions compromised tenants’ basic humanity, as a Fordham/University
Heights tenant described: “You come home, and you’re frustrated already because for the last
three days you haven’t been able to take a decent bath...you really don’t want to turn around and
have to warm up water to carry it to the bathroom to wash up”. Tenants were unable to relax at
home: “You can’t be comfortable—you don’t even have an apartment where you can go and
listen to music because its so freezing in the house” (Fordham/University Heights tenant).
Without heat, even sleep was a stressful proposition: “Me and my daughter, we had to sleep in
the coats. Coats and the whole thing. The only thing we didn’t have on is boots” (Hunts Point
tenant). Tenants felt powerless and stripped of dignity because they lacked control over these
fundamental activities of daily life at home. Low incomes and the high cost of housing and
moving limited their options, reflecting participants’ lack of class privilege: “It affects you
because you gotta deal with it…especially if you ain’t Donald Trump’s son or something, you
can’t just go up to the Hamptons, you gotta put up with it” (Hunts Point tenant). It is unclear to
what extent this degradation and under-maintenance was due to efforts to secure rent increases
(through inciting vacancies, then making major capital improvements), versus being the
byproduct of a risky investment pushed over the edge. Nevertheless it meant that home became
something participants had to bear, rather than a means of comfort, dignity security and respite
from the world.
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Tenants were worn down by having to adjust all of their routines to accommodate the
deterioration of their homes. A young man living with his mother and sister in a
Fordham/University Heights portfolio building described how this affected cooking and eating:
“Always have to be buying mousetraps, and putting them all around in the kitchen, in the
hallways, so that was very, very tiring…you can’t even leave food, to this day, on top of the stove
because rats come in through the stove.” Others reported being woken up by the sounds of rats
scurrying overhead during the night and “praying that no rat crawls out of the ceiling and drops
on my child’s face” (Hunts Point tenant). Tenants were also “infuriated” and “mad with the
world because of how we’re living” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). An exchange among
the Crown Heights tenants illustrates how living conditions linked to predatory equity
undermined the psychosocial benefits of home:
P1: You’re always upset, you’re upset from the time you open the door.
P2: Yeah. I – I feel that way.
P1: When I come in here, my stress level raise…I cry… It’s very unhealthy. I am unhappy.
P2: You think when you come home, you come home to your sanctuary, right?…So when you
come home and you think of it, like, all these problems I’m like, you know, it’s not comfortable at
all.
Social reproduction
Predatory equity also affected physical health, kin relationships at home, and social
relationships outside the home. These implications of predatory equity interrupt social
reproduction, framed by Nancy Fraser (2011) as the ability of families to care for one another,
maintain social bonds and build community, and to participate in the work of recuperating bodies
and spirits. Cindi Katz (2001) attends to how the mobility of capitalism runs counter to the
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placebound processes of social reproduction, which most often revolve around means of
existence such as food, clothing, shelter and health care. Particularly relevant to the struggles of
participants in this study is Katz’s focus on how the environment of social reproduction—the
spaces in which it is enacted—shapes the outcomes of this process.
The communities investors targeted already contend with greater burdens of chronic
health problems, crime, poverty, and poor access to amenities and services; predatory equity
served to further limit social reproduction. For example, the incidence of asthma is highest in
New York City’s poor, African-American and Latino communities due to poor housing, air
pollution and noxious land uses in such areas (Corburn, Osleeb, & Porter, 2006). Predatory
equity adds to this burden as financial risk translated to mold and mildew, rodents and other
vermin, and increased dust, plaster and paint in the air as walls and ceilings degraded. Those that
already had asthma described flareups they attributed to their living conditions: “At one point I
went to the emergency room…Not that serious, just my asthma flaring up or whatever, but if
those conditions weren’t there, then I probably wouldn’t have had to go to the emergency room,
or my doctor several times” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). Another explained how
unpredictable elevator service intersected with her asthma: “I’m on the fifth floor, so when we
didn’t have the elevator, that got tiring. I’m an asthmatic. That killed me some days to walk up
and down the stairs…I couldn’t go food shopping properly, because I couldn’t do anything
properly” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). Elevator service also affected the mobility of
elderly tenants: “I use a cane…You come downstairs on the elevator—‘oh, I can go shopping’—
You’d go shopping, come back, and no elevator”, and those with physical disabilities: “The lady
upstairs has a son in a wheelchair. She has to bring him down the stairs for school, and it’s a
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lot…a lady, carrying her son down the stairs because the elevators don’t work”
(Fordham/University Heights tenant).
Many simply felt constantly sick and run down due to their building’s physical distress.
A mother in Crown Heights described her situation: “Before they [the city’s emergency repair
program] changed the boiler system, in my room it used to be all black… they didn’t have the
proper exhaust going outside, so it was coming up in my room…if you cough and blow out,
you’re blowing out black soot.” In the Bronx, participants’ families “would always be sneezing,
have allergies. Always get some kind of cold or something, because those fumes or whatever, and
the dust coming in, affected them” (Fordham/University Heights tenant).
The stresses accompanying these living conditions strained family relations, with young
people coping by staying away: “When a lot of that was happening, I wasn’t coming home a lot.
I would stay out…I would hang out outside until 1:00 in the morning. I would sleep at my
friend’s house…my mom would think that I was dabbling in drugs” (Fordham/University
Heights tenant). Describing the same situation from a different perspective, a Crown Heights
tenant said “I have an 18 year old here, and she hates it here…you know, now they have friends
and she don’t bring nobody by…” On the one hand parents are worried about what youth are
doing when they’re not home, and guilty about not being able to provide a home where their
family wants to be; on the other youth feel the embarrassment and lack of social status associated
with their living conditions. Parents undertook extra work to ensure younger children wouldn’t
be stigmatized: “You don’t want your kid at school smelly, and you won’t be smelly, so you gotta
boil up two baths” (Hunts Point tenant). Worries emerged about how living conditions would
affect school performance: “See when you live in a house where its falling down around you and
you can barely do any better, it adds to, how are you gonna tell a child that ‘I want you to go to
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school and do your homework and get good marks’ when he’s living where the rats are running
in there…its going to affect them, it just leads to frustration on top of frustration”. Indeed, as a
tenant in Crown Heights argued, “when people are living in these environments, kids can’t sleep
in the night, you don’t have heat, they say they can’t study, its breaking down every different
aspect of your life.”
For others, anger and frustration disrupted spousal relationships: “I don’t want to be
cuddling up with my husband and I’m frustrated because the hot water…it just wasn’t smooth
sailing”. Another Fordham/University Heights tenant painted a vivid picture of how after
bathing with water he’d heated up himself, “smoke is coming out of your nose because you’re so
frustrated. And you walk to your table and dinner’s not made because your wife’s sick after four
days of this weather, no hot water, there’s no heat, and now she doesn’t cook…and you say, ‘Are
we eating today?’ And there’s the fight, there’s the stress, there’s the arguments, there’s the
destruction of family life.” The piling up of difficulties with the most basic tasks of social
reproduction—bathing, cooking, and caring for children--leads to familial tensions.
Relationships between spouses, and between parents and children, become stressed, and
identities as caretakers and providers are called into question.
Predatory equity also broke down tenants’ social relationships. Not only did participants
not want to be at home themselves, they didn’t want to invite friends into their homes: “I didn’t
want to come home. I wouldn’t bring anyone to my house. I didn’t want anyone seeing that hole
because it was depressing” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). Central Brooklyn tenants
echoed this, stating they felt “ashamed” to “bring friends in the building”. Likewise, Hunts Point
tenants talked about how they felt “embarrassed to bring friends home, because the place is so
falling down.” Participants were uniformly ashamed of their living conditions, feeling they
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could not bring friends into a space where drug dealers loitered in the lobby, apartments were
boarded up, and ceilings threatened to cave in.
Tenants and politicization
In this section I briefly discuss strategies tenants undertook to improve their living
conditions before analyzing how participants politicized their experiences of predatory equity.
Tenants reached out to one another to form tenants associations, contacted elected officials and
their local community board, and reported their issues to the city’s informational/non-emergency
hotline. Some tenants advocated with elected officials and city agencies to have their buildings
placed in the Alternative Enforcement Program, which involves heightened monitoring and
enforcement to improve distress and deterioration for a group of 200 buildings. Longtime,
elderly tenants were some of the most actively involved: “Age-wise, her and I are two of the
oldest tenants in the building. But we went out in the snow, slipping on ice to go to court
[Housing Court].” Participants also described more confrontational efforts, such as hanging
banners from their fire escapes emblazoned with slogans in English and Spanish describing what
was happening inside the building, e.g. “No agua caliente” (no hot water). This was a way of
broadcasting their experience to the broader community, and shaming the owners. Many tenants
simply stopped paying rent to protest their living conditions.
Throughout, the most difficult thing was “getting someone to listen who could do
something” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). It was a visit to a priest by one participant’s
mother that connected Fordham/University Heights tenants with the Northwest Bronx
Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), an organization with decades of experience doing
social justice community organizing in the area. NWBCCC provided support and training in
developing tenant leadership and community organizing skills, and assistance in building a
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coalition of tenant associations in all ten buildings in the Milbank portfolio. This led to a series
of face-to-face meetings where tenants and organizers from NWBCCC reported their concerns
directly to elected officials and the city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development
(HPD). They finally felt able to get their message across when members of the tenants
association met the officials in the lobby of a building with a cascading leak in the ceiling: “The
water was coming in the middle—we set chairs around it [the leak] and said, ‘Gentlemen, after
you. Why don’t you have a seat so we can talk?’ And they look at each other and said ‘not me,
I’m not sitting there’” (Fordham/University Heights tenant). This was a way of getting people in
power to engage with their living conditions on an experiential level.
Yet the lack of visible change in their living conditions led tenants to believe the city
didn’t impose severe enough consequences for landlords to take action, posing a challenge to
HPD’s legitimacy with tenants. Most participants desired more stringent responses by HPD,
arguing that if landlords didn’t improve conditions after a certain period of time, then the agency
should seize the property and allow tenants to run the building. Participants wanted HPD to be
“more involved” and have “more people following up on these issues” (Hunts Point portfolio). A
Fordham/University Heights tenant felt HPD should work more closely with tenants
associations, suggesting that building these relationships would result in better information about
property distress than relying on inspections in response to tenant self-report.
It took more oppositional tactics, like going to owner’s houses, rallying in front of
buildings and City Hall, and generally “making noise” for politicians to get involved in their
cause. The support of politicians, such as Speaker Christine Quinn and the mayor’s office,
helped build the tenant movement around predatory equity. Several participants from the
Fordham/University Heights portfolio mentioned a 2010 press conference tenants held as a
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milestone, because City Council Speaker Quinn and other elected officials were there, which was
useful for getting more public attention to their issues. The press conference was “very, very
gratifying” because it brought awareness, “not only to our community, but to other people
outside the community, to people around the area”.
Participants consistently underlined an ethic of care as a normative aspect of housing
provision they found absent from tenant-landlord relations in the context of predatory equity.
One compared owning a rental property to working in a hospital, arguing that in both cases,
caring about people is vital. By emphasizing how property owners’ business decisions impact
their lives directly, participants highlighted the use value of housing and its role in social
reproduction: “Landlords, be conscious that you’re not just affecting our property, you’re
affecting lives, affecting people…it’s not just business, there’s people involved.” Similarly, other
participants pointed to the notion of accountability for landlords: “although the investors is not
going to have a partnership with his tenants, somehow or other it has to be tied back so that
tenants can actually have a voice in saying what needs to be done in their buildings”.
Organizing amongst themselves and together with community-based organizations
cultivated a sense of determination among tenants: “Milbank [private equity firm buying the
Fordham/University Heights portfolio] taught us a lesson and we will never allow it to happen
again.” After the Milbank deal collapsed and the properties deteriorated and went into
foreclosure, tenants had some leverage in the disposition process because of all the media
attention and political support they had garnered. The buyer agreed to several conditions
designed to preserve affordability, and to keep to a rehabilitation timeline developed by tenants,
community groups and HPD. From struggling to get someone to pay attention to their situation,
tenants felt empowered to make demands on potential buyers: “We let him know what we
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wanted—there were demands and if you could not support us in those demands, we could not
support you in buying our buildings”. Participating in the disposition process was meaningful
because it communicated to potential buyers, and property owners in general, “the neighbors are
actually working together. They are going to be fighting together for everything we need on the
buildings, in our apartments, and everything we need in the community. They need to know that
we are together. We’re going to work together, and we’re going to fight together. Justice. Justice
is the main point.”
Participants also developed a broader perspective on predatory equity: “The landlord, and
whoever the people are doing all these loans and stuff, it’s a wide thing I think. Because it
happened not just in this building, not just in Brooklyn, its all over. They have to find a way, the
council people [City Council members] and all of them, I think they need to get together and
really get to the root of this problem, because this is about families”. As the
Kingsbridge/University Heights tenants association made advances in their buildings, they
sought to work with and support other tenants being affected by predatory equity--not just in
their own communities, but citywide: “We want to show and teach people, and also support
them, so they can get their landlord to take care of business. Let’s take those buildings away
from them—through their banks, through foreclosures, whatever it takes, let’s stop the rent, let’s
put these people out of business because all they want is to make money. They don’t care about
the tenants”. Despite wanting to proliferate their efforts, some were wary of potential conflicts
that could arise from widening their struggle. For example, after attending a meeting of leaders
involved in education, housing, public space, transportation and health, one participant remarked
“I noticed it was a game of tug of war”, pointing to concerns that building multi-issue coalitions
could devolve into infighting over limited resources. Notwithstanding expressions of solidarity
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with tenant struggles more broadly, the scale of the challenges in their own neighborhoods
(drugs, crime, liquor stores, lack of healthy food options) also overwhelmed some participants:
“there are so many things in the neighborhood that have to change…the problem is so vast, its
hard to even get a grip on it”.
Conclusions
Financialization represents a structural change in how the economy operates (Krippner,
2005), a shift that has led to greater interdependence between finance and the ‘real economy’ of
material commodities. Although renting is not confined to cities, cities have greater
concentrations of renters and multifamily housing (Mazur & Wilson, 2011). The loss of
homeownership to foreclosure and the impact of the Great Recession has expanded the ranks of
renter households; even as the number of financially stressed renters has grown, the supply of
affordable rental housing has continued to shrink (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011a,
2011b). As more households turn to renting and as private equity firms buy up foreclosed single
family homes to operate as rentals (Gittelsohn, 2012), it is critical to understand how the
dynamics of financialization might transform renting. In this study I have sought to deepen and
extend theories of the financialization of housing in two ways, addressed in turn below. First, I
considered the case of predatory equity in New York City to extend the discussion into rental
housing, with a focus on multifamily dwellings in urban areas. Second, I employed a social
ecological perspective to connect the workings of finance with tenants’ experience of home to
deepen our understanding of non-financial impacts of financialization.
Changing rent relations
A key contribution of this paper is showing how institutional private investment into
rental housing speaks to changing social relations of rent. The high-risk financial practices
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associated with predatory equity contribute to the reproduction of urban inequality. The collapse
of predatory equity deals has contributed to the deterioration of affordable rental properties in
poor and minority neighborhoods, creating housing insecurity for tenants affected directly and
threatening the supply of affordable housing for renters more broadly. In many ways then, the
story is familiar: poor people and minorities are bearing the brunt of a housing market crisis.
Which is why it’s important to point out what’s different here: there has been a fundamental
change in the key actors involved, and this transforms the social relations of rent. Today, private
equity funds and equity stakeholder, global banking and financial services companies, and
issuers of mortgage-backed securities are responsible for exploitation, rather than the inner city
slum landlords of the 1970s.
Elvin Wyly (2009) talks about this as a “selective replacement and de-localization” of
key actors in the landlord-tenant relation; complexities of scale, relationship and distance arise
from this transformation, breaking up important “ethical and economic interdependencies
between savers, lenders and borrowers” (p. 338). During the real estate boom in the broader
housing market for example, the ability to transcend real estate’s fixity with complex financial
instruments meant that investors, servicers, and other financial intermediaries (and actors in the
housing market, e.g. realtors and appraisers) could make money even (or especially) if borrowers
defaulted. This fact broke up an erstwhile interdependence in stable and steady growth that
existed when housing and investment markets were less intertwined.
With private equity investment into rental housing, multiple factors conflict with any
notion of interdependence between tenants, landlords (i.e. the funds themselves, or their
managing agents) and investors. Although “the class interests of landlord and tenant are clearly
opposed to each other”, certain “social, legal and political pressures may make it difficult for the
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landlord to disinvest without severe social and fiscal penalties” (Harvey, 1974, p.242). Predatory
equity defuses some of these pressures, distinguishing physical distress associated with this
strategy from distress arising from slumlords of the 1970s. Private equity is a relatively shortterm investment strategy (three to five years) especially in light of the steep leverage used to
finance the acquisition of underperforming companies (70% is debt; 30% equity stakes by
investors) (Evans & Habbard, 2008; Froud & Williams, 2007). “Dividend recapitalization”
allows funds to deleverage themselves and pay out dividends by remortgaging the original debt
(Froud & Williams, 2007), increasing the acquired company’s exposure to financial risk while
leaving investors and fund managers with “no skin in the game”. In the typically long-term,
slow-growing multifamily rental market, such short-term investment and aggressive risk posture
breaks any commitment shared between landlord and tenant to maintaining the long-term
physical integrity of the building. In fact private equity funds often implement cost-cutting
measures5 to maximize short-term value (Evans and Habbard, 2008); similarly estimated
maintenance costs for predatory equity investments typically were “deceptively low and bore
little relation to the reality of operating multifamily rental housing in New York City (ANHD,
2009, p.15).

Here the investment strategy of predatory equity conflicts with the need for

sustained maintenance and attention to manage the issues found in large, aging buildings
(typically constructed in the 1920s and 1930s) that characterize New York’s multifamily housing
stock (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010).
As key actors are distanced from the material consequences of their investment tactics,
and as layers of intermediaries proliferate between tenant and landlord, pressures and penalties
on landlords also ease. For example in the Milbank portfolio, a Los Angeles-based fund invested
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  Workers get laid off or lose benefits; important equipment isn’t maintained or replaced; training programs,
research and development and community engagement are scaled back or lost altogether.	
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equity from Israel in a group of ten buildings in the Bronx, exemplifying the “de-localization” of
actors Wyly and colleagues (2009) describe. Objectives of improved efficiency and reduced
costs often meant the introduction of large outside management companies and/or firing live-in
superintendents. These factors disconnect owners from tenants, a process also observed in the
case of institutional investment in Berlin’s rental housing (Uffer, under review). The
proliferation of intermediaries (investors, fund managers, loan servicers and special servicers,
limited liability corporation, trustees of commercial mortgage-backed securities, managing
agents) add to this distance by making it difficult to “pierce the veil” in order hold responsible
parties accountable for physical distress. As a result tenants’ power to exert social and political
pressures on landlords becomes limited under financialization compared to the more localized
rent relations David Harvey analyzed in 1970s Baltimore (Harvey, 1974), altering an important
check against housing deterioration.
Financialization, accumulation by dispossession and social reproduction
Another aim of this study was to re-center the financialization of housing around social,
psychological and material concerns. This approach highlighted important connections between
financialization, social reproduction and politicization among low-income tenants. Here I
especially wish to unpack predatory equity as a mode of accumulation by dispossession, and
through this its relation to social reproduction. Accumulation by dispossession is conceived as an
ongoing capitalist process of accumulation whereby collective resources, common property, and
public assets are taken, appropriated or privatized; as “untapped markets” these assets serve as
low cost (or free) inputs which in turn create profitable new markets for investment (Arrighi,
2004; Harvey, 2003). Drawing on political economic analyses, Hart (2006) frames accumulation
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by dispossession as deriving from “strategies to take apart those institutions that protect society
from the market, and the associated struggles between capital and labor” (p.982).
Accumulation by dispossession connects with social reproduction because the assets
being appropriated are defined by their collective, common public nature-such as housing and
land (predatory equity in New York City, forced evictions in East Asia and the global South);
natural resources (privatization of water in Bolivia, genetically modified seeds in India and
Bangladesh); health care (private equity markets in nursing care companies) and education
(where charter schools privatize public education). These examples show that “peoples of the
North, East, and South are facing phenomenally different but substantially similar strategies of
separation from the means of existence” (De Angelis, 2001, quoted in Hart, 2006). Against this
backdrop predatory equity may be seen as an effort to appropriate market-protected housing
from low and moderate-income New Yorkers. In continuous existence since 1943 in New York
State, the institution of rent regulation was designed to mediate the market by limiting annual
rent increases, entitling tenants to services, and ensuring lease renewal (New York State Division
of Housing and Community Renewal, 1993). The system was first developed in response to a
housing emergency (less than 5% vacancy rate) in order to ensure an adequate supply of decent,
affordable housing “in light of the inability of the private market” (and public housing) to do so
(New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 1993). In conflict with the very
aims of rent regulation, predatory equity revolves around efforts to dismantle these protections in
order to exploit rent-regulated housing as an untapped asset class.
Froud and Williams (2007) characterize the culture of private equity as one that
“rearranges ownership claims for value capture”, extracting assets for a narrow segment of fund
managers and investors. This paper has shown some of the most direct consequences tenants face
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as a result of this process. Participants in this study faced the deleterious material, social and
psychological externalities of a high-risk investment strategy. What is especially striking is how
the distanciated nature of relationships between investors and underlying assets facilitates a
neglect of the realities of lived experience in favor of a vision of added value, increased rental
income through renovation and release of ‘under-market assets’.6 Here we have seen how
financial risks become embodied in the well being, health, social and familial relationships and
housing security of a group of low-income, Black and Latino, predominantly female tenants in
the Bronx and Brooklyn. This study did not engage tenants (or former tenants) of predatory
equity properties that did not fall into financial distress; such deals have likely “succeeded”
through aggressive efforts to promote attrition of tenants paying affordable rents (i.e. harassment
and targeted under-maintenance, c.f. Powell, 2011) and subsequent upgrading and rent increases.
Some data (ANHD, 2009) suggests unusually high tenant turnover rates in properties affected
by predatory equity: future research should systematically explore rates of displacement by rent
increases or eviction, or moving on to different living arrangements due to harassment or
declining living conditions associated with “successful” predatory equity deals.
Of course this kind of financialization of rental housing not only has direct effects on
current tenants, but also indirectly affects other renters in general. To the extent that the model of
predatory equity is ‘works to deregulate rent-stabilized apartments, and to the extent that the
investments collapse and cause housing deterioration, affordable units will be removed from the
market. A reduction in the stock of rent-regulated units would constrain the supply of affordable
rentals and thus the housing stability of low and moderate-income New Yorkers. Moreover, just
as private equity practices affect the broader industry and lead other companies to cut corners or
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These terms are used in the websites of Milbank Real Estate and Madison Capital describing their real estate
holdings in the Bronx and Chinatown.
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take on debt in order to compete (Evans and Hubbard 2008), predatory equity may affect other
real estate operators in the New York rental market. For example, advocates fear that profit
expectations will shift upward, leading to even more rapid de-regulation of affordable units;
lower-tier local speculators have also adopted higher-risk leveraging practices to exploit
economies of scale, such as refinancing to cross-collateralize multiple smaller multifamily
properties. Those researching the social implications of financialization should address these
dynamics in future studies.
The toll of financialization on renters highlights the tensions between the city as a site of
capitalist production and the imperative of social reproduction for city residents. Indeed
predatory equity points to how the arena of social reproduction is a fundamental site for
contemporary urban social struggles (Hart, 2006; Harvey, 2012), as evidenced in a growing
direct action movement that aims to interrupt the relationship between speculation and the lack
of safe and affordable housing, thereby restoring the ontological status of home. Groups like
Organizing for Occupation and Take Back the Land are disrupting foreclosure auctions, holding
eviction blockades and occupying vacant homes to reclaim housing as a human right. Picture the
Homeless tracks vacant land and property to demonstrate connections between real estate
speculation and homelessness. The spread of the Occupy Wall Street movement has also drawn
attention to the role of financial institutions in the global economic downturn even as they have
been sheltered from its worst effects, which have affected the public both in the workplace and at
home (cf. a popular chant, “Banks got bailed out/we got sold out”). Harvey (2003, 2012)
suggests that this growing recognition of finance may thus unite often disparate struggles: those
at the point of production and those situated in the arena of social reproduction.
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Despite this potential for broadened resistance in these efforts to restore the ontological
status of home, the dynamics of financialization remain frustratingly complex, diffuse and
hegemonic, removed from the day-to-day experiences of city residents. Even as social
movements contest the financialization of the urban fabric, the workings of finance delimit the
actual tactics of capturing land and housing for non-speculative purposes on a broader scale
(Fields, in revision). For example having to purchase the distressed note, complete foreclosure,
and then take title in order to gain control of a building requires a set of skills and access to
capital that few grassroots groups can call upon. This highlights the need for more aggressive
regulatory and policy action while complicating the question of how to proceed, and at what
scale.
The financialization of rental housing is immediately important, and in ways that extend
far beyond New York City. As low interest rates and increased rental demands draw investors
back to the housing market, private equity funds and hedge funds are raising billions to purchase
bank-owned single-family homes to operate as rental. The investors have already made
significant inroads in Phoenix and Atlanta, and with a federal pilot program to offer toxic debt on
foreclosed single-family properties in bulk sales to institutional investors (Gittelsohn, 2012), the
category of investor-landlords will be expanding. In light of the consequences of predatory
equity for low-income tenants, researchers and advocates must keep this issue in public view
through ongoing study. It is through fleshing out the experiences of financialization in everyday
life and its consequences for social struggles that we can better understand the significance of
this economic shift.
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Abstract
As cities have become both site and object of capital accumulation in a neoliberal political
economy, the challenges to community practice aimed at creating, preserving and improving
affordable housing and neighborhoods have grown. Financial markets and actors are increasingly
central to the workings of capitalism, transforming the meaning and significance of mortgage
capital in local communities and redrawing the relationship between housing and urban
inequality. This paper addresses the integration of housing and financial markets through the
case of “predatory equity”, a wave of aggressive private equity investment in New York City’s
affordable rental sector in the mid-2000s real estate boom. I consider the potential for
community organizations to develop innovative, effective and progressive practices to contest
the impact of predatory equity on affordable housing. Highlighting how organizations employed
discursive, data-driven and spatial tactics, this research speaks to the political possibility of
contemporary community practice.

Keywords: financialization, housing, community practice, strategic positivism, critical narrative,
topology, counter-topography
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Contesting the financialization of urban space: Community organizations and the struggle
to preserve affordable rental housing in New York City

As cities have become both site and object of capital accumulation in a neoliberal political
economy, the challenges to community practice aimed at creating, preserving and improving
affordable housing and neighborhoods have grown. Today’s infrastructure of urban community
organizations emerged amidst the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, when the urban
crisis was one of disinvestment and capital flight. Now their struggles revolve more around
claiming and preserving space for low-income residents in a context where urban land and
housing are central nodes in global capital flows. The role of financial practices in the
foreclosure crisis and global economic downturn of 2007-2009 highlights both how neoliberal
restructuring (such as deregulation in banking and finance and opening up global capital flows)
has made financial markets and actors increasingly central to the workings of capitalism, and
how these changes have transformed the meaning and significance of mortgage capital in local
communities in ways that redraw the relationship between housing and urban inequality.
This paper builds on existing research and theory dealing with the financialization of
housing and home by focusing on how urban community organizations contend with
financialization in their practice, and extending the focus to the financialization of rental
housing. The basis of the paper is a series of 25 in-depth interviews about a wave of aggressive
private equity acquisition of affordable rental housing in New York City during the mid-2000s
real estate bubble, conducted with emerging, midcareer and veteran affordable housing and
community development professionals after the financial collapse of many such investments. I
argue that financialization poses new challenges for community groups whose work revolves
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around affordable housing. However, community-based organizations also demonstrate an
ability to contest the impact of financialization through advancing critical narratives, producing
quantitative and geographic data to document relationships among investment practices and
housing distress and reworking the spaces of finance. These responses suggest productive
directions for contemporary community practice that may not wholly transform or subvert
financialization, but which nevertheless work to regulate/reform it on some level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First I provide background on the
practice of urban community organizations, particularly changing constraints and demands
associated with neoliberal restructuring. Then I consider arguments about the political
possibilities for community practice in this context. This leads in to an overview of the
significance of financialization in contemporary global capitalism generally, but in the realm of
housing in particular. I provide further explication of private equity real estate investment in
New York’s affordable rental sector, substantiating the role of financialization in the production
of urban space and the challenges this poses for community-based organizations. With this
background in place, I move on to a brief description of research methods before delving into the
main findings on the accomplishments of community-based organizations in their efforts to
reform, rework and regulate financialization. In turn, I address the critical narrative of private
equity real estate investment developed and advanced by community groups; the role alternative
knowledge production played in their efforts; and how organizations took up the spaces,
structures and processes of global finance as sites of struggle. In conclusion I discuss the
innovation and effectiveness of these practices in relation to the challenges posed by
financialization, as well as implications for theories of contemporary community practice and the
emergent literature on geographies of financialization.
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Neoliberal restructuring and community practice
There is a long history of community development--efforts to improve living conditions
and quality of life—in low-income urban neighborhoods in the United States that go back to the
Progressive Era. Today’s field of community development is most closely linked with
movements, organizations and policies emerging in the 1960s (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012;
Sites, Chaskin, & Parks, 2007). This is when urban political activism associated with the Civil
Rights, Black Power and other oppositional social movements working for self-determination,
political participation and material resources for low-income residents briefly converged with
federal policies that provided financial support for community political organizing (DeFilippis,
2004; Newman & Lake, 2006; O'Connor, 2012). However this period was short-lived as federal
policy shifted in the late 1960s from direct support of local political organizing to providing
funding to cities and states for community economic development (DeFilippis, 2004).
The distinction between activist community organizing aimed at social change and
resource redistribution, and professionalized community development focused on local
regeneration and service provision can be traced to this shift, when community groups faced a
choice between preserving their political identity or maintaining government funding
(DeFilippis, 2004). In this paper, rather than dichotomizing the activities of community
organizations as either organizing or development, I rely on the term “practice”. This decision is
both pragmatic—a range of organizations participated in the study, and based on an
understanding of community organizations as taking up multiple roles that shift depending on
goals and context (Elwood, 2006).
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Although today’s infrastructure of community organizations can be linked to social
movements driven by goals of redistribution and political empowerment, these goals are at odds
with the imperatives of a neoliberal context, which revolve around a market- and asset-focused
approach, entrepreneurial governance, competitiveness, and individual responsibility. For
community organizations the turn to a neoliberal political economy entails both increased
constraints in the form of reduced and restricted funding, and increased demands associated with
a weakened social safety net. Increased state control over the distribution and use of federal
block grant funds and an expanded role for intermediary institutions and private foundations
(DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2009; J. Fraser & Kick, 2005) mean that available funding often
comes with strings attached and pressure to conform to funders’ visions and demands. These
changes in funding streams constrain the autonomy community organizations and their
constituents have in planning, priorities and decisions about neighborhood change (DeFilippis,
Fisher, & Shragge, 2006; J. Fraser & Kick, 2005). Competition for limited funds may undermine
inter-organization collaboration and require staff to professionalize, e.g. to demonstrate asset
management capacity (Bockmeyer, 2003; DeFilippis et al., 2006; J. Fraser & Kick, 2005).
Professionalization takes time and energy away from other efforts, such as political organizing,
and can disconnect organizations from their constituents. Relationships with community
members have also changed as organizations have increased their provision of services due to
social welfare gaps (e.g. in affordable housing, health care, and workforce development) created
by declining federal support for state and local government (DeFilippis et al., 2006, 2009; Fisher
& Shragge, 2000).
As community groups have adapted to this context, many have grown enmeshed with the
state and market structures they once resisted (DeFilippis, 2004). This distances them from
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radical politics and conflict-based models of organizing, diminishing their potential to contest the
power relations that cause inequalities (Newman & Lake, 2006). For example many
organizations now seek to address the lack of affordable housing in urban neighborhoods by
developing and managing rental properties through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
program, whereas more politicized approaches might focus on decommodifying land and
housing. DeFilippis (2004) argues this is because many community groups formed to address
local problems, not to fundamentally transform broader social, political and economic structures.
The 1990s reconfiguration of community development around asset development and opening
underserved urban markets supported this local focus, emphasizing building capacity,
community, and social capital within neighborhoods. The neglect of power and structural forces
outside the community obscures broader, external processes that shape local problems and
potential solutions; this is especially problematic as the forces shaping local life are increasingly
multilevel and global (DeFilippis et al., 2006).
Indeed as neoliberal urbanization has made cities central arenas for capital investment
and accumulation, urban community organizations are not contending with the effects of urban
disinvestment so much as the consequences of opening “underserved” urban markets to mobile
and under-regulated global capital. Even as urban neighborhoods are integral to the functioning
and reproduction of global capitalism, local community organizations are limited in how they
can shape and transform the neoliberal political economy (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012). In order
for urban communities to contest the social costs of capitalism to working class and marginalized
peoples (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2012), community groups need new political strategies, an
analysis of power relations and rescaled forms of activism that move beyond the local
(DeFilippis et al., 2006; Newman & Lake, 2006).
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Multiple roles, spatial strategies and alternative knowledge production in community
practice
Although neoliberalism has reshaped community practice, this doesn’t entirely foreclose
the pursuit of progressive social justice outcomes by community organizations. Instead, we
might ask both a general question about how activists “continue their work once the movement is
reconfigured into new, more formal institutions” (Majic, 2011 p.831) and a specific one about
how to understand the potential for community practice to be effective in contributing to social
justice in the 21st century (Sites et al., 2007). Given that conflict approaches became
marginalized soon after their 1960s-1970s heyday, perhaps using these approaches as the
reference point for contemporary community practice delimits understandings of how
community organizations are able to contest the imperatives of neoliberal restructuring and its
toll on urban neighborhoods. As Larner and Craig (2005) argue, “neoliberal spaces and
subjectivities are not simply imposed from above, nor is ‘resistance’ simply a bottom-up political
response to macro-level structural processes” (p.421). Just as attending to ‘actually existing
neoliberalism reveals that it is incomplete, nuanced, context-dependent and contingent rather
than monolithic (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), tracing the

particularities of contemporary

community practice may point to new political strategies and forms of activism. Some promising
signposts in this effort are understandings of community organizations as taking up multiple
roles, producing alternative forms of knowledge and engaging in new spatial strategies.
Rather than falling into binaries of opposition and co-optation or professionalization and
resistance, community practice produces multiple and diverse roles and relationships (Elwood,
2006). Indeed changing the terms of neoliberal urban governance depends on organizational
roles that encompass local activism, professional roles and relationships, and networking and
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relationship management skills (Larner & Craig, 2005). In this view, activist practices may
“strategically combine opposition with engagement in order to advance their agenda”, serving as
a more subtle and indirect form of contestation (Leitner, Peck, & Sheppard, 2007b, p. 320;
Majic, 2011; Roy, 2011; Zupan, 2011). Thus professionalized roles and public-privatecommunity partnerships can potentially generate new forums for the pursuit of activist goals
(Larner & Craig, 2005; Majic, 2011).
Alternative knowledge production such as research, policy advocacy and narrative
construction contribute critical perspectives to “the war of ideas” in which neoliberal rationality
dominates (Leitner, Peck, et al., 2007b; Majic, 2011). Thus while research and analysis is
frequently part of grant maintenance, it can also be part of political projects: community
organizations might use Geographic Information Systems, analyze public and proprietary data
(e.g. Census data, investment prospectuses) and collect their own data to make claims on the
state and the private sector, e.g. real estate developers and financial institutions. These efforts are
a form of “strategic positivism”: using sanctioned methods of producing knowledge, deployed
via postmodern sensibilities of multiple meanings in the service of politically progressive aims
(Wyly, 2009, 2011). Strategic positivism might support advocacy strategies by disseminating
alternative knowledge in public testimony and policy development (Majic, 2011).
In addition to strategic positivism and policy advocacy, organizations produce alternative
knowledge by advancing critical narratives to counter neoliberal discourses of the privatized,
entrepreneurial and marketized city (Leitner, Sheppard, Sziarto, & Maringanti, 2007). Reframing
mainstream attitudes and policies (such as those concerning urban revitalization) can articulate
and advance the interests and needs of marginalized groups and places (for example by debating
the impact of redevelopment on quality of life and wealth distribution) (Wolf-Powers, 2009).
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The understanding of community groups as taking on multiple roles suggests the potential for
community practice to construct multiple narratives. For example Elwood (2006) proposes
narratives of needs and injustice, assets and accomplishments and reinterpretive narratives that
present official data through new frames to reinterpret a local issue in terms of broader social,
economic or political inequalities. These narratives might serve as place frames (D. Martin,
2003) that respectively mobilize residents and make claims on elected officials, define and build
community within a neighborhood and promote collective action across neighborhood
boundaries.
Finally the central role of urban space in neoliberal strategy calls for rescaled and
resituated activism. Networking across space allows activists to share information, coordinate
activities and expand local power into regional, national and global movements (Leitner, Peck, &
Sheppard, 2007a). Here Katz (2001) offers counter-topography as one such political strategy,
which works against the fragmentation of place by tracing contour lines that analytically connect
places “and thereby enhance struggles in the name of common interests” (p. 1230). This relates
to Allen’s (2011) approach to geographies of power, in which power is spatialized not at fixed
scales of distance and location (topography), but in terms of “reach”. Powers of reach change
what can be demanded politically, the ability for different actors to make their presence felt by
drawing distant others close, or placing themselves beyond reach (Allen, 2011). These insights
take on new significance in relation to the financialization of housing.
Financialization of housing
The hegemonic role of finance in neoliberal restructuring forms a major area of
contention for contemporary community practice. With market liberalization deregulating the
banking and finance industries and opening up global capital flows, financial markets and actors
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have become increasingly central to the workings of capitalism itself (Fine, 2009; Krippner,
2005; Stockhammer, 2010), and thus to the production of urban space (French, Leyshon, &
Wainwright, 2011; Rutland, 2010; Weber, 2002). This “financialization” denotes an economic
shift where growth revolves around financial markets, products and practices rather than
industrial production (Krippner, 2005). Even where “real” commodities are involved, profits
increasingly accrue through their monetization and integration in financial channels (Fine, 2009;
Gotham, 2009; Stockhammer, 2010). Hence finance takes on new roles in non-financial realms:
financial institutions and markets come to shape economic, social and cultural life and individual
subjectivities (Aalbers, 2008; Allon, 2010; French et al., 2011; Ron Martin, 2011; Rutland,
2010). The extended reach of finance also transmits risk and volatility into the non-financial,
raising concerns about how it participates in and potentially exacerbates uneven geographies
(Aalbers, 2008; Pike & Pollard, 2010).
Interest in financialization has grown in the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis and
associated global financial downturn. One of the reasons community activists fought for access
to mortgage capital in the 1970s was to build wealth in low-income and minority communities.
However as the role of mortgages has changed to become a means of financial production by
providing the “raw materials” for asset-backed securities and derivatives (Newman, 2009) the
meaning of mortgage capital for local communities has also changed. Rather than anchoring
wealth in place via property, mortgages facilitate global investment and serve to extract value
from place-bound property (Aalbers, 2008). In the foreclosure crisis, the appetite for mortgagebacked securities’ financial yield shaped the subprime mortgage market, driving high-risk and
predatory lending practices that in turn contributed exponentially to the severity of the
foreclosure crisis and ensuing financial crisis and economic downturn (Aalbers, 2008; Ashton,
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2009; Gotham, 2009; Newman, 2009). The impact of high-risk lending has intersected with older
frameworks of racial inequality, disproportionately destabilizing low-income and minority
communities and African-American female-headed households (Wyly, Moos, Hammel, &
Kabahizi, 2009).. Meanwhile upstream actors have even profited from the housing market
collapse (Morgenson & Story, 2009; Story & Morgenson, 2010), pointing to how
financialization operates to transfer the wealth of broad sectors of society to a financial class
(Aalbers, 2008; Harvey, 2003).
Despite the clear social, spatial and political dimensions of the financialization of
housing, further critical attention to these concerns is needed among researchers at the
intersection of society, economy and space (Aalbers, 2008; French et al., 2011; Pike & Pollard,
2010). This paper addresses these concerns by focusing on how community organizations engage
with the process, actors and consequences of the financialization of rental housing in low-income
urban neighborhoods. Here I turn to the case of “predatory equity” a mid-2000s wave of
aggressive private equity investment in New York City’s affordable rental stock that
demonstrates the financialization of rental housing.
Predatory equity in New York City
New York is a city of renters (69% of residents rent), and the majority (75%) of the city’s
rental units are located in multifamily dwellings (buildings with five or more units) (Furman
Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010; Mazur & Wilson, 2011). Thus four in ten renters,
or about 2.3 million people, are tenants in multifamily buildings (Furman Center for Real Estate
and Urban Policy, 2010). Like the single-family market, in the mid-2000s the multifamily market
also experienced inflated property values, weakened underwriting standards, rapid turnover, and
increased demand for mortgage-backed securities (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Joint
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Center for Housing Studies, 2011; Parkus & An, 2009). Also similar to the single-family market,
since 2008 the multifamily market has had a rapid downturn and increased delinquencies and
foreclosures (especially on securitized loans) (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2010; Joint Center
for Housing Studies, 2011; Parkus & An, 2009). In New York these dynamics played out in the
city’s affordable rental sector through predatory investments by private equity firms.
The combination of the low stock market returns of the early 2000s, flood of low-interest
mortgage financing and the city’s historically tight rental market (the rental vacancy rate has
been below 5% for over 40 years) pointed to multifamily rental housing as a frontier for capital
in search of new investment opportunities. The city’s rent-stabilized housing, which includes
around a million units, was especially attractive to investors. These units are protected from the
open market by state laws limiting rent increases to a percentage set annually by the Rent
Guidelines Board, but were substantially weakened in the 1990s. “Luxury decontrol” made it
possible to deregulate units once their monthly rent exceeds $2000 (this ceiling is being raised to
$2500) while the introduction of other mechanisms, such as vacancy bonuses and major capital
improvement increases, help facilitate deregulation. These respectively allow owners to increase
rent 20% each time a unit turns over to a new tenant, and to pass on some of the costs of
upgrading to tenants; oversight of the latter is notoriously weak and the program is subject to
fraud (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, hereafter ANHD, 2009a).
Wyly and colleagues (2010) argue that luxury decontrol, without an inflation adjustment, “has
morphed into an automatic deregulation machine, liberating units whenever strong demand
pushes rents high enough” (p. 2609).
This erosion of market protections mediating the landlord-tenant relation (Wyly et al.,
2010) helped set the scene for the financialization of rent-stabilized housing by private equity

	
  

CONTESTING THE FINANCIALIZATION OF URBAN SPACE
149
funds. Private equity began to aggressively target the affordable rental sector around 2005,
buying up 100,000 units (about 10% of the supply of rent-stabilized housing) between 2005 and
2009 (ANHD 2009b). The purchases stood out not only because of the number of units affected,
but because of their scale—multiple properties were assembled in package deals as large as 50
buildings, and firms paid extremely inflated prices based on “frothy” appraisals, gross
overestimation of rental income and gross underestimation of operating expenses (ANHD,
2009b). Based on these terms, the deals could only succeed by displacing tenants paying
affordable rents and cutting back on maintenance costs. Advocates termed the investments
“predatory equity” to highlight the actors involved and the extractive nature of the investments
vis-à-vis the supply of affordable rental housing, and to capitalize on heightened public
awareness of the dangers of predatory lending in the homeownership market.
Predatory equity demonstrates a broader financialization of the social realm, where
public, common or collective goods serve as the materials for financial production and capital
accumulation (Fine, 2009; N. Fraser, 2010). Of course, rental housing is defined by its dual
nature as a business for owners and a home for tenants. This makes it important to clarify how
predatory equity is an example of financialization specifically versus property speculation more
generally. Here I address the aspects of predatory equity investments most characteristic of
financialization: the new role of capital market actors, norms and processes in the affordable
rental market (French et al., 2011; Pike & Pollard, 2010); the increased interdependence between
finance and the built environment (Aalbers, 2008); and the interlocking of finance with “the
lives, homes and households of ordinary citizens” (Allon, 2010, p. 373).
First, the encroachment of the financial into the non-financial: the affordable rental sector
has been characterized as a “financial backwater” (ANHD, 2009b, p. 8) because of the non-
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liquid nature of the assets, which return moderate profits of 7-8% a year taken as income (not
capital gains). This encourages long-term ownership, making for a low-pressure market (ANHD,
2009b). Moreover except in the case of properties with more than 50 units, multifamily property
owners are mainly individuals or limited partnerships, not corporations or financial entities
(Savage, 1998). By contrast predatory equity investments entailed the penetration of this market
by private equity firms, which typically seek returns of 10-20% a year over relatively short
investment terms of three to five years (Evans & Habbard, 2008; Froud & Williams, 2007). This
highlights a “fundamental discrepancy” between “the expectations of capital markets for doubledigit asset growth and the single-digit growth achievable in most real product markets” (French
et al., 2011, p. 803). Firms sought to achieve these expectations through the high-risk leveraging
typical of private equity: in a group of ten major investment portfolios covering 27,000 rental
units, properties had an average of only 55 cents of income for every dollar of debt (ANHD,
2009b). Indeed many deals started out overleveraged, loaded with debt that far outweighed their
rental income (Shultz, 2009).
This leads into the impact of finance in the everyday life of residents and the increased
interdependence between finance and the built environment, which I address together here. The
profit expectations and debt load associated with predatory equity deals were predicated on rates
of tenant turnover in the range of 20% or more a year, whereas the typical turnover rate for rentstabilized units is 5-10% a year (Rent Guidelines Board, 2009). Meeting these turnover
objectives required efforts to “promote attrition”, which entailed systematic harassment such as
building-wide eviction notices, baseless lawsuits for unpaid rent, aggressive buy-out offers,
refusal to make repairs inside units and threats to call immigration authorities (ANHD, 2009b;
Morgenson, 2008; Powell, 2011). This represents some of the problematic social consequences
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that can come with the extended reach of finance into the realm of the non-financial. It also
speaks to the uneven nature of processes of financialization (French et al., 2011; Pike & Pollard,
2010),1 since New Yorkers living multifamily rental properties have lower incomes than those
living in other housing types and Hispanics are more likely than other households to live in the
city’s multifamily rental properties (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010),
However the market crash of 2008 brought unsustainable debt on predatory equity deals
to the fore, with many standing at risk of (or already in) default or foreclosure. In the case of a
47-building portfolio London-based investment firm Dawnay Day purchased in 2007,
foreclosure came in 2009 as the firm found itself overexposed in the credit crunch. With
financial distress, harassment has given way to rapid, extreme physical deterioration in many
predatory equity portfolios. This confirms how financialization makes the fate of the built
environment increasingly tied to what happens in financial circuits (Aalbers, 2008). In turn these
conditions compromise tenants’ well-being, family and social relationships and housing security,
once again along lines of race and class (Fields, in preparation).
Whereas predatory equity may have first been based on speculative motivations for the
properties themselves (albeit with expectations of capital market-level returns), the market crash
affords speculation of another kind—in debt. Many scholars have thought through securitization
as an example of how financialization commodifies mortgages on the back end (see Gotham,
2009 for an overview), but most of the debt connected to predatory equity deals was not
securitized. However there are other ways mortgage finance can transcend real estate’s spatial
fixity. For example, private equity firms operate through leveraging equity and debt to acquire
assets: to a great extent profit depends not on the asset’s condition (or location), but on the
degree of credit capital leveraged (Linneman, 2004). Should the leveraged debt become
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distressed, it becomes its own financial product; indeed the private equity distressed debt market
has evolved from a concept to a global investment market since the early 1990s (DuPonte, 2010).
Thus physical and financial instability associated with predatory equity purchases has created a
market in distressed mortgage notes, putting properties at risk of an extended period of equitystripping and decline. Here the financialization of rental housing is not simply aggressive
speculation that bids up under-market property assets, but the creation of distressed financial
assets that in turn resituates speculation in the circuits of finance.
As a case of the financialization of rental housing, predatory equity presents a call to
action for New York City’s infrastructure of community organizations, many of which were
instrumental in responding to the city’s earlier crisis of disinvestment and abandonment in the
1970s. However the dynamics of financialization also present potential obstacles to action. The
actors involved in predatory equity deals are difficult to target and hold accountable because they
are unfamiliar, diffuse and spatially removed. Meanwhile, navigating the intricacies of mortgage
finance, note sales and the securities market calls for a set of legal and financial skills and nimble
access to capital that even the most sophisticated nonprofit groups lack. Within this context,
community organizations face the challenge of “inventing spaces of action” (Miraftab, 2009). In
the remainder of this paper I consider how community organizations have engaged with
predatory equity, focusing on what their responses show about the possibility for multiple roles,
spatial strategies and alternative knowledge production in community practice. To ground these
findings I first offer a brief overview of research methods.
Methods
This paper analyzes responses to predatory equity by community organizations in New
York City, focusing on what they show about political possibilities and challenges for
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community practice in relation to the financialization of rental housing. I conducted 25
interviews with veteran (11 participants), mid-career (6 participants) and emerging (9
participants) affordable housing and community development professionals. Participants were
employed at a variety of longstanding and newer community organizations with neighborhoodspecific and citywide missions. I also interviewed a handful of individuals working in housing
policy, property management, for-profit affordable housing, and housing finance (see table 3.1
for a list of participating organizations). Interviews focused on organizational responses to
predatory equity and the challenges and successes they associated with these efforts; actual and
potential outcomes of predatory equity; collaborations and partnerships with other organizations;
and how predatory equity compared to recent waves of gentrification and 1970s-era
disinvestment. I also draw on my ongoing contact with participants (e.g. through conferences,
communication of findings); artifacts such as blogs and pamphlets related to predatory equity;
and information found in local newspapers, websites of investors and community organizations
and trade publications for the finance and community development sectors.
The findings reported here focus most closely on the efforts of mainly longstanding
community organizations including the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, the Association
for Neighborhood and Housing Development, the University Neighborhood Housing Program
(an offshoot of the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition), Community Action for
Safe Apartments (a project of New Settlement Apartments) and Tenants and Neighbors; as well
as newer grassroots organizing group Movement for Justice in el Barrio. The work of Local
Initiatives Support Corporation 2 (LISC) and real estate think tank/advocacy group Citizens
Housing and Planning Council of New York City (established in 1937) also played a role in
these efforts.
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Table 3.1: Participating organizations
Citywide organizations
Neighborhood-based
organizations
Association for Neighborhood
and Housing Development
Urban Homesteading
Assistance Board
Tenants and Neighbors

Banana Kelly Community
Improvement Association
Northwest Bronx Community and
Clergy Coalition
University Neighborhood Housing
Program
Community Preservation
Community Action for Safe
Corporation
Apartments/New Settlement
The Parodneck Foundation
Movement for Justice in el Barrio
Mutual Housing Association of Community Voices Heard
New York
Hope Community Inc.
Catholic Migration Office

154

Housing policy, housing
finance, property
management, think tanks, forprofit affordable housing
NYC Department of Housing
Preservation and Development
Neighborhood Restore
PWB Property Management
Federal Home Loan Bank of
New York
Workforce Housing Advisors
Citizen’s Housing and Planning
Council

Findings
Constructing a critical narrative
Here I present the findings in terms of what responses to predatory equity suggest about the
potential for contemporary community practice to contest financialization. This discussion is
organized around three major themes: constructing a critical narrative, practicing strategic
positivism and reworking spaces of finance.
As predatory equity emerged around 2005 individual organizations struggled to make
sense of both the sudden interest of buyers from out of the state and country in affordable rental
properties, and the high prices they were paying. Neither the locations of the purchases, in places
that seemed odd for foreign investment, nor the prices, compared to market prices and the
realities of income and expenses in the properties, made sense. Coming together, a core group of
longtime community organizations including the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy
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Coalition (NWBCCC), the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD),
the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) and Tenants and Neighbors collaborated to
track the investments, finding that thousands of apartments were potentially overleveraged
(Shultz, Walsh, & Levy, 2010).
However as community groups sought to confront buyers and financial institutions with
this information around 2006 they were also coming up against the dominant logic of the real
estate boom. The entire country was caught up in buying and flipping property to build wealth.
Investors framed predatory equity strategy in terms like “recapturing” value, and “repositioning
and releasing” regulated units to the open rental market (Morgenson, 2010; Powell, 2011).
Firms saw affordable rental properties as “having added value for investors”, arguing
“revitalization would occur” with “an improved tenant base and increased rental income”
(Milbank Real Estate, 2007). Countering this narrative was challenging because of the real estate
boom, but also because of a view of housing advocates as hyperbolic, emotional and being far
left politically, and therefore not credible (interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010).
Thus despite their long histories and well-established relationships with city agencies and
financial institutions, it took UHAB and other core organizations more than two years of
research and advocacy--and the 2007-2008 market crash--to legitimate predatory equity as a
threat to affordable housing (interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010). Still these experiences
provided critical insight into the dynamics of financialization, such as banks’ ability to shed risk
via securitization and sales of distressed mortgage notes. Organizations used this knowledge and
perspective to develop a critical narrative of predatory equity investments. The narrative
implicates the structures of global finance and key actors such as private equity firms and
lending institutions, and reinterprets the norms of finance in terms of the fallout of boom time
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speculation on the quality and supply of affordable rental housing. With these efforts activists
made financialization legible and accessible for wider public understanding, and mobilization in
subsequent organizing and policy campaigns.
Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide, a collaborative effort between UHAB, Tenants
and Neighbors, and the Center for Urban Pedagogy exemplifies this narrative. The Survival
Guide (Center for Urban Pedagogy, 2009, hereafter CUP) translates the complexities of
predatory equity into everyday language and images understandable to the broader public (see
figure 3.1). The Survival Guide explains the logic and strategy of predatory equity, analyzing the
basic math behind how predatory equity leverages properties beyond what their net rental
income can cover.
Figure 3.1: Detail from Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide (CUP, 2009) explaining
constraints for overleveraged buildings.
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Throughout the Guide imagery represents housing as a means of predatory financial production,
such as a dollar sign formed by a snake squeezing two apartment buildings (see figure 3.2), and
mortgage securitization as an assembly line. The Survival Guide also includes a “To Do” list
identifying a variety of actors and what they can do to help stop predatory equity, including:
advocates and housing experts; banks; elected officials; media; private equity firms; tenants; and
institutional investors. By framing predatory equity and solutions as inherently multi-sectoral and
requiring action on many fronts, the Guide makes the set of stakeholders involved in predatory
equity visible and makes claims on them by outlining “to-dos” for each.
Figure 3.2: Cover of Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide (CUP, 2009).
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By no means was the Survival Guide the only means of constructing a critical narrative of
predatory equity; groups also used traditional press conferences, articles in affordable housing
trade publications (cf. Levy, 2011) and policy advocacy that leveraged their existing networks.
By 2008, the fallout of the broader housing and financial crisis was becoming clear and opinion
leaders, government officials and academics began to acknowledge predatory equity as a crisis as
well. Community organizations see the activist community as “extraordinarily successful in
creating this term ‘predatory equity’ and really getting it out there to policymakers, the
politicians and the press” (interview with Benjamin Dulchin of ANHD, 2011) crediting “the
story we told” with mobilizing resources and support from the city.
Media, politicians and city officials reproduced the terminology community groups used
and began framing the issue similarly. For example, the New York City Council created the
Predatory Equity Task Force, describing the problem as community organizations did: “At the
height of the housing boom, a large number of equity investor groups purchased multifamily
rental properties using unrealistic revenue expectations and taking out loans that could not be
supported by existing rent rolls” (New York City Council, 2009). New York State Senator
Charles Schumer also got on board, highlighting the role of banks and parallels to subprime
lending in the homeownership market: “Speculators have been unjustifiably raising their
estimates for how much rent they will take in after they buy the property and low-ball how much
maintenance costs will be in order to get a larger mortgage from the bank. The larger the loan,
the larger the fees the bank can take in, and then, similar to a subprime loan, the bank securitizes
the mortgage on the secondary market” (Schumer, 2008). And from 2008 to 2011, the New York
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Times ran 23 articles including the term “predatory equity”, several of them in the business pages
(cf. Bagli, 2008; Dolnick, 2010; Morgenson, 2008).
Constructing and circulating a critical narrative of predatory equity that got taken up in
public discourse was an accomplishment. The struggle to get predatory equity acknowledged as a
crisis also led community organizations to rethink their role in public discourse. In particular it
cultivated a sense that advocates alone could not reframe the discourse. Instead lobbying opinion
leaders and “people who are seen as credible in these much bigger universes of economic real
estate finance” to “come out early and say what needs to happen” (interview with Dina Levy of
UHAB, 2010) has become integral to disseminating alternative narratives that community groups
produce.
Strategic positivism: Interweaving data, claims-making and policy advocacy
Community organizations invented spaces of action not only in their narratives around
predatory equity, but by producing a body of empirical knowledge. Difficulty in developing and
accessing accurate data has complicated efforts to study the extent and severity of the foreclosure
crisis (Newman, 2010), pointing to the role for knowledge production in critical urban practice
(Wyly, 2009). Here I consider how community organizations engaged in strategic positivism
through constructing data and indicators to document predatory equity, evaluate investment risk
and link investment practices to housing distress.
Developed by the University Neighborhood Housing Program (UNHP) in response to
indicators that the multifamily market was heating up (rising sales prices, flat operating income)
in the early 2000s, the Building Indicator Project (BIP) provides a holistic indicator of potential
physical and/or financial distress for all multifamily rental buildings in New York City. It brings
together several public data sources on housing and building code violations and city-issued liens
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(water/sewage, back taxes, emergency repairs), then indexes these data to create a single
weighted score. A score of 800 or more “warrants examination to confirm probable physical
and/or financial distress” (University Neighborhood Housing Program, 2011). The BIP is a
monitoring tool that UNHP and a variety of community organizations have used to put pressure
on banks with irresponsible lending and asset management practices, shape tenant organizing
efforts, and influence city policy.
Showing that New York Community Bank (NYCB) financed 85,000 units of multifamily
housing that were in distress, twice that of any other entity (University Neighborhood Housing
Program, 2011), BIP data has been integral to a broad, multi-pronged campaign against the bank.
By connecting NYCB to its role in funding the 2007 purchase of 51 Southwest Bronx buildings
for $300M by the private equity-backed partnership SG2 and BlackRock Realty Advisors, BIP
data aided Community Action for Safe Apartments in their tenant organizing campaign to protest
the bank’s involvement in predatory equity. In the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board’s
(UHAB) decision to narrow their predatory equity campaign to one bank rather than diluting
their efforts across multiple institutions, BIP data helped them select NYCB. Under the bank’s
watch, 34 multifamily buildings (nearly 800 rental units) were in foreclosure and had a total of
over 5000 housing code violations, meaning that tenants were living with an average of more
than six violations per unit3. On The SurReal Estate, UHAB’s blog chronicling ongoing struggles
around predatory equity, a feature called “Picture This!” showcased tenant-submitted photos of
distressed physical conditions in overleveraged properties financed by NYCB.
As a result of these and other efforts, the bank’s Community Reinvestment Act rating
was downgraded from “outstanding” to “satisfactory” in 2012, in part due to concerns about its
efforts to ensure that multifamily borrowers could fulfill mortgage obligations and properly
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maintain properties (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2011). In its evaluation of the
bank’s performance, the FDIC reviewed and considered BIP data (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 2011). BIP has also influenced the city’s approach to distressed multifamily
properties. After being shocked by the deteriorated physical conditions in buildings that were
part of a portfolio in the Northwest Bronx, housing officials looked to BIP as the inspiration for
the city’s new Proactive Preservation Initiative. The initiative will develop indicators based on
BIP to identify distressed multifamily properties and target emergency repairs in order to prevent
such severe distress in the future.
A different example of strategic positivism derives from the work of community
organizations including UHAB, members of the Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development, Tenants and Neighbors and UNHP in tracking market activity, researching
property owners and organizing tenants. These efforts created individual organizational lists of
overleveraged properties that LISC then compiled lists into a master list of about 1100 buildings.
Cross-referencing the master with a variety of other data sources including BIP, property value
assessments, geographic building information, foreclosure filings, and Department of Finance
data on deeds and debt instruments yielded a rich, inductively-created database. Covering over
50,000 housing units owned by investors engaging in irresponsible real estate practices, it is the
best measure of a phenomenon that is difficult to measure. Using the database, the Citizens
Housing and Planning Council applied some of the analytic techniques used in the study of
single-family foreclosure to examine the impacts of multifamily foreclosure and overmortgaging
on the surrounding community. This analysis showed that buildings within 500 feet of
overleveraged properties are more likely to be physically deteriorated and have more housing
code violations; those within 250 feet are more likely to have serious housing code violations
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requiring emergency repair intervention by the city (Shultz, Perine, Bahchieva, & Dasgupta,
2012).
The database of overleveraged properties has supported policy advocacy by LISC in
public comments to the Federal Housing Finance Agency on the proposed structure for
evaluating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s duty to serve underserved communities. LISC held
that the government-sponsored enterprises should also preserve affordability in rental housing
that they have previously financed, which may be overleveraged or at risk of loss because
“current financing was based on unsustainable assumptions about rent growth, property values
and other economic conditions” (O'Donnell, 2009, p. 3). The overleveraged property database
affords the production of spatial knowledge about the geography of predatory equity and its
potential neighborhood impacts that is at once rooted in the day-to-day work of community
organizations, and can speak to policymakers.
Here strategic positivism documented relationships between investors, financial
institutions, debt, and physical and financial distress. In turn, these facts support the struggle—on
the ground, in policy circles, and in academe--against the destabilizing impacts of
financialization. Alternative knowledge production projects like BIP and the overleveraged
properties database suggest the power for “rigorous, radical analysis to expose the injustices of
predatory capitalism and accumulation by dispossession” (Wyly, 2011, p. 907) and interweave
meaningfully with claims-making and policy advocacy.
Reworking spaces of finance
Finally I turn to how community practice reworked spaces of finance in the struggle
against predatory equity. Community organizations took up financial structures as spaces of
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practice, re-inscribed hidden links between property as a distressed asset and property as
distressed housing and traced networks of activism through global capital flows.
The first case builds on the discrepancy between expectations for double-digit profits in a
single-digit growth sector, and between projected and actual tenant turnover rates discussed
earlier in the overview of predatory equity. ANHD uncovered these insights through mining
underwriting documents for a sample of nine property portfolios covering nearly 10,000 rental
units4 purchased by private equity firms and subsequently securitized in commercial mortgagebacked securities (CMBS) (ANHD, 2009b). The analysis was possible because for securitized
loans borrowers are required to report revenue, expenses and vacancies to the loan servicer, who
tracks this data against underwriting assumptions in the prospectus filed with the SEC. Based on
these data, each unit faced a discrepancy of $605 per unit/month; translated to all 9876 units
makes for a shortfall of $6 million a month and $71.7 million a year.5
Data on tenant turnover assumptions was less readily available, but in three major
portfolios assumptions were that 20-30% of units would turn over within a year of purchase—
actual turnover rates in rent-stabilized apartments range from 5-10% a year (Association for
Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009b; Rent Guidelines Board, 2009). By juxtaposing
finance logics outlined in CMBS prospectuses with measures grounded in the realities of the
city’s affordable rental sector, ANHD employed the structures of finance to produce evidence of
the risk and potential fraud involved in predatory equity.
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ANHD’s analysis included Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village, which is an outlier from other portfolios
because of its large size (11,227 units) and largely middle-class residents; I excluded the portfolio from my analysis
for this reason.
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Table 2: Discrepancy between underwritten and last reported net rental income for 9 major
predatory equity portfolios. Source: ANHD, 2009b.
Number of portfolios (units)
Rent revenues as underwritten (per unit
per month)
Last reported rent revenues (per unit
per month)
Discrepancy between revenue as
underwritten and last reported revenues
(per unit per month)
Operating expenses as underwritten
(per unit per month)

9 (9876)
$1404 ($12640/9 portfolios)
$842 ($7576/9 portfolios)
$562
$604
($4834/8 portfolios)
*Data not available for 1 portfolio
$647 ($5178/8 portfolios)
*Data not available for 1 portfolio
$43

Last reported operating expenses (per
unit per month)
Discrepancy between operating
expenses as underwritten and last
reported operating expenses (per unit
per month)
Total discrepancy between net rental
$605
income as underwritten vs. last reported (Shortfall for all units: $6m/month; $71M/year)
(per unit per month)
By re-signifying the materiality of their homes tenants and community organizations
defending distressed properties from investors reconstituted the link between housing as a
financial asset and as a home. In this case, in 2007 government-sponsored enterprise Fannie Mae
purchased the $29 million debt from Deutsche Bank for a portfolio of 19 properties (261)
originally purchased by New York-based firm Ocelot Capital in partnership with Israeli real
estate developers Eldan Tech (along with six other buildings) in 2005. Fannie Mae purchased the
Ocelot mortgage, only later finding it didn’t meet their underwriting standards. The properties
deteriorated severely over the next two years before falling into foreclosure early in 2009. Soon
after, Fannie Mae sought to sell the distressed debt connected to the Ocelot portfolio through the
“eBay of distressed debt” (interview with Dina Levy of UHAB, 2010), online auction site
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DebtEx. The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board and Northwest Bronx Community and
Clergy Coalition launched into action: tenant associations held press conferences in front of
buildings, posted signs to investors saying “don’t buy here” and “speculators keep out” in their
windows (see figure 3.3), and conducted guided tours of deteriorated building conditions for
politicians and the press (Levy, 2011). These efforts engaged Senator Charles Schumer and
Congressman Jose Serrano to publicly pressure Fannie Mae to help tenants and brought the city
onboard with substantial funds to offset renovation costs for a discount sale to a preservation
buyer.6 In the case of the Ocelot portfolio, community practice made tangible the connections
between financial mechanics on the one hand and the physicality of properties as homes
inhabited by people on the other.
Figure 3.3: Ocelot portfolio tenants protesting Fannie Mae’s sale of their homes on online
auction forum for distressed debt. (Photo credit: Urban Homesteading Assistance Board)
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The properties were eventually sold to affordable housing developer Omni New York at a significant discount.
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Finally, some activists reworked spaces of finance through building solidarities in the
tracks of global capital flows. Among the several neighborhood-based organizations addressing
predatory equity in East Harlem is Movement for Justice in el Barrio (MFJ), a group whose
constituents are predominantly Mexican immigrants.7 MFJ links itself to the Other Campaign, a
Zapatista political program fighting against neoliberalism and for self-determination. One of
MFJ’s key tactics is to link housing problems experienced in East Harlem with land struggles
around the world (Maeckelbergh, 2012). The group globalizes solidarity through annual
encouentros (encounters) bringing together social justice actors at a variety of spatial scales;
recent encuentros have included live feeds with the Shack Dweller’s movement in South Africa,
visited a community in Mexico that successfully halted the state’s effort to evict them, and
connected with New Orleans residents who organized against post-Katrina eviction.
In 2007, Steve Kessner, once labeled among the ten worst landlords in New York City
(Borrero, 2006), sold a group of 47 properties and 1100 apartments in East Harlem to UK-based
investors Dawnay Day for $225M. In the British press, the firm boasted of the profits it would
make once they displaced tenants. In East Harlem, they began pressuring longtime tenants to
move, charging for basic repairs, and asking the predominantly immigrant Latino tenants for
their Social Security numbers. Their experiences of harassment and outright fraud under the
firm’s ownership motivated MFJ to formalize alliances they had been building up before,
moving their activism to the UK to generate support on the firm’s own turf.8 Meeting with over
30 organizations in Europe allowed MFJ to present films about their experiences with predatory
equity and receive pledges of support. This tactic illustrates the group’s knowledge that housing
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Mexican immigrants have changed the face of the traditionally Puerto Rican barrio of East Harlem: Henry Serrano
of Community Voices Heard, observed that “all the cuchifrito [Puerto Rican fried foods] places have become
taquerias” since the influx of immigrants from Puebla, Mexico started in the 1980s.
8
Maeckelbergh (2012) provides more in-depth analysis of MFJ’s mobilizing against displacement.	
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problems in East Harlem aren’t isolated, but that global capital, multinational corporations and
other forms of development are all bound up with the displacement of tenants and small
businesses there. Illustrating this assertion, in 2008 the Dawnay Day portfolio collapsed when
the company found itself overexposed amidst tightened credit, and officially went into
foreclosure in 2009; their disposition remains unresolved. Nevertheless the point remains that
MFJ’s approach to activism builds allies and solidarities within globalized flows of capital,
underscoring that just as capital can circulate globally, so can social struggles around land and
housing.
Conclusions
This paper has addressed how community organizations whose work focuses on
affordable housing contend with financialization. Given the challenges to community
organizations posed by the neoliberal political economy more broadly and new financial
practices in the housing market specifically, I examined the potential for organizations to
cultivate effective and innovative practices to contest the financialization of affordable rental
housing. The study investigated a wave of high-risk private equity investment in New York
City’s rent-stabilized market during the mid-2000s real estate bubble, and the tactics community
organizations developed in response. The findings highlighted tactics that constructed a critical
narrative of predatory equity, used strategic positivism to study its geography and impacts and
reworked spaces of finance. Here I address the first two as part of a strategy of alternative
knowledge production that works at the level of policy advocacy, claims-making on financial
institutions and actors and public discourse. Then I discuss the last tactic (reworking spaces of
finance) as underlining how a spatial strategy of contesting finance must both re-assert fixity and
trace liquidity.
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Alternative knowledge production
Financialization operate at the level of investments and securities but also entails cultural
and discursive strategies by which financial norms of risk and investment are disseminated
throughout society (Allon, 2010; Randy Martin, 2002). Private equity firms often framed their
real estate investment strategies in terms of affordable rental properties as assets to be liberated
onto the open market. Developing a politically compelling narrative of predatory equity thus
became an important and powerful tactic to counter the dominant discourse of finance. The
media, politicians, academics and other opinion leaders ultimately took up the critical framing
and terminology of predatory equity that community organizations constructed. However it was
a struggle to legitimate this narrative, because community organizations are still largely viewed
as activists (a view that persists despite political and economic constraints on their activism).
This struggle yielded insights about the importance of influencing key opinion leaders who can
effectively sanction and circulate alternative narratives, underlining how contemporary
community practice calls for organizations to take up multiple roles (Elwood, 2006; Larner &
Craig, 2005; Majic, 2011).
The role of critical narratives in contesting financialization speaks to how rhetorical
framing strategies can work to challenge the “discursive naturalization” of market logic, and
chart alternatives (Hackworth, 2007, p. 200). Here the contemporary variety and accessibility of
media helped transcend some of the limits community groups face on (re)framing issues in the
dominant sphere. Predatory Equity: The Survival Guide was produced through Making Policy
Public, an initiative to engage designers in social debates and allow advocates to better reach
their constituents through design (Making Policy Public, 2013). Professional graphic production
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created a visual identity for the issue, allowing activists to playfully present critical debate about
predatory equity to tenants, the press, policymakers and other opinion leaders. This textual and
visual narrative made claims on tenants to mobilize and engage in activism, and on elected
officials and financial institutions to recognize and take action on the problem. I would argue it
was most successful in advancing a politicized public discourse of injustice (cf. Elwood, 2006;
D. Martin, 2003) that explicitly linked predatory equity to the dynamics of the real estate boom,
weakened underwriting standards and the role of securitization in allowing banks to shed risk.
Literally framing the issue of predatory as a matter of survival for tenants and affordable rental
housing more broadly, this discourse provided “crucial vocabularies and framing devices”
(Wolf-Powers 2009 163) that changed the public and political conversation about finance as
liberatory and constructive to one about finance as extractive and predatory.
Alternative knowledge production does not only operate through rhetorical tactics; datadriven tactics contribute facts to “the war of ideas”. As a practice of alternative knowledge
production, strategic positivism can be understood as both destructive of neoliberal practice and
imperatives (e.g. critical mapping, insurgent quantitative practices and radical statistics that hold
neoliberalism accountable and document its injustices), and creative of emancipatory alternatives
to neoliberalism (Wyly, 2011). This paper detailed three examples of the former approach. With
the Building Indicator Project and the overleveraged property database, community
organizations drew on public data and their own on-the-ground work to develop quantitative and
geographic knowledge about predatory equity that has informed organizing campaigns and
policy advocacy as well as further research. Although discussed under the rubric of reworking
spaces of finance, mining underwriting documents of CMBS also served as a mode of strategic
positivism. The juxtaposition of assumptions about rental income, operating expenses and tenant
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turnover with real-world metrics exposed how the financial logics underlying predatory equity
deals necessitated harassment and displacement (Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development, 2009b).
Community organizations are also using strategic positivism to develop alternative
approaches to land and housing that interrupt such real estate practices. For example Picture the
Homeless has enumerated vacant property and housing with expiring subsidies as a means of
substantiating claims for a community land trust (Picture the Homeless, 2012), demonstrating
how such inquiry provides a starting point “to make better urban worlds possible and real”
(Wyly, 2011, p. 908). Rather than being antithetical to insurgency, strategic positivism shows
how the acquisition of professional and technical skills and competencies can serve to destabilize
normalized relations of neoliberalism by producing and marshaling evidence to make injustice
visible and measurable. Strategic positivism supports rhetorical framings of social justice issues,
and can independently mobilize action to achieve justice (Wyly et al., 2010).
Tracing liquidity and reestablishing fixity
However in the case of the financialization of housing, achieving justice calls for new
spatial strategies. This is because in transcending property’s spatial fixity, financialization
produces a territory of housing finance that, like urban space, can be unevenly developed
(Gotham, 2009, drawing on Lefebvre, 2003). For example, in the run up to the financial crisis
mortgage-backed securities built up this territory; in its wake that space can be selectively
reconstructed through the commodification of distressed assets. Although financialization affords
the transcendence of spatial fixity, the case of predatory equity illustrates how financial actors
are able to make use of both fixity and liquidity to meet objectives for yield. That is, a strategy
that may have begun with the idea of upgrading and deregulating properties to capitalize on
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rental demand can become the basis for a market in distressed debt when that strategy fails. This
insight affirms Allen’s (2011) assertion that space and spatiality make a difference in the ways
power can be brought to bear (p. 291). It shows that in contesting financialization, community
organizations and activists must develop powers of reach for both the territory of finance and
material urban space.
In this study, I found that community organizations did this by reasserting fixity and
tracing liquidity. As a spatial tactic, reasserting fixity enters spaces and structures of finance and
brings them into relation with the material conditions of property and experiences of tenants.
Thus mining underwriting documents and juxtaposing financial logics with actual income,
expenses and tenant turnover draws our attention back to the fact of property as bricks and
mortar. In the case of the Ocelot portfolio, community groups leveraged these material
conditions to draw tenants’ experiences of property decline into the territory of finance. Tenants
and community organizations reasserted the physicality of property and its ontological status as
home in response to Fannie Mae’s attempt to sell distressed mortgage debt in an online
bankruptcy forum. This relates to the tactic of tracing liquidity, which moves social and political
action into the territory of finance. Thus Movement for Justice turned global capital flows into
circuits of solidarity, reaching social movement actors in the UK in order to lift out their activism
from East Harlem and re-embed it on Dawnay Day’s own turf. Tracing liquidity uses the spatial
form of capital flows to develop and maintain new political alliances.
However, operating materially within the arena of finance requires organizations to
contend with the scale and pace of investment. For example, UHAB has been working to
develop an interim facility that would negotiate, buy and hold batches of distressed mortgage
debt in order to lower transaction costs, complete foreclosure and transfer to preservation buyers

	
  

CONTESTING THE FINANCIALIZATION OF URBAN SPACE
172
more efficiently (Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, 2012). Here, economies of scale are
being leveraged to maneuver the asymmetries community organizations currently face in
capacity, capital, and ability to move quickly on their feet. Such efforts raise questions about
whether deploying financial techniques ensures continued domination by financial imperatives,
and how this approach can be made transparent, democratic and participatory for those directly
affected by predatory equity.
Financialization poses new challenges, both technical and strategic, for community
organizations engaged in affordable housing work. Focusing on new financial practices in the
rental housing market, this paper has contributed detailed empirical knowledge both about these
challenges and tactics to contest financialization, addressing a gap in the emerging literature on
geographies of financialization. The tactics included critical narrative construction and strategic
positivism, together forming a strategy of alternative knowledge production that denaturalizes
and challenges financial hegemony. Theoretically, I draw on a view of financialized mortgage
markets as a socially-produced space and a topological approach to understanding the geography
of contemporary power relationships. Here another approach to community practice reworked
spaces of finance, making their presence felt with a spatial strategy that reasserted fixity and
traced liquidity. Motivated to understand the political possibilities of contemporary community
practice, this research offers a positive reading of the potential to contest the uneven nature of
processes associated with financialization.
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Conclusions
In this brief concluding piece section I will consider the main contributions of this research, and
provide further interpretation on these themes. Through study of the entrance of new financial
actors into New York’s affordable rental market, this work provides insight on how
financialization transforms questions of value in urban space; how this transformation relates to a
long trajectory of activism, organizing and nonprofit development; and the role of the state in
shaping the conditions for and adapting to financialization. A key contribution of this research is
its deeply-grounded approach to the study of financialization of housing. Sociological and
geographic literature in this area has often remained at the level of theories, concepts and
descriptive statistics. In this project I drew on geographic data that community-based
organizations assembled in their efforts to track the entrance of new financial actors to New
York City’s affordable rental market, and also collected primary qualitative data through focus
groups with tenants affected by these investments and in-depth interviews with affordable
housing advocates. This approach helps advance understandings of the significance of
financialization for urban life.
Disambiguating and distinguishing financialization
The long time frame of this study affords a unique perspective from which to address
questions about the distinctiveness of financialization as it relates to past forms of real estate
(dis)investment and the organization of the economy. Briefly, a word on the question of
terminology regarding “the real economy” and “the financial economy”: I would argue there is a
need to distinguish between economic growth based primarily on producing goods and services,
and economic growth based on buying and selling in capital markets. As Krippner (2005) has
shown, since the 1970s the U.S. economy has shifted toward a pattern of accumulation wherein
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profits are generated more from financial than non-financial sources. This is important as it
relates to questions about the ability of the state to regulate and control increasingly globalized
capital markets that drive economic growth; and perhaps especially for state and municipal
governments contending with the localized social and spatial consequences of a financialized
economy (Fields & Uffer, under review).
Thus the distinction between the real and financial economies is not a natural one; instead
it is necessitated by the spectacular rise of finance over the past 35 years and the divergence
between the functioning of the real and financial economies. Nor should financialization be
understood as a functional separation. Indeed financialization depends in large part on the ability
to monetize illiquid assets in the real economy, such as real estate and infrastructure (Ashton,
Doussard, & Weber, 2012; Gotham, 2009; Weber, 2002) as the basis for financial engineering,
e.g. the creation of securities and derivatives to extract value, which I will consider in some
detail shortly.
However financialization is due not only to the expansion of banks and financial
companies but also to the increased activity of non-financial firms (such as producers of goods
and services) in financial markets (Krippner, 2005). This points out how the distinction between
financial and nonfinancial actors is not entirely satisfactory, precisely because it doesn’t capture
how financialization enrolls actors and subjects who might otherwise be less enmeshed in capital
markets. A major concern here is how finance comes to influence non-financial sectors of the
economy, for example by normalizing short-termist management behavior (Evans & Habbard,
2008). This issue is particularly relevant to the context of private equity investment in New
York’s affordable rental sector: to compete and maximize value in changing market conditions,
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more traditional landlords may adopt the leveraging and management standards of private equity
real estate firms, contributing to sectoral financial instability and physical distress.
A broader set of questions about the socio-cultural impacts of financialization in
cultivating “everyday investor identities” and compelling non-experts to accept financial risk
into their homes (Langley, 2007; Martin, 2002) also ties in to how financialization is transmitted
to non-financial actors. In this dissertation I did not directly explore these aspects of
financialization, however this could be a fruitful area for further research. For example, one
could investigate differences in financing and management by traditional landlords and financial
(e.g. private equity firms, hedge funds) landlords, perhaps comparing markets that have had
different levels of real estate investment by financial actors. Such an analysis might pick up on
the diffusion of financial techniques of risk management and capital accumulation into the local
real estate market.
Another nuance lost in a rigid distinction between financial and nonfinancial actors is
how the latter aid and abet financialization. Many longtime property owners, some responsible
landlords and others known for poor maintenance and management, took the opportunity to cash
out at the height of the market. In an example of the latter type, Jacob Selechnik’s sale of 51
buildings along the Grand Concourse corridor of the Bronx to a private equity partnership for
$300M in 2007 facilitated valuable economies of scale for investors, while leaving a problematic
landlord “flush with cash” headed into the market collapse (Haughney, 2009). “Nonfinancial”
actors and practices also become strategic for finance through potential to formalize previously
informal landlording practices. Along the 7-train corridor in Queens, previous owners
intentionally neglected management of leases and failed to properly register tenants with the
state department of Housing and Community Renewal in “a silent agreement” with an influx of
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poor, undocumented immigrants. This informality later turned into an opportunity for private
equity owners to promote vacancies (and rent increases), framing this strategy in terms of
cleaning up the neighborhood, saving it from “illegal” subletters and instilling order by “getting
everyone on the books”. These examples illustrate the slippage between the financial and the
nonfinancial.
Now I turn to the quantitative and qualitative distinctions between financialization in the
private rental market versus how this market has traditionally functioned in the U.S. generally
and New York in particular. First, the quantitative distinction: New York’s affordable rental
market has been described as a “financial backwater” because of its relatively low, stable
returns—7-8% annually, which owners take as income rather than capital gains (Association for
Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009, p. 7). Rent stabilization laws, which limit
annual rent increases to a percentage set by the Rent Guidelines Board, mean that profits are
moderate but predictable. A major factor in profit rates in the rent-regulated sector is the
stipulation that tenants have a right to renew their leases: because of high demand for rentstabilized units and a chronic shortage of affordable rental units, tenant turnover in rentstabilized units is low, ranging from 5-10% a year (Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development, 2009; Rent Guidelines Board, 2009). This makes for a generally stable, long-term
ownership model.
By comparison, the time horizon of private equity funds is generally no more than 10-12
years. Moreover, the capital market imperative to maximize shareholder value translates to
expectations for double-digit asset growth (opportunistic private equity funds can seek returns in
excess of 20% a year), which are frequently incompatible with conditions of single-digit growth
in real product markets (Froud et al., 2000, cited in French, Leyshon, & Wainwright, 2011). In a
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sample of nine major predatory equity investment portfolios containing about 10,000 apartments
there was a $605/month discrepancy per unit between projected and actual income; investors
aimed to make up what would be an annual shortfall of $71 million with lower maintenance
costs and increased rental income. The latter depended on promoting tenant attrition (some
aiming for as much as 30% turnover in the first year) in order to secure vacancy bonuses (up to
20% increase in rent) and major capital improvements increases, and to eventually move units
out of regulation.
Thus one way to interpret the difference financialization makes in rental housing
provision is in terms of time and speed —higher returns are expected over a shorter period of
time, through more rapid tenant turnover. Although not as severe or widespread as the urban
crisis of the 1970s, this difference also had significant and troubling implications for tenants’
housing quality and security. I return to some of these concerns about use value as I address the
more expansive question of some qualitative distinctions we can associate with the
financialization of rental housing.
I’ll highlight two critical aspects that qualitatively differentiate financialization of rental
housing from a more traditional private market approach to rental housing provision, focusing on
the production of financial space and the related issue of scale. The production of financial space
is a fundamental point of distinction, and relates to how financialization makes it possible to
monetize real estate in ways that transcend its spatial fixity. Gotham (2009, drawing on
Lefebvre) argues that this aspect of financialization produces a territory of housing finance that,
like urban space, can be unevenly developed. Thus in the run up to the financial crisis mortgagebacked securities built up this territory; in its wake that space can be selectively reconstructed
through the commodification of distressed financial assets. In this formulation, yield can be
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achieved independently of the condition and location of the “real” commodity—property itself-through financial engineering techniques of capital leveraging, interest rate derivatives and
swaps, and so on. This has twofold implications for value—financialization multiplies the
possibilities for realizing exchange value, because even distressed financial products can offer
yield; however this possibility can be quite detached from use value, which I’ll address further in
a discussion of scale.
Here the issue of scale is relevant in a couple of ways. An important aspect of predatory
equity is how the original investments assembled economies of scale that didn’t previously exist
because of the general character of the rental market. In the U.S. individual owners and small
investors make for a highly differentiated multifamily rental market in small and medium-sized
buildings (5-49 units) (Savage, 1998), and less cost-efficient financing and securitization.
Financial institutions also lack information about individual and small investors, tending to see
them as less financially sophisticated and therefore a greater credit risk than corporate owners,
who mainly own large properties (more than 50 units) (Donovan, 2002). This made private
equity funds well positioned to access the smaller multifamily market: they could bring in equity
stakes for large package deals of multiple buildings, giving financial actors an advantage over
smaller owners that helped them to quickly penetrate the market.
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income, but nonetheless makes for “an attractive risk diversifier” in global investment portfolios
(DePonte, 2012, p. 14). This countercyclical market is akin to the process of creative destruction,
but in financial space. Here questions of value are a central site of contention: small discounts on
initially overleveraged debt offer exchange value for both the owners and the buyers of the debt
while keeping the door open to further transactions, whereas for residents use value becomes
increasingly imperiled as investment strategies diverge from the location and condition of the
property itself. That is, an approach that depends on the difference between interest rates and
total equity invested provides little incentive for attending to the property’s physical and social
environment (Uffer, 2012).
Housing advocates fear this approach in fact will come to represent an extended period of
“milking the building” as debt leverage continues to outpace income, resulting in prolonged
physical deterioration and increasing the need for major rehabilitation work. This was certainly
true for the tenants participating in this research in 2011, who had been living in increasingly
deteriorated conditions since 2009—while all the properties are in various stages of transfer to
new owners with commitments to affordable housing, the lengthy process of transferring
ownership and completing renovations will require a year or more of work.
These dynamics also foreclose the possibilities for shaping alternative relationships to land
and housing that the devalorization of urban space made possible in the 1970s; as a recent
commentary on the legacy from that era argues, “looking around the city today, saturated with
money and starkly divided by wealth, the very bleakness of the ’70s seems a refuge, a time of
possibility” (Phillips-Fein, 2013). When the state’s ability to mobilize urban space as an
economically productive force is constrained (Brenner, 2000) as it was amidst the disinvestment
of the 1970s, alternative forms of spatial practice may emerge (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]), such as
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community ownership, low-income cooperatives, sweat equity, squatting and other forms of
urban homesteading and mutual housing. Today, nonprofit and activist approaches to property
disposition that seek to reclaim the use value of urban space are largely out of reach against the
scale of capital—hundreds of millions of dollars for a single portfolio—involved in purchasing
distressed debt, foreclosing on it and financing the extensive physical rehabilitation necessary in
many overleveraged properties. Furthermore as the market recovers, opportunities for distressed
debt in the New York City market may be diminishing, indicating potential for investors to
return to a strategy of increasing rents and deregulating units, which also clashes with the use
value of rent-regulated housing for low-income renters. Later on I will discuss the role of the
state further, but first I want to touch on another aspect of scale and financialization.
The ability to adapt to changing market conditions in this way points to the globalized
nature of real estate investment portfolios. We have moved from smaller individual and local
owners for whom a few thousand apartments in New York City might constitute the better part
of an empire, to private equity firms (in the case of this research) for whom a few thousand
apartments in New York City might constitute only a portion of global holdings including
portfolios in many other markets, purchased on behalf of pension funds, university endowments,
and extremely wealthy individuals and families. Considering data from a national census of
multifamily property owners taken in 1995 (Savage, 1998), representing almost 500,000
medium-sized (5-49 units) and over 50,000 large (50+ units) properties (and more than two
million 2-4 unit properties) provides some perspective on how financialization changes the
dynamics of the rental market:
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• 75% of medium-size buildings and 30% of large buildings were owned by individuals or
husband/wife teams;
• Real estate investment trusts, real estate corporations or other corporations owned a small
minority (8%) of medium-size buildings, while 20% of large buildings had a corporate
ownership structure;
• More than a quarter of owners cite long-term capital gains, retirement security and for a
small group use as residence, as their reason for continued ownership; around 40% cite
rental income as the primary reason;
• In both medium and large buildings, a large majority of owners (60% and 85%
respectively) owned more than one property however no data was provided on the scale
of multiple property ownership.
Among owners of medium and large multifamily buildings, 67% and 80% respectively were
trying to minimize tenant turnover. Many upgraded or renovated their property or provided
increased maintenance or services to maintain a stable population, retain desirable tenants and
minimize turnover costs. While about 20% of owners planned to change the tenant population,
only 1% of owners were actively trying to increase tenant turnover (All data in this section
provided in United States Census, 2011). While no follow-up information is available to
compare this survey with the picture today, these data are suggestive of difference between
traditional and financialized approaches to multifamily property ownership. In the 1990s
(especially in medium-size buildings), multifamily property owners were unlikely to be pursuing
ownership as a means of diversifying risk in their global investment portfolio. Instead most were
individual investors, seeking exchange value from the property itself through extracting rental
income, as a nest egg for retirement or for long-term capital gains.
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By contrast, New York-based Vantage Properties, started by a former investment banker,
spent a billion dollars buying up 10,000 rent-regulated apartments in upper Manhattan and
Queens from 2006 to 2008, and has since expanded to New Jersey and single-family foreclosed
properties in Florida (Jones, 2012; Morgenson, 2008). Although New York’s status as a center of
global finance capital means that many private equity real estate investors involved in predatory
equity are based in and around the metropolitan area, these firms also actively participate in
markets in other states and countries. For example, Blackstone was involved in both the
Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village deal and the purchase of an entire municipal housing
company in Berlin (cf. Uffer, 2012 for more on private equity real estate investment in rental
housing in Berlin). Furthermore firms based in other states and countries have also participated
in the New York rent-regulated market, as in the case of Dawnay Day mentioned earlier, and the
Ocelot portfolio in the Bronx, purchased with financing from Israel by a Los Angeles-based firm.
Financialization thus represents an important qualitative distinction from traditional
approaches to rental property ownership and management. First is the ability to transcend the
fixity of real estate and extract exchange value from property through short-termist capital
market machinations (Ashton, 2009; Ashton et al., 2012; Gotham, 2009; Newman, 2009) rather
than being limited to value extracted as rental income or long-term capital-gains. Second is the
rescaling of rental property ownership such that package deals that seem sizable in the local
context may constitute only a segment of an even larger, globally interconnected investment
portfolio by corporate financial actors. These factors signal an important shift in value with
critical implications for urban space and the social relations of rent; all of this is tied up in the
role of the state, which first promoted financialization and is now contending with its effects.
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The state and financialization
The federal policy changes that promoted today’s dominance of finance resulted from the state’s
desire to avoid taking responsibility for social conflicts over the distribution of increasingly
scarce resources once U.S. economic hegemony began to wane in the late 1960s and early 1970s
(Krippner, 2011). While it was hoped that deregulation of finance seen in the 1970s and 1980s
would unleash market discipline on the problem of allocating scarce credit, instead deregulation
and a series of related policy shifts loosened discipline, expanding the overall supply of available
credit capital. This led to increased finance sector profits and the diversion of capital from
productive to financial investment in the post-1970s period (Krippner, 2011). Deregulation rolled
back consumer protections while promoting interstate banking, large-scale consolidation of the
banking industry, and the breakdown of longstanding barriers between banking, insurance
companies and securities companies. Further policy changes in the 1980s and 1990s cultivated
the secondary mortgage market; developed and expanded the commercial mortgage-backed
security market; and encouraged the growth of REITs (Gotham, 2009). Increased global financial
integration resulted from the parallel process by which “vanguard” neoliberal regimes including
the U.S. and UK (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009) unilaterally relaxed regulations on capital,
and technological advances (especially in telecommunications) multilaterally dismantled state
control of capital mobility (Herring & Litan, 1995; Linneman, 2004). While credit expansion
deferred some of the distributional tensions seen in the 1960s and 1970s (Krippner, 2011) the
postwar urban crisis was left substantively unresolved, as the class and race contours of the
foreclosure crisis have made all too clear (Newman, 2012; Schafran, 2012).
The globalization of capital markets created an international competition among
governments to maintain social welfare and support domestic business while also attracting
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foreign investment. In many respects the state has negotiated this conflict by privileging business
interests at the expense of social welfare, and redefining social problems in terms of marketbased solutions (Harvey, 1989; Newman & Lake, 2006). Therefore governments have withdrawn
themselves from affordable rental housing provision, transferring public loans to private loans;
demolishing or privatizing public housing; reducing supply-side subsidies in favor of housing
allowances; promoting home ownership; and deregulating rents (see, for example, Aalbers &
Holm, 2008; Crump, 2002; Turner & Whitehead, 2002; Wyly, Newman, Schafran, & Lee, 2010).
Starting in the 1970s U.S. federal policy imposed sharp funding reductions and a moratorium on
new construction in the public housing sector, and more recently, demolition under the HOPE VI
program. Today the nation’s affordable housing is much more marketized at the point of
production, with the Treasury’s Low Income Housing Tax Credit program offering indirect
subsidies for construction costs. The same is true at the point of consumption, with households
receiving Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers for use in the private rental market (Schwartz,
2010).
The decline of federal aid for social welfare combined with the increased mobility of
capital has posed particular challenges for cities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2007;
Peck & Tickell, 2002), pushing localities to find new ways to attract and retain the surplus
capital generated through financialization. Often they have done so by commencing their own
strategies of privatization and deregulation. Weber (2002) argues that discourses of
obsolescence, in which property fails to measure up to its maximum economic potential and
leads to an objective loss of exchange value, underpin such urban entrepreneurialism. This is a
shift from the discourses of blight, or loss of use value, that rationalized midcentury urban
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renewal, which then set the stage for subsequent cycles of “financing, constructing, destroying
and reconstructing the built environment” (Weber, 2002, p. 533).
New York’s experience with property abandonment corresponds to the process Weber
describes, whereby significant devaluation prompted the local state to initiate an accelerated
taking (Local Law #45 of 1976) of particular properties serving as a “holding tank for devalued
properties” with the aim of “speeding the turnover of capital in the built environment” (Weber,
2002, p. 535-536). In New York’s experience, social, political and fiscal pressures led the city to
offer significant concessions to nonprofit housing developers and to hold abandoned, taxdelinquent properties for longer periods of time. In 1995, a study the Giuliani administration
commissioned found the cost of this extended period of public ownership to the city was
estimated at $2.2 million per property over an average of 19 years, for a total cost of $10.6
billion as of 1994, $1.3 billion of it in lost revenues (Andersen, 1995). This made the case for
public ownership as unproductive, offering a marketized, thus politically neutral rationale for the
city to step aside from the direct role it had been playing in affordable housing provision and
rehabilitation since the abandonment crisis.
Having established government ownership as inefficient and slow to adapt to changing
market conditions, thus a potential obstacle to private investment (Allred, 2000; Andersen, 1995)
legitimated Giuliani’s speedy privatization of city-owned property. While many advocates
believed the city would keep some properties as a permanent resource for affordable housing,
city-owned housing declined from 58,000 units when Giuliani was elected in 1993 to 13,000
units when he left office in 2001. What had been obsolete for the city represented profitable
rehabilitation and redevelopment opportunities for developers in the for-profit private rental
market. As the city’s real estate market heated up and pushed up rents in the 1990s, landlords
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were lobbying a market-friendly state government to end rent-regulation entirely. In 1993 they
had some success, with vacancy decontrol allowing owners to raise rents to market level upon
vacancy in units renting for more than $2000 a month. In 1997, vacancy bonuses were added,
giving landlords the right to raise rents in vacant units by at least 20%, albeit not ending the
system of rent regulation altogether, as some Republicans had aimed to do. Without an inflation
adjustment, vacancy decontrol promotes rapid deregulation “whenever strong demand pushes
rents high enough” (Wyly et al., 2010, p. 2609). Of the nearly 200,000 units that were
deregulated between 1993 and 2008, luxury decontrol was the leading source (Citizens Budget
Commission, 2010).
Neither privatization of city-owned property nor the partial dismantling of rent regulation
directly set financialization in motion. Yet both promoted new, more economically productive
uses of publicly owned and state-regulated housing as land prices were starting to escalate and
population was increasing in the 1990s. Coinciding with the rise of the financial economy,
privatization of in rem housing and the weakening of rent regulations provided crucial assistance
to the financialization of rental housing: the release of market-protected housing stock would
offer new spaces for surplus finance capital to expand into.
While “law and order” Giuliani worked to make the city more businesslike, billionaire
mayor Michael Bloomberg is business; more specifically Bloomberg represents the new
economy, led by media, information and finance (Brash, 2011). Drawing on corporate strategy,
the Bloomberg administration has focused on property-led urban redevelopment to shape a
postindustrial luxury city favorable to favor developers, Wall Street, transnational class interests,
high-value businesses and tourists (Brash, 2011; Harvey, 2012). This approach relies on
transforming the city’s physical form, albeit through old-fashioned top-down planning tools of
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rezoning and eminent domain (Hum, 2010; Lander & Wolf-Powers, 2004), to attract and retain
these interests, generating concern about who (and which neighborhoods) shares in the benefits
of the city’s changing landscape (Lander & Wolf-Powers, 2004).1
Indeed the combination of strong housing demand and rezoning locally with low interest
rates and expanded credit access globally led to a surge of new residential development in New
York from 2000 to 2008 (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010). The building
boom was concentrated in “traditionally robust” areas such as Manhattan’s Chelsea, Upper East
Side and Midtown; areas rezoned from industrial to residential use, e.g. Williamsburg and
Greenpoint in north Brooklyn; and new residential centers such as lower Manhattan, upper
Manhattan and the west Bronx (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 2010). A flood
of high-risk mortgage capital in the homeownership market also escalated property values and
turnover in the city’s low- and moderate-income minority communities, most notably in
Bedford-Stuyvesant and southeast Queens (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy,
2009; Ludwig, 2007). By 2005, the city’s low-cost rental market was “pressured and surrounded
by overheated, highly-leveraged ownership” (Wyly et al., 2010, p. 2611), pointing to the rentregulated sector, with its weakened protections, as a frontier for capital in search of new
investment opportunities.
The entrance of new financial actors (private equity firms) to the city’s affordable rental
market thus sits in a long and complex history, once comprised of federal policy changes and
their unintended consequences (Krippner, 2011), as well as the rise of entrepreneurial local
governance and its imperative to combat obsolescence of the built environment (Weber, 2002).
Having promoted financialization and made the urban environment receptive to finance capital,

1

While Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan has largely met its ambitious goal of creating or preserving
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today the state (at all levels) is faced with the problematic social and spatial consequences of
financialization. Weber’s focus on obsolescence helps illuminate some of the thorniness of
contending with these negative externalities. That is, while predatory equity has led to property
blight and the destruction of use value for residents, it has not translated to obsolescence: the
properties, or rather the debt attached to them, have remained economically productive in the
circuit of finance capital. I would further argue, now that the state has handed off (through
various forms of privatization and deregulation) difficult matters of social welfare to a
discursively objective market, it is in a weak position to intervene—indeed a common refrain in
conversations about what the city could do to address predatory equity was “you can’t intervene
in a private transaction”. Instead, the city has focused most of its response at the level of
property, e.g. heightened code enforcement. This is an interesting inversion of its initial response
to property abandonment, which applied a fiscally oriented tactic (auctions meant to return
properties to tax rolls) to a problem that demanded (among other things) a focus on the
restoration and stewardship of the built environment. Today, the city is relying on tactics that
intervene at the level of use value, but the situation calls for policy approaches that can also
intervene on financial terrain where exchange value is created (and destroyed, and then
recreated…).
As a key strategic site of global finance and business services, New York may actually be
in a unique position to develop regulations (Sassen, 1999) that begin to address the problems of
accountability that have emerged in today’s financialized economy. Of course, the complex and
proprietary nature of relevant information, rapid financial innovation and capital mobility, and
the ability for financial actors to quickly respond to changing market and regulatory conditions
complicate the re-regulation of finance (Boyer, 2013). Nevertheless, “controlling finance is not a
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simple technocratic exercise but an expression of the ability of the state and civil society to
discipline a powerful interest group that has been delegated to manage a crucial public good”
(Boyer, 2013, p. 35); thus re-regulating finance is a contentious and collective political process.
In addition to the state, there is a key role for social movements in this process.
An urban spatial politics of financialization
To end, I reflect briefly on how this research speaks to an urban spatial politics of
financialization. Capitalism has long relied on urban space as a key site for the absorption of
surplus capital (and urbanization depends on surplus capital), however the turn to financialized
capitalism has particular implications for urban space (Harvey, 2012). For one thing, the
expansion of capital associated with “the rise of financial markets for their own good” (Aalbers,
2008, p. 149) intensifies the need for surplus capital absorption in the urban environment, while
the global integration of finance markets affords the rescaling of this process (Harvey, 2012).
Thus financial actors have the leeway to make massive interventions in the property markets of
individual cities, as with the large package deals associated with predatory equity purchases in
New York. Such interventions depend on pockets of “undervalued assets” that may be exploited
for financial yield. Here the partial dismantling of rent regulation laws intersects with the city’s
property-led redevelopment, which attracted capital that heated up many segments of the real
estate market, while weakened rent protections provided an opening to create new financial
value. Here the historical geography of New York’s multifamily rental housing, largely
concentrated in working class parts of Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn, also contributed to
the economies of scale assembled in predatory equity purchases. However, urban space beyond
rental housing in New York is replete with such openings that finance may penetrate, both in the
form of “long turnover” areas created through earlier rounds of uneven development, and the
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newer swaths of devalued land and property associated with dispossession perpetrated in the
foreclosure crisis. The global rescaling of property ownership means that financial landlords’
decisions are based not only on the conditions of the local real estate market, but global capital
market conditions, and relationships among different local markets. Finally, financialization
alters the temporal rhythms of real estate (Gotham, 2009), as short-term, high-yield capital
market strategies speed turnover of properties and tenants.
In this research I have highlighted how the financialization of housing exacerbates tensions
between the city as a site of capitalist production and the imperative of social reproduction for
city residents. Indeed predatory equity points to the arena of social reproduction as a
fundamental site for contemporary urban struggles (Hart, 2006; Harvey, 2012). Yet the dynamics
of financialization described above—large-scale interventions in local property markets, the
globalization of property portfolios and the rapid turnover of ownership—entail a significant
transformation in the social relations of rent. A “selective replacement and de-localization” of
key actors in the landlord-tenant relation has taken place: rather than the inner city slum
landlords of the 1970s private equity funds and their stakeholders, global banking and financial
services companies, and issuers of mortgage-backed securities are the key actors in classmonopoly rent (Wyly, Moos, Hammel, & Kabahizi, 2009, p. 338). New financial landlords can
own more property in more places and can quickly change investment tactics based on global
market conditions, without much regard for how changing tactics may reverberate on the ground
in potentially distant local contexts.
Even in a city like New York, with its long history of tenant and community activism, this
transformation in the social relations of rent complicates efforts to exert social and political
pressures on landlords and restore the ontological status of home. It raises questions about how
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to bring landlords to accountability when they are removed from the local context, layers of
actors and intermediaries complicate the question of ownership, and investment strategies are
short term and their success not necessarily linked to maintaining property conditions. A politics
of financialization depends on a topological understanding of power, in which power is
spatialized not at fixed scales of distance and location, but in terms of “reach” (Allen, 2011).
Powers of reach change what can be demanded politically, allowing different actors to make
their presence felt by drawing distant others close, or placing themselves beyond reach (Allen,
2011). This research has started outlining spatial tactics of contesting finance that make novel
use of the dynamics of fixity and liquidity: entering the spaces and structures of finance and
bringing them into relation with the material conditions of property, and also moving social and
political action into the territory of finance. The ability for financial actors to operate in both
spaces of capital and in urban space requires strategies of contestation that are capable of
reaching financial territory. Despite the immediacy of financialization’s impact on housing and
home, an urban politics of finance cannot be limited to physical space. In this view, contesting
financialization doesn’t entail turning away from finance, but a creative, strategic and active
engagement to draw it near.
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